

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) INOPERABLE WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM HYDROGEN/OXYGEN MONITORS																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 6	0 5	8 5	8 5	0 3 5	0 0	0 7	0 3	8 5	SONGS, UNIT 3				0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2			
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				X 50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME H. E. MORGAN, STATION MANAGER										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO																

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 6/5/85 at 1715, with Units 2 and 3 at 100% power, the Waste Gas Surge Tank (WGST) Hydrogen and Oxygen (H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub>) Monitors and the Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> Monitors were found out of service during a shiftly surveillance. Contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.3.9, Action Statement 39, both channels of Waste Gas Holdup System Explosive Gas Monitoring System were inoperable for 4 1/2 hours without taking the required 4 hour grab sample.

In preparation for a 31-day surveillance on the WGDT H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> Monitors, the Control Operator instructed the Radwaste Operator to take the "Train A" Monitors out of service without explicitly stating which monitors are associated with "Train A." The Radwaste Operator, thinking that Train A was associated with the WGST, erroneously isolated the WGST Monitors. The lack of specific direction contributed to the error, and the use of the "Train" terminology in reference to the WGST and WGDT Monitors is not used in plant labeling.

As corrective actions, this event has been discussed with operators to stress the importance of providing specific details while giving orders for equipment manipulations, and H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> Monitor surveillance procedures will be revised to exclude "Train" designations. This was an isolated event and no further corrective actions are planned.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER		
		8 5	- 0 3 5	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.9, Action Statement 39, requires when both the Waste Gas Surge Tank (WGST) Hydrogen and Oxygen ( $H_2/O_2$ ) Monitors (EIIS Component Code MON) and Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT)  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors are inoperable, operation of the Waste Gas Holdup System (EIIS System Code IL) may continue provided that grab samples are taken at least every 4 hours.

The I&C surveillance procedures for the Waste Gas Holdup System's  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors specify the WGDT  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors as "Train A," and the WGST  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors as "Train B." Train terminology is not used by other station groups for these monitors.

On June 5, 1985, at 0820, with Units 2 and 3 at 100% power, a Work Authorization Record (WAR) was approved to perform the I&C 31-day surveillance on Train A  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors and maintain Train B  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors aligned to the WGST. The Control Operator directed the Radwaste Operator to isolate the Train A  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors and align the Train B  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors to the WGST in preparation for the 31-day surveillance. The Control Operator did not explicitly identify by equipment number which monitors are associated with Train A. At 0853, the Radwaste Operator, thinking that Train A was associated with the WGST, took the monitors normally aligned to the WGST out of service, and aligned the other monitors to the WGST.


At 1300, I&C isolated the Train A  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors, unaware that the Radwaste Operator had erroneously isolated the Train B  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors, inadvertently rendered the Waste Gas Holdup System Explosive Gas Monitoring System (EIIS Component Code IL) inoperable. At approximately 1716, a Radwaste Operator discovered that the system was inoperable, and at 1730 the system was restored. Contrary to the Technical Specification Action Statement, both channels of the Waste Gas Holdup System  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors were inoperable for 4 1/2 hours without taking the required 4 hour grab sample.

The error by the Radwaste Operator was due to inadequate instruction by the Control Operator. The use of the terminology "Train" in reference to the WGDT and WGST  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors is inappropriate since it is not used in plant labeling for this equipment.

As corrective actions, the event has been discussed with operators stressing the importance of giving clear instructions and not to use the "Train" terminology in reference to the  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors. The  $H_2/O_2$  Monitor surveillance procedures will be revised to exclude the "Train" terminology. Operating Instruction S023-8-14, "Radwaste Gas Collection System Operation," has been revised to include a section providing details on aligning the WGDT  $H_2/O_2$  Monitors to the WGST.

Since  $H_2/O_2$  were within safe limits, and the period of inoperability was less than required to build up an unacceptable concentration of  $H_2/O_2$ , there was no safety significance to this event.

*Southern California Edison Company*



SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

P.O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

July 3, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361  
30-Day Report  
Licensee Event Report No. 85-035  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36 and 50.73(a)(2)(i), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving the waste gas hydrogen/oxygen monitors. Since this event involved shared systems between Units 2 and 3, a single report is being filed in accordance with NUREG-1022. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the health and safety of the public was affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

H. E. MORGAN  
STATION MANAGER

Enclosure: LER No. 85-035

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)  
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)  
  
J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)  
  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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