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July 11, 1985

Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 2
Docket Number 50-370
Standby Shutdown System Component Inoperable for Seven Days

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to McGuire Nuclear Station's proposed Technical Specification 3.7.14, attached is a report which describes a failure of a Standby Shutdown System (SSS) Makeup Pump to meet Surveillance Requirements that occurred at McGuire Nuclear Station in June, 1985. Duke Power has administratively implemented this proposed specification at McGuire and considers it applicable until an NRC approved version is issued.

The event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker/JBD

Hal B. Tucker

JBD/mjf

Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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On June 4, 1985, at 1200, the Unit 2 Standby Shutdown System (SSS) makeup pump was declared inoperable due to failure of the pump to meet the surveillance requirement flowrate of 26 gpm. The pump was not repaired and declared operable until June 11, 1985, at 1730. Under proposed Technical Specification 3.7.14a, if the system is inoperable for more than seven days, it is reportable. Duke Power has administratively implemented this proposed Specification at McGuire and considers it applicable until an NRC approved version is issued.

On June 4, 1985, the standby makeup pump was tested per the procedure "Standby Makeup Pump Flow Periodic Test". The pump delivered approximately 14.6 gpm. This was well below 26 gpm as required by the procedure and proposed T. S. 4.7.14.3c. So at 1200 of the same day, the pump was declared inoperable. A Work Request was written and scheduled as a T. S. item to be completed by 1200 on June 11, 1985.

Nothing could be found wrong external to the pump. Since the standby makeup pump had never been disassembled, the pump manufacturer was consulted on Friday June 7. An emergency requisition was then written to secure the necessary parts to repair the pump.

The parts arrived on Saturday, June 8. Repair work was delayed until Monday, June 10 until approximately 1300 when Quality Assurance had completed their acceptance of the parts and finished the required paperwork.

The pump was partially disassembled and the problem was found to be a discharge valve, which was found lying in the pump cavity. Repairs were completed on the morning of June 11. It was decided not to perform the procedure "Standby Makeup Pump Flow Periodic Test" in conjunction with the functional verification to avoid possible interference by maintenance activities.

The functional verification was completed at approximately 1500. The pump was successfully tested according to the test procedure at 27.7 gpm and declared operable at 1730; seven days, five and one half hours after it was declared inoperable.

This incident will be reviewed by all groups involved to emphasize the importance of adhereing to proposed Technical Specification 3/4.7.14. In addition, a pump manufacturer representative will visit the plant to determine the exact model of pump at McGuire. Spare parts for the pump will then be ordered and placed on the stock program.

It will be re-emphasized to plant management personnel that the section that is assigned responsibility for a Technical Specification Surveillance Test is responsible for assuring that the test is successfully completed within the allowable time frame.

SAFETY ANALYSIS: The standby makeup pump is part of the standby shutdown system. This system provides an alternate means to achieve and maintain a hot standby condition under certain postulated conditions. The pump would supply makeup to the Reactor Coolant (NC) system and the NC pump seals. This pump

would only be used if the Chemical and Volume Control (NV) system was not available as a result of extensive damage. The NV system was available to continue its required makeup and NC pump seal supply capability at the time of this incident. No problems were encountered which would have required the use of this system during the incident. The health and safety of the public were unaffected by this incident.