



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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In reply please refer
to SPM 880-340

August 26, 1980

Attachment 2

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Acting EDO
FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary
SUBJECT: SECY-80-340 - SECTION 208 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES FOR JANUARY-MARCH 1980 (COMMISSIONER ACTION ITEM)

This is to advise you that the Commission (with all Commissioners concurring) has approved the proposed letters to Congress, and the proposed Twentieth Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences with the incorporation of the following revisions:

1. Incident #2 in the letters to Congress should read:
"2. There was one abnormal occurrence at the fuel cycle facilities (other than nuclear power plants). The incident involved a loss of confinement system which resulted in inhalation of plutonium by an employee." (MPA) (SECY Suspense: 9/12/80)
2. The Report to Congress should be modified as shown in the attached pages; (MPA) (SECY Suspense: 9/12/80)
3. In Appendix B, Item 79-2, the date when all modifications to correct deficiencies in the piping designs at Beaver Valley Unit 1, James A. Fitz Patrick, Maine Yankee, and Surry Units 1 & 2 were verified by NRC should be included. (MPA) (SECY Suspense: 9/12/80)
4. On page 3, first full paragraph, last line, the report states with regard to AO 80-1, "There are limitations on the ability of standard survey instruments to measure radiation fields of different quality which must be understood and users must have available the necessary response curves for instrument calibration, particularly for beta radiation." Staff should identify what NRC is doing to address the limitations in this area. Is the equipment inventory of licensees being monitored to make sure the proper types of equipment are available? Are checks being made to ensure that licensees are providing the necessary calibration curves for equipment and any instructions needed to alert users to the limitations of the equipment? The Commission requests that this information be included in the report unless it would result in a prolonged delay in submission. (MPA) (SECY Suspense: 9/12/80)

The Commission requests the following:

5. In addition to completing the engineering analysis of the SWCS failure at San Onofre 1, the staff should evaluate the significance of the off-site plant management action which resulted in terminating the plant shutdown, described on pages 25 & 26 of the report. Both the engineering analysis and the evaluation of off-site management action should be considered in determining whether this will be classified as an abnormal occurrence in a future report; (IE) (SECY Suspense: 9/19/80)

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