

SSER

Task: Allegation A-160 and A-161

Reference Number: 4-84-A-06/55 and 56

Characterization: It is alleged that support structures for instrumentation cabinets mounted on grating inside the reactor containment building (RCB) were fabricated with materials which lack heat number traceability; that the weld rods used on these supports are not traceable; and that welding on the instrumentation cabinet supports was performed by unqualified welders and inspected by an uncertified inspector.

Assessment of Allegation: In examining the allegation concerning instrument cabinet supports, the NRC staff reviewed copies of requisition on warehouse (ROW) forms which tie directly to material receiving inspection reports (MRR). From the MRRs, the purchase order was identified. These records allowed the material used in the instrumentation cabinet supports to be traced. Further, all support steel for the instrument cabinets was purchased as safety-related. This item has neither safety significance nor generic implications.

Review of the allegation that the weld rods used on instrument cabinet supports were not traceable indicated that inspection reports listed the heat number or the lot number of the weld rods used so that weld rods were indeed traceable. This item has neither safety significance nor generic implications.

The NRC staff reviewed the allegation that welding on structural supports for instrumentation cabinets inside the RCB was performed by unqualified welders. NCR W3-7549 was written after the allegation and documents the issue in concern. The NRC staff reviewed qualifications for all welders who worked on the instrumentation cabinet supports.

The NCR indicated that two welders performed work in welding positions for which they were not qualified. LP&L is committed to American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1-1972 for welder qualification. A review of inspection reports indicated that only one welder may have been unqualified.

A review of the quality control (QC) inspection records indicated that on many supports there were more than two welders performing work. The records indicated that the welder was qualified for the welding he was performing by QC checking "satisfactory" in the welder qualification check box. There was an inspection report for each welder, but the exact weld location each welder made was not identified. EBASCO records review group stated that all J. A. Jones Construction Company's documentation may still not be completely assembled. They strongly believe there is documentation that proved that the welding on the instrument cabinet supports was performed by welders working in positions for which they were qualified.

A QC inspector from J. A. Jones stated that it was very common for one welder to work only on the portion or position of a structural member for which he was qualified and that another welder would complete other portions of the weld for which he was qualified.

A review of this issue indicated that welding on the instrumentation cabinet structural supports in question may have been performed by welders qualified in the proper position; however, there were no inspection records available to verify that this was true.

The NRC staff reviewed the allegation that an unqualified QC inspector was examining welds on instrumentation cabinet supports. LP&L was committed to ANSI N45.2.6-1973, "Qualification of Inspection, Examination and Testing Personnel for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." A review of the J. A. Jones QA manual, Attachment F, "Quality Assurance Personnel Training and Certification Program" (June 18, 1975), indicated that it was in compliance with ANSI N45.2.6-1973. A review of the QC inspector's qualification records indicated that he was qualified and certified to perform the inspections.

The item of safety significance arising from these allegations is that the quality of welds made on safety-related supports is indeterminate. This appears to be an isolated case not previously identified by LP&L and, therefore, has no generic implications.

Potential Violations: Missing inspection records for welding performed on the instrumentation cabinet supports indicate that 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, has been violated. Criterion XVII states that sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality.

J. A. Jones apparently does not have sufficient inspection records to provide evidence that qualified welders performed work on instrumentation cabinet supports on cabinet numbers C-2B, C-6A, C-8 and C-9. Failure to assure that suitable proficiency was maintained and achieved by personnel performing activities affecting quality, in this case inspector certification, indicates that procedures affecting quality have not been fully accomplished this violates 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

Actions Required: See Item No. 9 in the Enclosure to the letter from D. Eisenhower to J. M. Cain (LP&L), June 13, 1984.

References

1. NCR-W3-7549
2. J. A. Jones Quality Assurance Program for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants, "Attachment F," Quality Assurance Personnel Training and Certification Program, June 18, 1975.
3. [J. Pertuit, Personnel File.]
4. [E. Toler, Welder #68 Qualifications.]
5. [C. Doss, Welder #79 Qualifications.]
6. ANSI N45.2.6-1973 "Qualifications of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants."
7. Regulatory Guide 1.58, "Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel."
8. Nuclear Project Operating Procedure #POP-N-702, Rev. 4, "Personnel Training, Qualification and Certification," October 15, 1975,
9. Procedure W-SITP-14, Rev. 4, "Welding Inspection," March 30, 1977,
10. FCR-IC-10, Rev. 3, August 28, 1979.
FCR-IC-P-1, January 7, 1980.
FCR-IC-42, Rev. 1, May 21, 1979.
FCR-IC-25, Rev. 1, April 23, 1979.
FCR-IC-44, May 3, 1979.
FCR-IC-45, May 15, 1979.

Statement Prepared By:

C. E. Johnson

Date _____

Reviewed By:

Team Leader

Date _____

Reviewed By:

Site Team Leader(s)

Date _____

Approved By:

Task Management

Date _____

Document Name:
SSER X A-160

Requestor's ID:
CONNIE

Author's Name:
C. E. Johnson

Document Comments:
A-161

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Assessment of Allegation: In examining the allegation concerning instrument cabinet supports, the NRC staff reviewed copies of requisition on warehouse (ROW) forms which tie directly to material receiving inspection reports (MRR). From the MRRs, the purchase order ^{was} ~~can be~~ identified. These records allow ^A the material used in the instrumentation cabinet supports to be traced. Further, all support steel for the instrument cabinets was purchased as safety-related. This item has neither safety significance nor generic implications.

X
X

Review of the allegation that the weld rods used on instrument cabinet supports were not traceable indicated that inspection reports listed the heat number or the lot number of the weld rods used so that weld rods were indeed traceable. This item has neither safety significance nor generic implications.

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The NCR indicated that two welders performed work in welding positions for which they were not qualified. LP&L ^{was} ~~has~~ committed to American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1-1972 for welder qualification. A review of inspection reports indicated ^{that} ~~only~~ one welder may have been unqualified.

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A review of the quality control (QC) inspection records indicated that on many supports there were more than two welders performing work. The records indicated that the welder was qualified for the welding he was performing by QC checking "satisfactory" in the welder qualification check box. There was an inspection report for each welder, but the exact weld location each welder made was not identified. EBASCO records review group stated that all J. A. Jones Construction Company's documentation ^{may} ~~was~~ not be completely assembled ~~at present~~. They strongly believe there ^{was} ~~is~~ documentation that proved that the welding on the instrument cabinet supports was performed by welders working in positions for which they were qualified.

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A review of this issue indicated that welding on the instrumentation cabinet structural supports in question may have been performed by welders qualified in the proper position; however, there were no inspection records available to verify that this was true.

The NRC staff reviewed the allegation that an unqualified QC inspector was examining welds on instrumentation cabinet supports. LP&L was committed to ANSI N45.2.6-17-1973, "Qualification of Inspection, Examination and Testing Personnel for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." A review of the J. A. Jones QA manual, Attachment F, "Quality Assurance Personnel Training and Certification Program" (June 18, 1975), indicated that it was in compliance with ANSI N45.2.6-1973. A review of the QC inspector's qualification records indicated that he was qualified and certified to perform the inspections. X

The item of safety significance arising from these allegations is that the quality of welds made on safety-related supports is indeterminate. This appears to be an isolated case not previously identified by LP&L and, therefore, has no generic implications.

Potential Violations: Missing inspection records for welding performed on the instrumentation cabinet supports indicate that 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, has been violated. Criterion XVII states that sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality.

J. A. Jones apparently does not have sufficient inspection records to provide evidence that qualified welders performed work on instrumentation cabinet supports on cabinet numbers C-2B, C-6A, C-8 and C-9. Failure to assure that suitable proficiency was maintained and achieved by personnel performing activities affecting quality, in this case inspector certification, indicates that procedures affecting quality have not been fully accomplished this violates 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

Actions Required: LP&L shall locate the missing documents and determine if the welders were appropriately certified for all of the weld positions they utilized. If the documentation cannot be located, appropriate action must be taken to assure the quality of the welds for the cabinet supports.

*See Item No. 9 in the Enclosure to the D. Esentut
Letter of June 13, 1984 to J.M. Cain (LP&L),*

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FCR-IC-44, May 3, 1979.
FCR-IC-45, May 15, 1979.

Statement Prepared By: C. E. Johnson Date

Reviewed By: Team Leader Date

Reviewed By: Site Team Leader(s) Date

Approved By: Task Management Date

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FILE

*Crutchfield
comments*

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C. E. Johnson

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