

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2												
TITLE (4) Emergency Diesel Generator Start																										
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)													
0	8	2	9	8	5	8	5	0	3	5	0	0	0	9	2	3	8	5	0	5	0	0	0	3	2	8
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																										
OPERATING MODE (9)		5		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				XX		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 1 0 1 0		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)										
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text NRC Form 366A)										
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)												
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)												
				20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																										
NAME Glenn Duggin, Compliance Section Engineer												TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 5 4 8														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC																
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR								
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												XX		NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While performing troubleshooting on vital battery board IV, control power for the 2B-B diesel generator (D/G) was inadvertently lost for a few seconds. The loss of control power and the resulting undervoltage signal started D/Gs 1A-A, 2A-A, and 2B-B. D/G 1B-B was out of service for maintenance at the time, and it did not start. The D/Gs started normally and came up to speed, frequency, and voltage within 10 seconds. The D/Gs were given a normal stop signal shortly after the event occurred.

The 'B' train suction valves for radiation monitors 106 and 112 also went closed. These valves are redundant valves, and there was no loss of monitoring capability. They were returned to normal after it was determined that the loss of voltage was momentary, and no equipment had failed.

The troubleshooting was to find the source of a ground as indicated by a ground-detection meter, but it was not located. The ground did not cause any equipment operability problems, and no other equipment was affected by this event.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Sequoyah, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 8 5 -	0	3	5	-	0	0 0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On August 29, 1985, unit 1 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 0 psig, 100 degrees F), and unit 2 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 500 psig, 150 degrees F).

At 0745 CST, while performing troubleshooting on 125 VDC vital battery board IV, control power for the 2B-B diesel generator (D/G) was inadvertently lost for a few seconds. The loss of control power and the resulting undervoltage signal started D/Gs 1A-A, 2A-A, and 2B-B. D/G 1B-B was out of service for maintenance at the time, and it did not start. The D/Gs started normally and came up to speed, frequency, and voltage within 10 seconds. The D/Gs were given a normal stop signal shortly after the event occurred.

The 'B' train suction valves (FCV-90-109, -115) for radiation monitors 106 and 112 also went closed during this event. These suction valves are redundant valves, and there was no loss of monitoring capability. They were returned to normal without incident.

Operations personnel discovered a -45 volt ground indicated on the ground-detection meter of the 125 VDC vital battery board IV during a normal daily surveillance. A maintenance request (MR) was prepared to request the performance of maintenance instruction (MI)-10.13, "Ground Detection on Vital Battery Boards." While performing MI-10.13, power was lost to fuse column D which caused a loss of control power to the undervoltage protection for D/G 2B-B. The power was lost for less than one minute. The test rig serves as the power supply while ground detection is being done. The loss of power was caused by a loose connector going from the test rig to the breaker lugs. Electrical maintenance personnel performing the MI were not aware that control power had been lost until a reactor operator came to investigate, and by then control power had been restored. No ground was found, and the assistant shift engineer (ASE) decided not to pursue the cause of the ground any further. The ground was left with a -25 volt magnitude. Grounds of less than 50 volt magnitude occur on a daily basis from such things as a leaky valve. These grounds do not interfere with the operation of equipment, but they are monitored and investigated to keep them from becoming a problem. A survey taken on September 13, 1985, showed two vital battery boards with 0 volt ground, one with +18 volts, and one with -24 volts. The normal alarm setpoint is  $\pm 50$  volts which annunciates in the main control room.

MI-10.13 was evaluated for adequacy, and no change is needed. The test equipment was checked, and no problems were found. This event has been attributed to a personnel error in that a loose connection existed for a few seconds.

This event had no effect on the safety of personnel onsite or offsite.

Previous occurrences - no D/Gs have been started by searching for grounds before this event.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

September 24, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.  
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT  
SQRO-50-327/85035

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning the emergency diesel generator start caused by an inadvertent loss of control power. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.iv.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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