

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

September 19, 1985

BLRD-50-438/85-14

BLRD-50-439/85-14

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region II

Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900

Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BARRIER  
DEFICIENCY - BLRD-50-438/85-14, BLRD-50-439/85-14 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Al Ignatonis on April 22, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8503. This was followed by our first interim report submitted on May 20, 1985. Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about March 30, 1986.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*J. A. Damer*

for S. W. Hufham, Manager  
Licensing and Risk Protection

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
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## ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BARRIER DEFICIENCY  
BLRD-50-438/85-14 AND BLRD-50-439/85-14  
NCR BLN NEB 8503  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

### Description of Deficiency

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) design criteria for the containment isolation and leak testing system, N4-NI-D740, requires at least two containment isolation barriers with the following minimum requirements: containment isolation valves, piping between these valves, and closed systems used as isolation barriers shall be, as a minimum, ANS Safety Class 2.

The drain line and the compressed air line attached to the fuel transfer tube (penetrations X-37 and X-78) each have only one manual isolation valve within the seismic category I, safety class 2 boundaries.

The cause of this deficiency was that the code boundaries were shown incorrectly on the design criteria diagram which resulted in one valve providing containment isolation.

### Interim Progress

TVA design documents have been reviewed and revised to comply with the code and safety requirements. Seismic analysis to requalify the compressed air line and drain line to category I requirements will be complete by December 26, 1985. Requalification of the compressed air line and drain line is required because the piping arrangement was changed to comply with ANS Safety Class 2 requirements. Completion of the seismic analysis will complete design scope of work on this deficiency.

The schedule for completion of construction activities will be determined after completion of the seismic analysis.

The recent issuance to and training in OEP-10, "Review," of all Office of Engineering (OE) personnel precludes the need for action required to prevent recurrence on this deficiency.

TVA will provide the NRC with the next report on this deficiency on or about March 30, 1986.