



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

October 2, 1985
(NMP2L 0506)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Reactor Projects
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a interim report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning acceptance of soldering installations that are rejectable. This problem was reported via tel-con to R. A. Gramm of your staff on July 24, 1985.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Senior Vice President

CVM/GG/cia
(1241H)

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

8510180157 851002
PDR ADOCK 05000410
S PDR

11 1E27

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKER NO. 50-410

Interim Report for a Problem Concerning
Acceptance of Soldering Installations That are Rejectable
(55(e)85-24)

Description of the Problem

A surveillance inspection performed by Niagara Mohawk Quality Assurance identified unsatisfactory soldering connections that were previously accepted by Field Quality Control. A reinspection was performed by Stone & Webster Field Quality Control which confirmed the unsatisfactory conditions which were subsequently documented on inspection reports E5A20475 and E5A20703. A followup investigation determined that the inspection procedures provide adequate accept/reject criteria to allow the inspector to identify the unsatisfactory condition. The initial acceptance of the unsatisfactory condition is attributable to a failure by one inspector to properly verify the accept/reject criteria.

The problem included soldered connections on 32 indicating lights installed in reactor water cleanup and recirculation control board panel 2CEC*PNL602.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Based on the condition that the solder connections had been final accepted by Field Quality Control, there appears to be a breakdown in the implementation of the Quality Assurance program.

The 32 indicating lights monitor the status of the containment isolation valves for the hydraulic units to the recirculation control valves. Any failure mode of the soldered connections at the indicating lights would not prevent the valves from performing their safety function, i.e., closing on a containment isolation, because these valves are fail-safe (fail closed). Therefore, if the subject condition had remained uncorrected, it would not have adversely effected the safety of operations of the plant.

Corrective Action

All above identified connections were reworked via Nonconformance and Disposition Report 12187 and completed on July 3, 1985. An evaluation of the extent of the inspection problem is continuing and a final report will be issued by January 31, 1986.