

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Wolf Creek Generating StationDOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2 1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features Actuation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
0	6	2	3	8	5	8	5	0	4	5	0	0	0	7	2	3	8	5	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 01 21 9	1	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
		20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 356A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE
3116 316141-1818311

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO ☐

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1329 CDT on June 23, 1985, a Reactor trip occurred when a Reactor Trip Breaker was inadvertently tripped during a surveillance test. The Reactor trip caused a Main Turbine trip. The Reactor trip coupled with low Reactor Coolant System average temperature caused a Feedwater Isolation. Water levels in all four Steam Generators subsequently decreased below the low-low level actuation setpoint due to the combined effects of the Feedwater Isolation and the "shrinking" of level due to the Main Turbine trip. This caused an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation and a Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation to be initiated. All required Engineered Safety Features and Reactor Protection equipment responded properly.

The plant was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at a Reactor power level of approximately 29 percent at the time of this event. The Reactor Coolant System was at normal operating pressure and temperature.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time during this event did conditions develop which could have posed a threat to the public health or safety.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/7/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Wolf Creek Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2 8 5 - 0 4 5 - 0 0 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
						OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1329 CDT on June 23, 1985, a Reactor trip occurred during the performance of surveillance test STS IC-211A, "Actuation Logic Test Train A Solid State Protection System". In accordance with this procedure, Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker [JC-BKR] "A" was placed in the TEST position and closed. Operability of this bypass breaker was to be checked by depressing the local TRIP push-button for that breaker and observing the breaker trip. However, when this step was performed, the TRIP button for Reactor Trip Breaker [JC-BKR] "A" was depressed instead, resulting in the Reactor trip. The Reactor trip caused a Main Turbine trip. The Reactor trip coupled with low Reactor Coolant System (RCS)[AB] average temperature (Tavg) caused a Feedwater Isolation. Water levels in all four Steam Generators (S/G)[AB-SG] decreased rapidly to the low-low level Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation setpoint due to the combined effects of the Feedwater Isolation and S/G "shrink" due to the Main Turbine trip. This caused Auxiliary Feedwater Actuators for both the motor-driven and turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFWP)[BA-P] and a Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation. All required Engineered Safety Features and Reactor Protection equipment responded properly during this event.

The plant was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at a Reactor power level of approximately 29 percent at the time of this event. The Reactor Coolant System was at normal operating pressure and temperature. S/G water levels were at approximately 50 percent with Main Feedwater Pump (MFP)[SJ-P] "B" running in "automatic" and the Main Feedwater Control Valves [SJ-FCV] also in the "automatic" control mode. The Main Steam System [SB] was supplying Main Turbine Steam Seals [TC] and the Auxiliary Steam System [SA] via the Auxiliary Steam Reboiler.

Following the Reactor trip and the actuation of the Engineered Safety Features, RCS Tavg decreased due to the heat load remaining on the Main Steam System. At 1334 CDT, MFP "B" was manually tripped and startup of the Auxiliary Boiler [SA-BLR] was commenced to facilitate transferring Main Turbine steam seals and Auxiliary Steam System loads to the Auxiliary Boiler. At 1343 CDT, with RCS cooldown continuing, the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSLIV)[SB-ISV] were slow-closed to eliminate steam flow as a contributor to RCS cooldown. Shortly thereafter, the turbine-driven AFWP was secured and RCS cooldown was terminated at a minimum Tavg of 552 degrees F. Water levels in all four S/G's reached a minimum of approximately 15 percent during this event. Reactor Coolant System Tavg and S/G water levels were returned to normal, and the actuated plant systems were restored to normal configuration by approximately 1440 CDT.

Subsequent investigation into this event revealed that the Reactor Trip Breaker was inadvertently tripped due to procedural steps within surveillance procedure STS IC-211A which were inadequate and confusing. This resulted in the wrong TRIP button being depressed. This procedure, and the corresponding Train B surveillance procedure (STS IC-211B), are being revised to eliminate confusion and to provide more detail to preclude similar occurrences in the future. This procedural problem is considered to be an isolated case caused by the relative complexity of the Reactor Trip Switchgear Cabinets [JC-SWGR].

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0500048285	-	045	-	00	03 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time did this event pose a threat to the public health or safety.



KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

July 23, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. R.P. Denise, Director
Wolf Creek Task Force
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011


KEL 5-184
Re: Jacket No. STN 50-482
Subj: Licensee Event Report 85-045-00

Dear Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv) concerning an Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. Otto Maynard of my staff.

Yours very truly,

for 
Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear

GLK:dab

Enclosure

xc: PO'Connor (2), w/a
JCummins, w/a

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