TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY
SKYWAY TOWER • 400 NORTH OLIVE STREET, L.B. 81 • DALLAS, TEXAS 75201

WILLIAM G. COUNSIL
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

July 22, 1985
TXX-4516

Mr. D.R. Hunter, Chief
Reactor Project Branch 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

Docket No.: 50-445

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADERS: FEEDWATER LINE BREAK
QA FILE: CP-85-20, SDAR-181
FILE NO.: 10110

Dear Mr. Hunter:

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed written report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding a branch feedwater line break which could cause unacceptable jet and whip interaction with the containment spray headers. We have submitted an interim report logged TXX-4487, dated June 3, 1985.

Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspector's review.

Very truly yours,

W.G. Counsil

WGC:tlg

Attachment

cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy)

Director, Inspection & Enforcement (15 copies)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

85-658

1/1 IE-27

ATTACHMENT

CONTAINMENT SPRAY HEADERS: FEEDWATER LINE BREAK

Description

During the Unit 2 jet and pipe whip interaction analysis, the results of the interaction of a branch feedwater line and the containment spray headers in Unit 1 was referenced. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 configurations for this installation are similar. The Unit 1 analysis had concluded no protection was required. Because of the similarities between Units, a field survey was initiated to re-evaluate prior Unit 1 analysis. As a result, we have identified an unacceptable interaction between the six inch (6") branch feedwater line and the three inch (3") containment spray header. Provisions are required to restrain the pipe whip motion of the larger piping in the event of a break. This issue is applicable only to Unit 1.

Safety Implications

In the event the condition had remained undetected, operability of the Unit 1 containment spray headers and the resultant safety effects could not be assured under accident conditions.

Corrective Action

A pipe whip restraint structure will be designed and installed to correct the unacceptable interaction. The installation has been identified as a condition prerequisite to fuel load and operation of Unit 1. The design is anticipated to be complete in mid-September with installation to proceed immediately after fabrication.

A review of the interaction program by site engineering has determined the analysis error is an isolated instance. However, in order to assure additional errors do not exist in the analysis, all interaction resolutions will be checked in the process of updating the Unit 1 damage study. Procedures to control this effort are scheduled to be issued no later than September 1, 1985. Completion of the update is anticipated by December 30, 1985.