

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fermi-2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 OF 0 2										PAGE 13	
TITLE (4) CRD Pump Trip																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
06	28	85	85	029	0	07	24	85						0 5 0 0 0							
														3 5 0 0 0							
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
2		20.402(b)				20.406(a)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				80.38(a)(1)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(a)							
0 0 2		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				80.38(a)(2)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(x)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												TELEPHONE NUMBER									
NAME L. P. Bregni, Compliance Engineer												AREA CODE 3 1 3 5 8 6 - 5 3 1 3									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)																					

On June 28, 1985, at 1422 hours while in Operational Condition 2, reactor pressure at 140 psig and reactor power at 2%, the reactor was manually scrammed in response to a trip of the running control rod drive (CRD) pump. The CRD pump tripped because of a low suction pressure transient that occurred when a Torus Water Management System (TWMS) valve was opened in the same supply line from the condensate polishing demineralizers to the CRD pumps. The scram was performed in compliance with the procedure which requires that a manual scram shall be performed whenever no CRD pump is running and reactor pressure is less than 900 psig.

The standby CRD pump was started at 1428 hours. A post scram evaluation was performed, the required surveillances were accomplished and criticality was reestablished at 1109 hours on June 29, 1985.

A caution has been added to the TWMS System Operating Procedure stating that opening of the subject valve should be done slowly to prevent causing the CRD pump from tripping on low suction pressure.

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PDR ADOCK 05000341  
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Fermi-2	0500034185	—	029	—00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On June 28, 1985, at 1422 hours while in Operational Condition 2, reactor pressure at 140 psig and reactor power at 2%, the reactor was manually scrammed in response to a trip of the running control rod drive (CRD) pump. The scram was performed in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 20.106.01, "CRD Hydraulic System Failure". This procedure requires that a manual scram shall be performed whenever no CRD pump is running and reactor pressure is less than 900 psig. Had the CRD pump trip occurred at normal reactor operating pressure, an immediate manual scram would not have been required or initiated.

The CRD pump tripped due to a low suction pressure transient that occurred when a Torus Water Management System (TWMS) valve was opened to raise the water level in the torus. The TWMS valve is located in a line that tees off the same supply line feeding the CRD pumps from the condensate polishing demineralizer discharge header. When the TWMS valve was opened part of the flow was diverted from the CRD pump causing the reduction in suction pressure. The low suction pressure was detected by instrumentation that caused the pumps to trip, as designed.

The standby CRD pump was started at 1428 hours. After performing a post-scram evaluation and the required surveillances, reactor criticality was reestablished at 1109 hours on June 29, 1985.

A caution has been added to the TWMS System Operating Procedure 23.144, stating that the subject valve should be opened slowly to prevent the CRD pump from tripping on low suction pressure.

**Detroit  
Edison**

2000 Second Avenue  
Detroit, Michigan 48226  
(313) 237-8000

July 24, 1985  
NP-85-831

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


Reference: Fermi 2  
NRC Docket No. 50-341  
NRC Operating License No. NPF-43

Subject: Transmittal of Licensee  
Event Report 85-029

Please find enclosed LER No. 85-029-00, dated July 24, 1985, for a reportable event which occurred on June 28, 1985. As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Region III office.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,



R. S. Lenart  
Plant Manager

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: Mr. P.M. Byron  
Mr. M.D. Lynch

Regional Administrator  
USNRC Region III  
799 Roosevelt Rd.  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Director/Coordinator  
Monroe City-County Office of Civil Preparedness  
965 South Raisinville Road  
Monroe, MI 48161

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