



SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
**EDISON**

An EDISON INTERNATIONAL Company

R. W. Krieger  
Vice President  
Nuclear Generation

January 15, 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361 and 50-362  
30 Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 96-009  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 and 3

This submittal provides an abstract Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving a failure to perform surveillance testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators' non-critical trip bypasses in accordance with the Technical Specification surveillance requirements. A revised report will be submitted within fifteen (15) days. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel nor the public was affected by this occurrence.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 96-009

cc: L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV  
J. P. Dyer, Director of Reactor Safety, NRC Region IV  
K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)																		
Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2										Docket Number (2) 0   5   0   0   0   3   6   1			Page (3) 1   of   0   1					
Title (4) Surveillance Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Non-Critical Trip Bypasses																		
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)					
1	2	1	7	9	6	9	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	1		
OPERATING MODE (9) 6			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10) 0   0   0   0			<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)  <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)  <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)  <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)  <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v) </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)  <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x) </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)  <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)  <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below and in text) </div> </div>															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																		
Name R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation										TELEPHONE NUMBER 7   1   4   3   6   8   -   6   2   5   5								
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																		
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	////////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	////////							
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)											Expected Submission Date (15)		Month	Day	Year			
X Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)													0	1	3	1	9	7

The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) (EK) each have 16 protective trips; three "critical" and 13 "non-critical." The critical trips prevent immediate damage to the EDG. The non-critical trips monitor parameters that can not lead to immediate EDG damage, but are intended to preclude long term degradation. If a bypassed non-critical trip is received, an alarm alerts operators to take corrective action. The non-critical trips are bypassed by a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), but not a Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS).

On 12/16/96, an engineer (utility, non-licensed) reviewing a surveillance procedure noted the EDG non-critical trip bypass test was performed with only a SIAS present, instead of a LOVS concurrent with a SIAS as required by the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.13. On 12/17/96, Edison concluded this condition was reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). At that time, Unit 2 was in a refueling outage and Unit 3 was at about 99% power. The cause of the procedure error is under investigation. The investigation results and any additional associated corrective actions will be provided in a revised LER within fifteen (15) days.

Edison performed a circuit design review to confirm a LOVS does not affect the non-critical trip bypasses, and that omitting a LOVS during TS SR testing could not affect test results. Nevertheless, Edison successfully completed the TS SR 3.8.1.13 required testing (LOVS concurrent with SIAS) by December 21, 1996, using a temporary procedure change. Edison will revise the surveillance test procedure prior to the Unit 3 Cycle 9 refueling outage (next use of this procedure).

Based on the EDG design verification and satisfactory TS SR 3.8.1.13 testing, EDGs were fully capable of performing their intended safety function. Consequently, this condition had no safety significance.