

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-322/85-16

Docket No. 50-322

License No. NPF-19

Licensee: Long Island Lighting Company
175 East Old Country Road
Hicksville, New York 11801

Facility Name: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: Wading River, New York

Inspection Conducted: March 4-8, 1985

Date of Last Physical Security Inspection: January 21-25, 1985

Type of Inspection: Special Physical Security Inspection

Inspectors:

Roland J. Bailey
R. J. Bailey,
Physical Security Inspector

June 25, 1985
date

W. G. Martin
W. G. Martin,
Physical Security Inspector

7-1-85
date

Approved by:

R. R. Keimig
R. R. Keimig, Chief
Safeguard Section, DRSS

7-1-85
date

Inspection Summary: Special Physical Security Inspection on March 4-8, 1985
(Inspection Report No. 50-322/85-16).

Areas Inspected: Special inspection to determine the state of training of security force personnel at the licensee's facility and their ability to carry out assigned duties. The inspection consisted of: reexaminations of a statistically selected sample of security force personnel in qualification/re-qualification tasks; observations of examination administration; interviews of security personnel; and, reviews and evaluations of examination results. A review of security events (reported and recorded) was also conducted. The inspection, conducted by two region based inspectors, involved 90 hours on site, of which 76 hours were on the day shift.

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Results: The inspection determined that security force personnel are sufficiently knowledgeable to carry out their assigned duties.

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

J. Smith, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support Department
J. Morin, Manager, Nuclear Services Division
R. Reen, Site Security Supervisor
J. Devlin, Security Administration
C. Hicks, YOH Security Program Supervisor

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel and members of the YOH Security contract guard force.

2. 30703 - Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 8, 1985. At that time, the purpose, scope and results of the inspection were reviewed. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

3. Background and Introduction

This special inspection was conducted because of security force training deficiencies identified at other nuclear power plants. The purpose of the inspection was to determine the state of security force training and to determine the ability of security force personnel to carry out their duties and responsibilities. The inspection consisted of reexamining a statistically selected sample of the security force in the tasks in which they were qualified. The statistical sample used by the inspectors was based on MIL-STD-105D, "Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes", to obtain results at a confidence level of 95%. To do this, personnel were divided into two groups, i.e., one composed of Supervisors/Guards/Watch-persons and, the other, CAS/SAS operators. Three hundred and thirty-six examinations (representing 18 sets of individual tasks) were administered to 25 members of the security force by the licensee and observed on a random basis by the inspectors. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the examination results and interviewed examinees, other security force personnel, and representatives of the security force contractor and the licensee.

4. Results

Based on the results of the written examinations, the inspectors determined that security force personnel, with the exception of one specific group, are adequately trained to carry out the duties and responsibilities to which they are assigned. Compensatory measures were taken and remedial actions promptly initiated with regard to all personnel who failed any portion of the reexaminations. The one group, whose reexamination failure rate was found unacceptable, was subsequently verified capable of

performing their assigned tasks, based on observation by the inspectors of on-the-job performance. The inspectors advised the licensee to evaluate the qualification and requalification program for that group.

5. General Knowledge of Security Program Duties and Responsibilities

Task specific examinations used by the licensee to qualify the security force were combined by the inspectors into 13 discrete sets. Twenty individuals, who were deemed qualified by the licensee to perform the specific tasks, were selected by the inspectors at random from the total security force to take the thirteen sets of examinations. A total of 311 task specific examinations were administered to those 20 individuals. Four individuals failed a total of eight tests. Remedial action was promptly initiated for the four individuals.

6. Knowledge of Central and Secondary Alarm Station (CAS/SAS) Duties and Responsibilities

The qualification for CAS/SAS operators consists of a total of five examinations; two written tests and three practical tests. Five CAS/SAS operators, deemed qualified by the licensee, were selected by the inspectors and were administered a total of 25 examinations. Three of the five operators failed to meet the licensee's established standard for CAS/SAS operator qualification.

Because of the statistically unacceptable number of failures, the licensee agreed to examine all operators deemed qualified for CAS/SAS duty. These additional examinations were not completed prior to the end of this inspection, however, based on observations of on-the-job performance by the inspectors, sufficient individuals were found capable of performing their assigned tasks to allow continued operation. The inspectors advised the licensee to evaluate the qualification and requalification program for CAS/SAS operators to determine whether:

- (1) the training properly prepares an individual for the required tasks;
- (2) the qualification examination is a valid measure of the knowledge an individual requires to carry out the tasks; and,
- (3) the individuals selected to be operators are properly suited for that assignment.

The licensee committed to perform an evaluation and make the results available to the inspectors. (Inspection Follow-up 50-322/85-16-01.)

In an April 16 telephone conversation, the licensee's Site Security Supervisor informed the inspector that the written examination of the remainder of the CAS/SAS operators showed 10 failures in one of the two written tests and one failure in the other. However, due to a misunderstanding, the remaining operators had not been administered the three practical tests. The licensee agreed that the test results indicated that

retraining of the entire group prior to administering the practical tests would be the prudent course of action. On April 23, the licensee advised by telephone that all of the CAS/SAS operators had been retrained; two-thirds had been retested and requalified, and the remaining one-third would be tested by April 26. The licensee advised the NRC on April 26 that the remainder of the operators had been retested and all had requalified.

7. Weapons Qualification

Seventeen individuals, who were deemed weapons qualified by the licensee, were selected by the inspectors from the armed security force and were examined by firing the weapons qualification course. In addition, nine individuals were selected for examination in the night familiarization weapons course. There were no failures.

8. MC 92700-Follow-Up On Security Event Reports

A review of the security event report log by the inspectors revealed that eight events had been recorded in the log since January 1, 1985, of which only one required reporting to the NRC. Review of the licensee's follow-up action taken in each event revealed that adequate compensatory measures had been taken. No generic problems were identified in the events, security force response, or in documentation of the events. Additionally, the inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's routine incident reports, which are not required to be reported to the NRC. The inspectors found that numerous reports did not fully reflect, in the written documentation, the follow-up action that was taken, as required by instructions on the incident report form. However, the inspector was able to determine through interviews that the Site Security Supervisor or one of his authorized representatives had conducted some level of follow-up action on the events selected by the inspectors for review. While documentation of follow-up action on these incidents is not required by NRC, the licensee's report form requires that the follow-up action by security management be documented. The Site Security Supervisor agreed to take positive steps to ensure that this would occur. (Inspector Follow-up 50-322/85-16-02.)