

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

R.J. Adney
Site Vice President
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

January 2, 1997


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 -
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-328/96006

The enclosed report provides details concerning an automatic reactor trip as a result of the loss of power to Start Bus 2A, the start of four emergency diesel generators, and loading of emergency diesel generator 2B-B. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of engineered safety features, including the reactor protection system.

Sincerely,



R. J. Adney

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
700 Galleria Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957

Mr. R. W. Hernan, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624

Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0
HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED
INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO
THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T
6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK

FACILITY NAME (1)

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000328

PAGE (3)

1 OF 6

TITLE (4)

Automatic Reactor Trip Because of the Loss of Power to Start Bus 2A, the Start of Four Emergency Diesel
Generators, and Loading of Emergency Diesel Generator 2B-B

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	6	96	96	-- 006	-- 00	1	2	97	NA	05000
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

J. Bajraszewski, Compliance Licensing Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(423) 843-7749

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On December 6, 1996, at 0033 Eastern standard time, with Unit 2 in power operation at approximately 100 percent, the reactor automatically tripped because of the loss of power to Start Bus 2A. When the 2A start bus lost power, a reactor trip was initiated as a result of a bus undervoltage condition for Reactor Coolant Pumps 1 and 3. Start Bus 2A lost power because the alternate source feeder breaker opened without a legitimate trip signal. The 2A start bus was being supplied by the alternate source, common station service transformer (CSST) B. The normal feeder (CSST A and the 2A start bus normal feeder breaker) was out of service for maintenance activities. At the time of the trip, maintenance personnel had opened the normal feeder breaker compartment to continue maintenance work in the compartment when the alternate feeder breaker opened. Investigation into the event did not identify any equipment failure or inappropriate personnel action. A refurbished breaker was installed in the 2A start bus normal feeder breaker compartment, the breaker was tested, found acceptable, and the bus was returned to service.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. PLANT CONDITIONS

Unit 2 was in power operation at approximately 100 percent.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. Event:

On December 6, 1996, at 0033 Eastern standard time (EST), the reactor automatically tripped because of the loss of power to Start Bus 2A [EIIS Code EA]. When Start Bus 2A lost power, a reactor trip was initiated as a result of a bus undervoltage condition for Reactor Coolant Pumps 1 and 3. Start Bus 2A lost power because the alternate source feeder breaker [EIIS Code BKR] opened without a legitimate trip signal. The 2A start bus was being supplied by the alternate source, common station service transformer (CSST) B. The normal feeder (CSST A and the 2A start bus normal feeder breaker) was out of service for maintenance activities. At the time of the trip, maintenance personnel had opened the normal feeder breaker compartment to continue maintenance work in the compartment when the alternate feeder breaker opened.

B. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:

None.

C. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences:

November 17, 1996 Normal feeder breakers to start bus 1A and 2A and
at 2310 EST CSST A are removed from service for maintenance.

December 6, 1996 Maintenance personnel opened the Start Bus 2A
at approximately normal feeder breaker compartment door to reinstall
0030 EST grounds.

December 6, 1996 The Start Bus 2A alternate feeder breaker tripped open
at 0033 EST deenergizing the 2A start bus, 6.9-kilovolt (kV) Unit Board
2A and 2C, and the 6.9-kV Shutdown Board 2B-B. The

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

four emergency diesel generators started, and the 2B-B emergency diesel started and loaded (appropriate loads were shed and required loads were automatically sequenced back).

December 6, 1996 at 0155 EST Emergency diesels 1A-A, 1B-B, and 2A-A were shut down.

December 7, 1996 at 1122 EST Start Bus 2A was energized from the normal source (CSST A).

December 7, 1996 at 1338 EST Blackout relays were reset in accordance with procedure allowing the 2B-B diesel generator to be shut down.

D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:

None.

E. Method of Discovery:

The reactor and turbine trips were annunciated in the main control room.

F. Operator Actions:

Control room personnel responded as prescribed by emergency procedures. They promptly diagnosed the plant condition and took actions necessary to stabilize the unit in the hot standby, Mode 3.

G. Safety System Responses:

The equipment required to respond to the reactor trip operated as designed. The four emergency diesel generators started and the 2B-B emergency diesel generator loaded upon loss of the 2A start bus. Load shedding and sequencing occurred as designed. Following the reactor trip, the turbine tripped, feedwater isolation occurred, and auxiliary feedwater system started as expected.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. Immediate Cause:

The immediate cause of the event was a loss of power to Start Bus 2A. Loss of start bus power resulted in an undervoltage condition in reactor coolant pumps 1 and 3. The undervoltage condition initiated the reactor trip.

B. Root Cause:

The root cause of the event was not determined. At the time of the trip, two electrical maintenance craftsmen were in the vicinity of the 2A start bus normal and alternate feeder breaker compartments. After opening the normal feeder breaker compartment door, the craftsman noted that the bus shutters were not fully closed. The bus shutters are operated by a linkage contained inside the breaker compartment. In addition to the bus shutter linkage, the compartment contains a mechanical/electrical interlock between the normal and alternate feeder breakers. The interlock linkage is located approximately 18 to 24 inches inside the breaker cubicle and was not identified to indicate that its movement will trip the companion breaker. In statements taken immediately after the unit trip and during subsequent interviews, the craftsmen stated that they took no inappropriate action(s). An equipment failure analysis was performed by ASEA-Brown Boveri (ABB) (the breaker manufacturer) on the breaker that opened. ABB did not identify any hardware deficiency that could have caused the opening of the breaker without a legitimate trip signal.

C. Contributing Factors

None.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

The plant responses during and after the unit trip were consistent with the responses described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the event did not adversely affect the health or safety of plant personnel or the general public.

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V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. Immediate Corrective Actions:

Control room personnel responded as prescribed by emergency procedures. They promptly diagnosed the plant condition and took actions necessary to stabilize the unit in the hot standby, Mode 3.

An evaluation was performed to determine the potential signals that could trip the feeder breaker. Each potential trip was studied to determine if it could have caused the trip. In the cases where no conclusive evidence existed to ensure that the potential trip signal did not cause the breaker to open, testing was performed to eliminate that potential signal as a cause. Either through evaluation or testing, no trip signals were identified that could have caused the 2A start bus alternate feeder breaker to open.

A spare (refurbished) breaker was installed into the Start Bus 2A normal feeder compartment. The breaker was tested, found to be acceptable, and placed in service supplying the 2A start bus.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional actions are necessary to prevent recurrence.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components:

None.

B. Previous LERs on Similar Events:

A review of previous reportable events identified one licensee event report (LER) (50-327/96004) that was associated with an inadvertent loss of power signal and start of four emergency diesel generators. The cause of that event was the failure of the normal feeder breaker's operating mechanism. As a result of the event

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contained in that LER, a spare breaker was purchased and a breaker refurbishment/preventive maintenance program was initiated for the 6.9-kV breakers. Preventive maintenance of the 6.9-kV breakers was in progress when the unit tripped. However, no equipment failure was identified in the event described by this LER.

C. Additional Information:

The start bus feeder breakers at SQN are Gould-Brown Boveri (currently ASEA-Brown Boveri), Type 15HK-1000 breakers. SQN has eight of these breakers, which are installed in the start bus switchgear plus one spare breaker.

The normal feeder breaker was out of service before the event as part of a program to refurbish the start bus feeder breakers to ensure equipment reliability. Start bus breaker refurbishment will continue and is expected to be completed in the summer of 1997.

To increase awareness of trip risk when working in or around start bus breaker cubicles, "Trip Sensitive Device" tags are being added to the breaker enclosures as the breakers are refurbished. Tag installation and breaker refurbishment are scheduled to be complete in May 1997. Training will be provided to appropriate personnel relative to the function of the levers (bus shutter and breaker interlock) contained inside the start bus breaker enclosures before maintenance activities are continued for refurbishment of the remaining 6.9-kV breakers.

VII. COMMITMENTS

None.