

NRC Form 366
(9-83)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Approved OMB No. 3150-0104
Expires: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name(1) Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	Docket Number(2) 10 15 10 10 10 1 31 01 91	Page(3) 11 of 012
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Title(4) Title (4) - ECCS Train Inadvertent Activation											
Event Date(5)			LER Number(6)			Report Date(7)			Other Facilities Involved(8)		
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)	
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This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
Operating Mode (9)		1		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
Power Level (10)		10 01 0		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in	
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		Abstract below	
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		and in Text, NRC	
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		Form 366A)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
NAME Richard S. McGrath, Nuclear Safety Engineer								Telephone Number Area Code 2 0 7 8 8 2 6 3 2 1			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
Cause	System	Com- ponent	Manufac- turer	Reportable to NPRDS	Cause	System	Com- ponent	Manufac- turer	Reportable to NPRDS		

Supplemental Report Expected (14)								Expected Submission Date(15)	Month	Day	Year
(If yes, complete Expected Submission Date)								X No			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While the plant was in Refueling Shutdown, electricians were working inside the main control board modifying Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) annunciator logic.

This modification involved work on circuitry that activates the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). To prevent activation, mechanical blocking devices were installed on two SIAS relays. An electrician bumped these relay blocking devices and partially activated one ECCS train.

No water transferred into the Reactor Coolant System. There were no adverse effects on the running Residual Heat Removal System.

After the ECCS activation additional blocking devices were installed on the SIAS relays.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company									
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On September 16, 1985, the plant was in Refueling Shutdown. Electricians were working inside the Main Control Board (CBD), modifying the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) "Loss of Control" annunciator. This involved work on circuitry associated with SIAS lockout relays (86) which activate the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS).

The precautions taken to prevent activation of these SIAS relays included installing blocking devices on the relay trip latches and removing power from the 125 volts DC circuit that energizes these relays. The blocking devices were intentionally fabricated long enough to prevent installation of the relay covers with the blocking devices in place, so they could not inadvertently be left in place when the relay covers were reinstalled.

At 1110, the "B" Train Safety Injection Actuation Signal was initiated as an electrician bumped two SIAS relay blocking devices, and partially dislodged them (the blocks installed in the 86 SIAS B1 and B2 relays) causing the SIAS activation.

All of the "B" train ECCS components, that were in service and are activated by the 86 SIAS B1 and 86 SIAS B2 relays, operated properly as the relays were activated. Five valves (V) (three Low Pressure Safety Injection Header Stop Valves and two High Pressure Safety Injection Header Stop Valves) opened to their ECCS position. The remaining "B" train ECCS valves were out of service for maintenance or are activated by relays that had their power removed when the SIAS signal was initiated. All of the "B" train Safety Injection Pump (P) Control Switches (HS) were in the "Pull to Lock" position during this event.

No water was transferred into the Reactor Coolant System (AB). There were no adverse effects on the running Residual Heat Removal System (BP).

This incident involved the inadvertent activation of an ECCS train even though controls to prevent it had been established and implemented. After the activation, additional blocking devices were installed to prevent relay activation by physical contact.



ATOMIC POWER COMPANY •

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October 16, 1985
MN-85-178

GDW-85-260

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Reference: License No. DPR-36 (Docket 50-309)

Subject: Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 85-011-00 - ECCS Train Inadvertent
Activation

Gentlemen:

Please find enclosed Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report #85-011-00. This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

G. D. Whittier, Manager
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

GDW:bjp

Enclosure: two pages

cc: Mr. Edward J. Butcher, Jr.
Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Mr. Cornelius F. Holden

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