

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE June 7, 1985
COMPLETED BY B. Sarsour/
M. Khazrai
TELEPHONE (419) 249-5000
Ext. 384/290

MONTH May, 1985

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	<u>785</u>
2	<u>785</u>
3	<u>786</u>
4	<u>784</u>
5	<u>782</u>
6	<u>783</u>
7	<u>787</u>
8	<u>787</u>
9	<u>785</u>
10	<u>780</u>
11	<u>778</u>
12	<u>667</u>
13	<u>757</u>
14	<u>781</u>
15	<u>786</u>
16	<u>794</u>

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
17	<u>788</u>
18	<u>786</u>
19	<u>788</u>
20	<u>782</u>
21	<u>790</u>
22	<u>791</u>
23	<u>789</u>
24	<u>783</u>
25	<u>781</u>
26	<u>733</u>
27	<u>736</u>
28	<u>787</u>
29	<u>787</u>
30	<u>783</u>
31	<u>778</u>

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

8508090546 850607
PDR ADOCK 05000346
R PDR

OPERATING DATA REPORT

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 TELEPHONE M. Khazra
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OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: May 1985
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 915
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 904
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 860

Notes

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:
To obtain an acceptable offset from the Reactor Protection System (RPS)
trip setpoints

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): _____
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: _____

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	<u>744</u>	<u>3,623.0</u>	<u>59,928.0</u>
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	<u>744</u>	<u>2,696.8</u>	<u>35,728.3</u>
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>4,014.1</u>
14. Hours Generator On-Line	<u>744</u>	<u>2,590.0</u>	<u>34,231.3</u>
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>1,732.5</u>
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>1,836,172.0</u>	<u>6,032,760</u>	<u>81,018,182</u>
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>610,042</u>	<u>1,996,696</u>	<u>26,843,040</u>
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>577,434</u>	<u>1,861,502</u>	<u>25,151,758</u>
19. Unit Service Factor	<u>100</u>	<u>71.5</u>	<u>57.1</u>
20. Unit Availability Factor	<u>100</u>	<u>71.5</u>	<u>60.0</u>
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	<u>90.2</u>	<u>59.7</u>	<u>48.8</u>
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	<u>85.7</u>	<u>56.7</u>	<u>46.3</u>
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	<u>0.0</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>16.3</u>

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: _____

26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
INITIAL ELECTRICITY	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
COMMERCIAL OPERATION	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

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290

REPORT MONTH May, 1985[illegible]

¹ F: Forced
S: Scheduled

2 Reason:

- A-Equipment Failure (Explain)
- B-Maintenance or Test
- C-Refueling
- D-Regulatory Restriction
- E-Operator Training & License Examination
- F-Administrative
- G-Operational Error (Explain)
- H-Other (Explain)

3 Method:
1-Manual
2-Manual Scram
3-Automatic Scram
4-Continuation from
Previous Month
5-Load Reduction
9-Other (Explain)

4 Exhibit G - Instructions
for Preparation of Data
Entry Sheets for Licensee
Event Report (LER) File
(NUREG-0161)

⁵ Exhibit I - Same Source

REFUELING INFORMATION

DATE: May 1985

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: Spring, 1986
3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: Summer, 1986
4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

Ans: Expect the Reload Report to require standard reload fuel design Technical Specification changes (3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems and 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits).

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information: Winter, 1985
6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

Ans: None identified to date.

7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

(a) 177 (b) 204 - Spent Fuel Assemblies

8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

Present: 735 Increase size by: 0 (zero)

9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

Date: 1992 - assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
MAY, 1985

5/1/85 - 5/12/85:

Reactor power was maintained at approximately 90% power (power was limited to 90% due to the noise in the Reactor Coolant System flow transmitters, which is believed to have caused the reactor trip on April 24, 1985), until 2300 hours on May 11, 1985, when a manual power reduction to approximately 78% was initiated due to low load requirements.

5/13/85 - 5/31/85:

Reactor power was increased to approximately 90% power at 0600 hours on May 13, 1985.

During the period from May 13, 1985 to May 31, 1985, the unit operated at approximately 90% power except over the weekends when planned load reductions to approximately 75% were initiated to support low load requirements.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 78-348

SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System

COMPONENT: Reactor Coolant Pumps

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 78-348 changed the controls that automatically trip the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) and close the RCP seal return valves. This involved:

- (1) Removing the closure of the seal return valve on a loss of seal injection for an operating RCP.
- (2) Adding a 90 second time delay to the automatic closure of the seal return isolation valve
- (3) Changing the time delay on the tripping of the RCP motor from 120 seconds to 90 seconds
- (4) Reducing the trip setpoints on FIS-4133, FIS-4233, FIS-4333, and FIS-4433 from 45 GPM to 25 GPM

Work was completed August 15, 1980.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The interlock changes were made to ensure that the seal return valves will close only on a loss of seal injection to an idle RCP. The time delay additions and setpoint revisions were made to prevent spurious closures of the seal return valve from short duration reductions in Component Cooling Water or seal injection flow. These changes were made to improve the reliability of the RCP seals.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY: The function of the RCP seal injection and seal return valves is to close as required per the Safety Features Actuation System. This function is not decreased by the change made by this FCR. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO: 81-023

SYSTEM: Concrete Masonry Block Wall

COMPONENT: Wall 4016

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 81-023 modified wall 4016 by removing six columns of masonry block throughout the wall and installing steel box pilasters (vertical wall stiffeners) in their place. This wall is located on the 603' level of the Turbine Building and separates the Low Voltage Switchgear Room (428) and Battery Room B (428A). Work was completed August 24, 1984.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The change in the wall structure was required by NRC IE Bulletin 80-11 which showed during a seismic event, wall 4016 could experience masonry overstress. Therefore, steel box pilasters were installed in wall 4016.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY: This change does not reduce the fire rating of the wall, nor affect the attached safety related conduits in any adverse manner. Therefore, this modification does not result in an unreviewed safety question.