

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1										PAGE (3) 1 OF 2			
TITLE (4) INADVERTENT STARTING OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR																							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0	8	2	7	8	5	8	5	0	3	0	0	0	9	2	4	8	5	0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0			20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)								
			20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)								
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)								
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)												
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)												
			20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																							
NAME Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance														TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 1 2 3 6 7 7 8 5 1									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC													
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)														EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)														<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO									

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 08/27/85 at approximately 0820 CDT with the unit at 2430 MWt (approximately 100% reactor power), plant personnel were verifying the equipment clearance in preparation for performing semi-annual preventive maintenance on the "A" emergency diesel generator (1R43-S001A), plant personnel mistakenly entered the "C" diesel room. They attempted to vent the air pressure from the diesel air start system by taking "At Engine" control of the diesel and pressing the start button; this is the normal method of venting air from the air start system. Since the starting air to the "C" diesel was not isolated, the "C" started and ran normally. The personnel involved immediately shutdown the engine and placed the "Remote/At Engine" switch back to the "Remote" position.

In order to prevent the recurrence of events of this nature, the diesel preventive maintenance procedure will be revised to include a specific order for clearance verification with sign-offs at each step. Additionally, the personnel involved in this event were disciplined.

There were no actual or potential adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 8 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		0 3	0 0	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because the unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature took place.

On 08/27/85 at approximately 0820 CDT with the unit at 2430 MWt (approximately 100% reactor power), unlicensed plant personnel in the process of verifying an equipment clearance on the "A" emergency diesel (1R43-S001A) inadvertently started the "C" emergency diesel (1R43-S001C).

While verifying the equipment clearance in preparation for performing semi-annual preventive maintenance on 1R43-S001A, plant personnel mistakenly entered the "C" diesel room. They attempted to vent the air pressure from the diesel air start system by taking "At Engine" control of the diesel and pressing the start button; this is the normal method of venting air from the air start system. Since the starting air to the "C" diesel was not isolated, it started and ran normally. Realizing their error, the personnel involved immediately shutdown the engine and placed the "Remote/At Engine" switch back to the "Remote" position.

The cause of this event was personnel error in that the personnel did not verify that they were working on the proper engine, nor did they perform the equipment clearance verification in the proper order. The starting air isolation valve should have been verified closed before attempting to vent the system.

In order to prevent the recurrence of events of this nature, the diesel preventive maintenance procedure will be revised to include a specific order for clearance verification with sign offs at each step. Additionally, the personnel involved in this event were disciplined. The importance of properly verifying clearances was stressed to them.

There were no actual or potential adverse safety consequences as a result of this event, nor were the health and safety of the public affected since the "C" emergency diesel was unavailable for service only during the short period while the control switch was in the "At Engine" position.

A previous similar event in which plant personnel worked on the wrong equipment occurred in October, 1984 as reported in LER 50-366/1984-022. The corrective action taken at that time was sufficient to prevent recurrence by the personnel involved in that event. This is considered to be an isolated event, and the corrective action described above is considered to be adequate to preclude recurrence of an event of this nature.

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
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

September 24, 1985
LR-MRG-080-0985

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1985-030. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).



H. C. Nix
General Manager

SB
HCN/SBT/vlz

xc: NRC Region II
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Letter File (2)

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