ACRS-2312
PDR 101785

CERTIFIED

June 19, 1985

SUMMARY AND MINUTES OF THE
MAY 7, 1985 MEETING OF THE ACRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
WASHINGTON D.C.

Purpose:

The primary goal for the meeting was to review and evaluate the NRC Staff position and review practices with regard to sabotage protection at power and non-power nuclear reactor facilities. The Staff discussed the threat of sabotage, the potential consequences of sabotage at non-power reactors, and sabotage protection at power reactors with the Subcommittee, in addition to presenting the review practices and procedures used to evaluate licensees' security plans. The Staff also briefed the Subcommittee on the status of Generic Issue A-29, "Nuclear Power Plant Design for the Reduction of Vulnerability to Sabotage."

Notice of the meeting, published in the Federal Register on Tuesday, April 23, 1985 is reproduced and shown in Attachment A. The schedule for the meeting is Attachment B. Sign-in sheets of meeting attendees are contained in Attachment C. Attachment D contains a list of meeting handouts kept with the office copy of these minutes. Portions of the meeting were open to public attendance, however, those portions that dealt with confidential and secret safeguards information were closed to the public. This version of the "Summary and Minutes of the Meeting" covers only the open portions of the meeting and, hence, is NOT Classified. Three oral statements by members of the public were scheduled and made; there were no written comments submitted by members of the public to be read into the transcript of the meeting. Mr. John McKinley and Mr. John Schiffgens were the assigned ACRS staff members for the meeting.

Attendees:

ACRS
J.C. Mark, Subcommittee Chairman
J.C. Ebersole, Member
C. Michelson, Member

NRC Staff
R.F. Burnett, NMSS/D/SG
T.R. Allen, NMSS/SG
R.A. Erickson, NMSS/SG

ACRS
G.A. Reed, Member
C.P. Siess, Member
C.J. Wylie, Member
H.W. Lewis, Member
J.D. Schiffgens, Staff
J.C. McKinley, Staff

Others
P.C. Carr, Bechtel
G. Sherwood, DOE/NE
P.J. Davis, DOE
D. Knuth, KMC
D. Hirsch, UCSC
B. Ramberg, UCLA
S. Murphy, UCSC
D. Horner, NCI
S. Seth, MITRE
F. Leventhal, NCI
B. Gellerman, NPT

NRC Staff
W.B. Brown, NMSS/SG
D.M. Carlson, NMSS/SG
R.J. Dube, NMSS/SG
C.E. Gaskin, NMSS/SG
G.W. McCorkle, NMSS/SG
C.J. Withee, NMSS/SG
P. Baker, Jr., NMSS/SG
R. Rosano, IE
L.L. Bush, Jr., IE
E.W. McPeek, DL
C.O. Thomas, NRR/SSPB
H.N. Berkow, NRR/SSPB
R.E. Carter, NRR/SSPB
P. Ting, RES
J.S. Wermiel, NRR/ASB
O.D. Parr, NRR/ASB
L. Rubenstein, NRR/D/CPS
R.W. Hernan, NRR/PPAS
W.B. Andrews, Consult. (PNL)
J.N. O'Brien, Consult. (BNL)

Meeting Highlights, Agreements, and Requests:

Opening Statements - C. Mark

Mr. Mark discussed briefly the meeting schedule and objectives. He mentioned that Mr. Reed had called to his attention an April 24, 1985 report from Region IV concerning an erroneous emergency evacuation command at Wolf Creek which had the effect of unlocking doors in protected and vital areas. Mr. Siess added that there were actually two errors because somebody else confirmed the command.

Introduction - R. Burnett

Mr. Burnett discussed the schedule briefly before addressing the incident at Wolf Creek brought up by Mr. Mark. He began by reviewing the history of Commission interest in the safety-safeguards interface (i.e., those areas where security precautions could inhibit adequate safety response). A Commission study group found that some plants did a very good job of considering security precautions and how they would affect ingress or egress during a safety event, while others did nothing. The outcome of the study was a) a proposed rule (for which the public comment period has just closed) which would require

licensees to evaluate security precautions from a safety perspective, and b) an information notice suggesting that licensees begin such an evaluation immediately (i.e., before the rule is promulgated).

Licensees have been advised that all electrically-controlled doors should have manual overrides (e.g., keys, which should never leave the site) as required by the rules. Mr. Mark asked how quickly access to vital areas must be made available. Mr. Burnett said that the Staff allows each licensee to determine this for his plant. Some licensees prefer to issue keys to the operators, some prefer to have keys spaced throughout the facility, and some give the keys to the guard force. Entry by key, without notifying the access computer, should cause an alarm to sound. Mr. Michelson asked if there could be a common master key. Mr. Burnett replied that the security force almost always has master keys that can override the subsystems, and the total system.

For facilities that have electrical controls, the Staff has allowed a central position like the control center to have the capability for personnel to press certain combinations of keys on the computer access panel that will open either individual vital area doors or, in the event of an emergency, all doors. Licensees have the authority to do this according to the current rules. The Staff has evaluated this practice from both safety and safeguards points of view, and finds it acceptable. In the new rule, it is made clear that the site supervisor can declare a safety emergency and can drop vital area controls. With regard to Wolf Creek, Mr. Burnett said that a new recruit, familiarizing himself with the panel, hit the three or four numbers of the code that opens the doors, it appears that the code entry was validated by a second person, and the doors opened. He said that the Staff did not have enough detailed information yet to fully explain the event.

With regard to vital areas, Mr. Ebersole asked what is meant by "vital." Mr. Burnett said that many years ago it was noticed in this agency that there were areas within nuclear reactor facilities where a single act of sabotage could disable major portions of the safety system, so a methodology was developed for identifying these "vital" areas. In the proposed "insider threat" rule, the Staff has laid the groundwork for a new method of identifying vital areas and islands. It should be noted that for security evaluations, the Staff does not give credit for the mitigation capabilities of the operators, only for

automatic features. They analyze to determine whether the automatic features are disabled by the sabotage event.

START OF THE
CLOSED PORTION OF THE MEETING
- CLASSIFIED -

Threat Consideration - J. Davidson

Commission Paper on Threat - R. Burnett

Consequences of Sabotage at Non-power Reactors - R. Dube

END OF THE
CLOSED PORTION OF THE MEETING

Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Non-Power Reactors - W. Brown

Mr. Brown said that his talk would describe how the Staff performs security plan reviews for non-power reactors. He pointed out that the rules basically deal with categories of materials. Category 1 is an amount of material containing 5 kilograms or more of the U-235 isotope in uranium at an enrichment greater than or equal to 20 percent (it is also called the formula quantity). Category 2 material is a material of moderate strategic significance (e.g., material with greater than or equal to 1 but less than 5 kilograms of U-235 enriched to 20 percent or greater, or 10 kilograms of U-235 enriched to between 10 and 20 percent). Category 3 material is of low strategic significance (e.g., material with less than 1 kilogram of U-235 enriched to greater than or equal to 20 percent, or between 1 and 10 kilograms of U-235 enriched to 10 to 20 percent).

Mr. Brown said that there are a set of regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 that are structured to provide safeguards for these categories. For example, category 3 material is covered under section 73.67 (f), category 2 material is covered under section 73.67 (d), and category 1 material (for non-power reactors) is covered under sections 73.67 (b) and 73.60. The licensee has to make a determination and decide what category material he possesses to safeguard. At this time, there are no category 1 reactors

in the non-power reactor community, there are 27 category 2 reactors, 30 category 3 reactors, and 10 others. Mr. Mark asked if this meant that there is no non-power reactor operating which has as much as 5 kilograms formula amount of fresh fuel. Mr. Brown said yes. Mr. Mark asked if the fuel in the reactors was meeting the 100 rem requirement. Mr. Burnett said yes and pointed out that the fuel in the pool was also, noting that before it falls below the limit it is shipped off site.

Time Requested for Oral Statements - S. Murphy, D. Hirsch, and B. Ramberg

Mr. Hirsch introduced Ms. Murphy and Mr. Ramberg. He said that they anticipated talking about the design basis threat to power reactors, the threat to non-power reactors, and then the consequences of sabotage of power reactors. Mr. Hirsch said that his program, the Adlia E. Stevenson Program on Nuclear Policy at UC Santa Cruz, has been doing a study of sabotage risks both for power and non-power reactors, focusing on current data (i.e., since the design basis threat was defined in 1973). Mr. Ramberg has done research at Princeton University, and currently at UCLA, on the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to military destruction in war. Ms. Murphy is a research assistant to Mr. Hirsch at UCSC.

Ms. Murphy summarized some recent terrorist trend data, focusing on how they may affect the design basis threat. She said that terrorist incidents have escalated to almost three times what they were when the design basis threat was formulated, and that the numbers of fatalities have also increased dramatically (e.g., 250 people were killed in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Compound in Beirut). Mr. Lewis pointed out that many people have known for a long time how to kill large numbers of people in an act of sabotage, yet they have not committed such acts. Ms. Murphy said that she thinks that terrorists are looking at reactors as symbolic targets of power and showed data to demonstrate an increase in bombings of nuclear installations abroad since the design basis threat was promulgated. She said that terrorism is increasing all over the world, and that bombs have been found at nuclear facilities in this country (e.g., she mentioned a pipe-bomb at a research reactor in Illinois, and a quantity of dynamite at the Indian Point Reactor). Mr. Bush of the NRC Staff suggested that they may have been hoaxes.

Mr. Hirsch said that just as we don't wait for a core melt

down to try to prevent one, we should stop research reactors from having weapons grade material stolen before some is stolen, and we should make sure that power reactors are protected against major radiological sabotage before such an event happens. He said the current design basis threat stems from three considerations: 1) There were no known groups with the combination of motivation, skill, and resources to attack a fuel facility or nuclear power reactor. He thought that the Staff should reexamine the situation to see if this is still true. 2) Redundant safety systems were thought to make severe core damage "non-credible" (i.e., a class nine accident was considered impossible, hence, so was intentionally induced severe core damage). He said that the Three Mile Island accident and the Rasmussen Report caused the Commission to accept the possibility of a class nine accident. 3) Terrorists were thought to be unwilling to undertake actions involving large numbers of lives. He expressed the view that terrorists are, now, not only willing to kill large numbers of people whom they have never met, but kill themselves in the process (although he acknowledged that this sort of thing has not reached our shores yet).

With regard to research reactors, Mr. Hirsch said that the primary requirement concerning theft is that you must be able, after the theft has occurred, to report that the material is missing. He said that if you convert to HEU then you have to increase the level of security to sabotage prevention; post-theft detection and reporting would not be sufficient. The second threat is sabotage. Mr. Hirsch thinks it is a logical step along the path leading to attacks on fully-operational power reactors. Research reactors are often in densely-populated areas, often in politicized environments, and often are such that many people have access to them. He thinks more security is needed in this area than is currently employed (there are currently no explicit sabotage prevention requirements, however, theft prevention requirements do bring some limited sabotage protection).

Mr. Ramberg discussed his recent book, "Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril," which addresses the policy implications and potential consequences of intentional destruction of nuclear energy facilities. He believes that an important threshold was passed in June 1981, when Israeli aircraft bombed and destroyed the Osirak Research Reactor while being constructed outside of Baghdad. That this was neither an isolated incident or a phenomenon restricted to just research reactors was demonstrated just three months

ago, in February of this year, when aircraft of Iraq bombed a nuclear power plant under construction in neighboring Iran. He feels that attacks on operating nuclear reactors are merely the next step in an escalating process that began with the 1981 bombing.

Sabotage Protection at Power Reactors - T. Allen

Mr. Allen said that the requirements in the regulations now have been deemed, within the body of those regulations, to protect against the given design basis threat. He said that, basically, safeguards requirements take the form of licensee commitments that are reflected in three different kinds of plans. There is a physical protection plan which describes the physical protection system itself, including the existence of a security organization, and such items as barriers, communications, and hardware. There is a guard training and qualification plan where the suitability of, and the physical requirements and training curriculum for the guard force is discussed and committed to by the licensee. There is also a safeguards contingency plan wherein specific events are enumerated (i.e., a description is provided for coordination with the local law enforcement authorities; responsibilities are laid out on how to handle particular incidents, and response strategies are discussed).

With regard to the insider, under the present commitments licensees have made in their security plans, most licensees conduct background investigations, and some conduct psychological tests and have behavioral observation programs (similar to those described in ANSI Standard 18.17 and its successor, ANSI Standard 3.3). Guards come under a separate requirement within the guard training and qualification requirements. They consistently get the psychological testing and training. For general application to the work force, the industry is split down the middle on the value of psychological testing and behavioral observation.

Status of Generic Issue A-29 - J. Singh

Mr. Singh said that resolution of Generic Issue A-29 (Nuclear Power Plant Design for the Reduction of Vulnerability to Sabotage) involves evaluation of design features, damage control measures, and physical security in an effort to identify additional measures of protection against sabotage. He described an action plan consisting of six tasks: 1) To evaluate the vulnerability of standard plants to sabotage. Mr. Michelson requested more

written information to support the Staff position that the GESSAR II design is adequate in this regard. 2) To evaluate foreign plants for sabotage inhibiting features. The Staff pointed out that most European countries do not recognize the insider as a threat. 3) To evaluate alternative system design, plant layout, and safeguard features. The objective is to identify potential modifications to both new and existing plants for improved protection against sabotage and tampering. 4) To have PNL and BNL, independently, develop methodologies for ranking the alternative system designs by attempting to quantify the sabotage contribution to risk. 5) To evaluate a sample of operating plants using the methodologies developed by BNL and PNL to determine their sabotage vulnerability. This task is expected to begin this Fall. 6) To prepare a regulatory package for any recommended new criteria. The Staff expects to make a decision by mid-1986.

Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Power Reactors - C. Gaskin

Mr. Gaskin stated that physical security plans are reviewed against Part 10 CFR Section 73.55 (b) through (h) and the supporting guidance, and not against the design basis threat. Plans that satisfy these requirements are presumed to satisfy the design basis threat, including the insider. Generally, the basis for the review is NUREG-0908, which is a compilation of all the Staff's previous guidance. The Staff uses NUREG-0907 (essentially, just a scoring document) to determine whether the response force which the applicant has chosen is adequate to meet the requirements of Section 73.55.

The SRP requires the Staff to make two specific site visits. The initial site visit, generally two to three years prior to the anticipated OL date, is a plant walk-through (with drawings) and a discussion of security philosophy. The final site visit, generally five to six months prior to the anticipated OL date, is to determine if licensee installed what he said he was going to install. Later on, the Inspection and Enforcement Staff will pick up on the operation of the equipment during their preoperational inspection.

Mr. Gaskin said that the (5 to 10) designated armed responders have other duties, but these duties are such that they can be dropped immediately when the need arises. There are other armed individuals trained to act as responders, they are just not the "designated armed

response force members" at that time. When notified of an intrusion, the responders first make an assessment and then respond. There are very few reactor sites that have the minimum number of designated armed responders and some, at least one, even have more than 10.

Future Meetings:

The ACRS is scheduled to discuss the Safeguards and Security issues reviewed at this subcommittee meeting during the 301th ACRS meeting, May 9-11, 1985.

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NOTE: A complete transcript of the OPEN PORTION of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H St., NW., Washington, D. C. or can be obtained at cost from ACE Federal Reporter, Inc., 444 N. Capitol St., Washington, D. C. 20001, Telephone (202) 347-3700.

*E. *Quantitative Safety Goals*—Discuss NRC Staff evaluation of two-year trial period and plan for implementation of the proposed NRC quantitative safety goals.

*F. *Future ACRS Activities*—Discuss anticipated ACRS activities including preparation of the ACRS report to the NRC regarding the proposed safety research program and budget for FY-1987 and proposed reveiw of scram systems for Westinghouse PWR nuclear plants.

*G. *EPA Standards for High-Level Radioactive Waste Repositories*—Discuss EPA environmental standards for management and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in geologic repositories.

*H. *Prioritization of Unresolved Generic Issues*—Discuss proposed priorities for a new list of approximately 23 unresolved generic safety related issues.

*I. *ACRS Subcommittee Activities*—Discuss safety related activities of designated ACRS subcommittees including hydrodynamic effects in BWR dynamic containments and the effects of insulation debris on containment sump performance following a LOCA.

*J. *Meeting with NRC Commissioners*—Discuss ACRS report regarding the roles of the ACRS in review and evaluation of the proposed DOE program for management and disposal of radioactive wastes.

*K. *Activities of ACRS Members*—Hear and discuss reports of ACRS members regarding activities as individual ACRS members.

*L. *ACRS Procedures and Practices*—Proposed changes to ACRS Bylaws will be considered with respect to the conduct of ACRS members as part of the collegial body and as individuals.

June 6–8, 1985—Agneda to be announced.

July 11–13, 1985—Agenda to be announced.

Dated: April 18, 1985.

John C. Hoyle,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 85-9780 Filed 4-22-85; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Reactor Operations; Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor Operations will hold a meeting on May 8, 1985, Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

Monday, May 6, 1985—1:00 p.m. until the conclusion of business

The Subcommittee will discuss recent operating occurrences.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, its consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr. Herman Alderman (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EST. Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual one or two days before the scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule, etc., which may have occurred.

Dated: April 18, 1985.

Morton W. Libarkin,

Assistant Executive Director for Project Review.

[FR Doc. 85-9777 Filed 4-22-85; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Safeguards and Security; Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Safeguards and Security will hold a meeting on May 7, 1985, Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.

Portions of the meeting will be open to public attendance, however, those portions that deal with confidential Safeguards Information will be closed to the public.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

Tuesday, May 7, 1985—8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business

The Subcommittee will review the potential consequences of sabotage at nonpower reactors, be briefed by NMSS on sabotage protection at power reactors, and hear how the NRC Staff reviews and evaluates licenees' security plans.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, its consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr. John Schiffgens (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 a.m and 5:00 p.m., EST. Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual one or two days before this scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule,etc., which may have occured.

Dated: April 18, 1985.

Morton W. Libarkin,

Assistant Executive Director for Project Review.

[FR Doc. 85-9778 Filed 4-22-85; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

REVISED May 3, 1985 J. Schuffgens x 37

PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE MAY 7, 1985 MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

8:30am	Opening Statements	C. Mark	10 min
8:40	Introduction	R.F. Burnett	10
	CLOSE MEETING		
8:50	Threat Consideration (secret)	J.J. Davidson	50
9:40	- Break -		10
9:50	Commission Paper on Threat (confidential)	R.F. Burnett	50
10:40	Consequences of Sabotage at Non-Power Reactors (confidential)	R.J. Dube	50
11:30	- Lunch -		60
	OPEN MEETING		
12:30	Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Non-Power Reactors	W.B. Brown	45
1:15pm	Time Requested for Oral Statement	D. Hirsch	25 min
		B. Ramberg	25
		S. Murphy	25
2:30	Sabotage Protection at Power Reactors	T.R. Allen	40
3:10	- Break -		15
3:25	Status of Generic Issue A-29	J. Singh	40
4:05	Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Power Reactors	C.E. Gaskin	40
4:45	Subcommittee Discussion (M. Carbon's draft letter)		45
5:30	- Adjourn -		

ATTACHMENT C

UBCOMMITTEE MEETING: SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY

OCATION: Room 1046

DATE: MAY 7, 1985

ATTENDANCE LIST

PLEASE PRINT

	NAME	AFFILIATION
1.	GEORGE W. McCORKLE	(SG) NRC
2.	Charles E. Gaskin	NRC/SG
3.	Robert J. Dube	NRC/SG
4.	Carl J Withee	NRC/SG
5.	LOREN L BUSH JR	NRC/IE
6.	Dick Rosano	NRC/IE
7.	DONALD M. CARLSON	NRC/SG
8.	Willard B. Brown	NRC/SG/NMSS
9.	ROBERT A. ERICKSON	NRC / NMSS (SG)
10.	[illegible]	NRC/RES
11.	Peter C. Carr	Bechtel Power Corp
12.	George Sherwood	DOE /NE
13.	PETER J. DAVIS	DOE
14.	DONALD KNUTH	KMC
15.	EUGENE W. McKEEK	NRC/DL
16.	TOM K. ALLEN	NRC / NMSS/SG
17.	ROBERT F. BURNETT	NRC / NMSS / SG
18.	Cecil O. Thomas	NRC/NRR/SSPB
19.	HERBERT N BERKOW	NRC / NRR / SSPB
20.	Robert E. Carter	NRC/NRR/SSPB
21.	PAUL BAKER, JR	NRC/NMSS/SGLP
22.		
23.		
24.		

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

LOCATION: Rm. 1046

DATE: MAY 7, 1985

ATTENDANCE LIST

PLEASE PRINT:

NAME	BADGE NO.	AFFILIATION
DAVID HOFFMAN	E-0930	Ace Federal
Peter C Carr	E-0986	Bechtel Power Corp
DONALD KNUTH	E0950	KMC
Daniel [illegible]	E 0994	UCSC
Bennett [illegible]	E 0991	UCLA
Stephanie Murphy	E 0944	UCSC
WB ANDREWS	E0926	PNL
JN O'Brien	E 0958	BNL
Daniel Horner	E 0995	NCI
Shiv Seth	E0957	MITRE
BRUCE [illegible]	E-0930	NPT
PAUL LEVENTHAL	E-0911	NCI

UBCOMMITTEE MEETING: SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY

ICATION: Room 1046

DATE: MAY 7, 1985

ATTENDANCE LIST

PLEASE PRINT

	NAME	AFFILIATION
1.	J. S. Wermiel	NRC/NRR/DST/ASB
2.	D. D. Sard	"
3.	W. B. ANDREWS	PNL
4.	John [illegible]	BNL
5.	RONALD W. HERNAN	NRC/NRR/PAAS
6.	LES RUBENSTEIN	NRR/CPS
7.		
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ATTACHMENT D

HANDOUTS
OF MAY 7, 1985 MEETING OF THE
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

A. General Threat Considerations

B. Current Commission Paper - Re: Threat

B_2. Vehicle Barrier Analysis Study

C. Potential Consequences of Attempted Sabotage of Non-Power Reactors

D.
1. Nonpower Reactor Security Plan Review
2. Acceptance Criteria for Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance
3. U. S. NRC Regulatory Guide 5.59 Revision 1, Feb. 1983
4. Acceptance Criteria for Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance

E.
1. Statement of Stephanie A. Murphy
2. Charts - Accident Probability per Year
3. Nuclear Terrorism: A Growing Threat/Rpt. by D. Hirsch & S. Murphy
4. Statement of Dr. Bennett Ramberg Re Intentional Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities
5. Intentional Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities

F.
1. Physical Protection for Power Reactors

G. NRR Staff Presentation to the ACRS Re Generic Issue #29

H.
1. Review of Security Plans for Power Reactors
2. NTOL Vital Area Reviews
3. NUREG-0907 Acceptance Criteria for Determining Armed Response Force Size at Nuclear Power Plants
4. NUREG-0908 Acceptance Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans