


Dave Morey
Vice President
Farley Project

Southern Nuclear
Operating Company
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Tel 205.992.5131

December 20, 1996



Docket Nos.: 50-348
50-364

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
Revision to Licensee Event Report Number 96-004-01
Surveillance Requirements Not Met For Manual
Safety Injection Input Into The Reactor Trip System

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Attached is Farley Nuclear Plant Licensee Event Report No. 96-004-01. This revision is being submitted to provide updated corrective action information. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

Dave Morey
Dave Morey

EFB:LER96-04.doc

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Region II Administrator
Mr. J. I. Zimmerman, NRR Project Manager
Mr. T. M. Ross, Plant Sr. Resident Inspector

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE
LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE
INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33),
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC
20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT
(3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000348

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

Surveillance Requirements Not Met For Manual Safety Injection Input Into the Reactor Trip System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME																				
0	6	2	0	9	6	9	6	-	0	0	4	-	0	1	1	2	2	0	9	6	J. M. Farley - Unit 2	0	5	0	0	0	3	6	4
												FACILITY NAME																	

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § : (Check one or more) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10)	1	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)						
		20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)						
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(5)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71						
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER						
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below						
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)	or in NRC Form 366A						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

R. D. Hill, General Manager - Nuclear Plant

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

334899-5156

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
		X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1757 on June 20, 1996 with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100% reactor power, during FNP's review of GL 96-01 'Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits', it was determined that Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) had been operating in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS). TS 4.3.1.1 requires surveillance testing to be performed on the manual safety injection (SI) Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) input to the Reactor Trip System. However, it was determined that surveillance testing was not being conducted and FNP entered TS 3.0.3. Following entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3, a power reduction was commenced at 1845 on Unit 2 and at 1850 on Unit 1. At approximately 2054 on June 20, 1996, NRC enforcement discretion was granted relative to TS 4.3.1.1 and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The power reduction was secured at approximately 95% reactor power on Unit 1 and at approximately 72% reactor power on Unit 2. The cause of the missed surveillance was cognitive personnel error which resulted in a failure to ensure the surveillance test procedure was adequate for testing of the manual SI input into the reactor trip circuitry. Procedures have been revised to test the manual SI input into the reactor trip system. Unit 1 testing will be performed prior to Mode 2 entry following the next unit shutdown. Unit 2 testing has been performed. FNP's review of GL 96-01 is continuing to verify adequate testing of safety-related logic circuits. This review will be completed by March 31, 1997.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

0500034896-004-012 OF 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366) (17)

Plant and System Identification

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as [XX].

Description of Event

At 1757 on June 20, 1996 with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100% reactor power, it was determined that Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) had been operating in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS). TS 4.3.1.1 requires surveillance testing to be performed on the manual safety injection (SI) Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) [JE] input to the Reactor Trip System [JC]. However, it was determined that surveillance testing was not being conducted and FNP entered TS 3.0.3.

Following entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3, a power reduction was commenced at 1845 on Unit 2 and at 1850 on Unit 1. At approximately 2054 on June 20, 1996, NRC enforcement discretion was granted relative to TS 4.3.1.1 and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The power reduction was secured at approximately 95% reactor power on Unit 1 and at approximately 72% reactor power on Unit 2.

This situation was discovered during FNP's review of GL 96-01 "Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits." During the review, no current procedure could be found that periodically tests the manual SI ESF input to the reactor trip system. It was determined upon review of the specific procedures referenced by the surveillance tracking master list that the procedures do not completely test the circuit. Specifically, the internal manual SI handswitch contacts that input to the reactor trip breaker shunt trip coils to cause the reactor trip breakers to open have not been tested. Although this feature was tested in pre-operational testing, surveillance procedures developed during plant initial startup did not address testing of these particular contacts.

Cause of Event

The cause of the missed surveillance was cognitive personnel error which resulted in a failure to ensure the surveillance test procedure was adequate for testing of the manual SI input into the reactor trip circuitry.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0500034896-004-013 OF 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365) (17)

Safety Assessment

The SI input to the reactor trip system is designed to ensure that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection. The SI reactor trip is a diverse signal provided to protect the core in the event of a LOCA. The manual SI input to the reactor trip system is a redundant feature of the reactor trip system. Current operating procedures direct the operator to ensure that the reactor is tripped (not critical) following any safety injection signal. In fact, for any event requiring a manual SI, operating procedures direct the operator to manually trip the reactor prior to initiating manual SI. Review of the FNP FSAR and accident analyses indicate that the manual SI input to the reactor trip system is not taken credit for in any accident or transient analysis. In addition, because of the redundant features associated with the reactor trip system, actuation of the SI handswitch above 35% reactor power would cause a reactor trip by tripping of the main turbine.

The health and safety of the public was not affected by this event.

Based on the above, no safety concerns exist.

Corrective Action

Procedures have been revised to test the manual SI input into the reactor trip system. Unit 1 testing will be performed prior to Mode 2 entry following the next unit shutdown. Unit 2 testing has been performed.

FNP has performed a broadness review of missed Technical Specification surveillance's identified from 1993 to August, 1996 to determine the root cause contributors. Based on the broadness review the events associated with the missed Technical Specification surveillance's concerning inadequate preparation were either unique in nature or within the scope defined by GL 96-01. The lessons learned of the broadness review will be discussed with appropriate plant personnel.

FNP's review of GL 96-01 is continuing to verify adequate testing of safety-related logic circuits. This review will be completed by March 31, 1997.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1

YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER
05000348	96	-004-01

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366) (17)

Additional Information

The SI function of the handswitch contacts is tested on a regular basis in accordance with unit TS. FNP maintenance history has shown no problems with these handswitch contacts and therefore, SNC believes that no problems exist with the particular contacts in question. The shunt trip and undervoltage trip circuits associated with the manual reactor trip switches are fully tested each refueling.

On June 20, 1996, an Enforcement Discretion was granted relative to TS 4.3.1.1 to allow continued operation, pending a TS change. A request was submitted on June 24, 1996 for a Unit 1 Cycle 14 only and Unit 2 Cycle 11 only TS change to delete the requirement for surveillance of the manual SI input to the reactor trip circuitry until the next unit shutdown.

The following LERs involved missed TS surveillance due to inadequate procedural guidance:

LER 90-002-00 (Shared) - Surveillance Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedural Guidance

LER 93-002-00 (Unit 2) - Missed Technical Specification on the TDAFWP

LER 96-002-00 (Unit 2) - Misapplication of Technical Specification 4.4.6 Requirements Regarding F*