



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39215-1640

May 24, 1985

O. D. KINGSLEY, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N. W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator

Dear Dr. Grace:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29
File: 15521/15524
Report No. 50-416/85-09, dated
April 25, 1985 (MAEC-85/0133)
AECM-85/0166

Reference: (1) AECM-85/0097, March 25, 1985
(2) AECM-85/0146, May 3, 1985

This is in response to your letter dated April 25, 1985, which contains a Notice of Violation for Violation 50-416/85-09-01 and 50-416/85-09-07. MP&L's responses to the violations are attached. In addition, References 1 and 2 transmitted Licensee Event Reports which also address the occurrences, causes, and corrective actions.

Should you have any questions, please contact my office.

ODK:dmm
Attachment

cc: (See Next Page)

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cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)
Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/a)
Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o)
Mr. R. C. Butcher (w/a)

Mr. James M. Taylor, Director (w/a)
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

RESPONSE TO NRC VIOLATION 50-416/85-09-01

Notice of Violation

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI states in part that measures shall be established to assure that documents, including changes, are reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel.

Contrary to the above, Procedure 06-EL-1L21-0-0001 was inadequate in that it permitted an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation when technicians put the Division 2 batteries on equalize charge.

I. ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION

Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) admits to the alleged violation. The violation did not affect the health and safety of the public.

II. REASONS FOR THE VIOLATION IF ADMITTED

The inadequacy of the procedure was that it allowed both battery chargers to be placed in service together. With this procedural method, high voltages are encountered while adjusting the second charger to the equalizing voltage.

The Division 2 battery chargers were being placed on equalize to charge the battery banks in preparation for a battery discharge test. During the sequence of operations, required by the procedure, the chargers potentiometers were turned down to minimum voltage prior to placing the chargers on equalize. The first charger was then placed on equalize and its output adjusted to 140 VDC as required by the procedure; however, when adjusting the second charger, a voltage increase to 147 VDC occurred which tripped the inverter.

III. CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED

Surveillance Procedures 06-EL-1L11-R-0003, "ESF 125 Volt Battery Bank Service Discharge Test" and 06-EL-1L21-0-0001, "Battery Capacity Discharge Test", were revised. These procedures now allow only one charger to be used when equalizing a battery.

IV. CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS

MP&L considers the action taken in III sufficient to prevent further violations.

V. DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Full compliance has been achieved.

RESPONSE TO NRC VIOLATION 50-416/85-09-07

Notice of Violation

Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained.

Contrary to the above, on April 4, 1985, steps in Surveillance Procedure 06-EL-1D31-M-0001 were performed out of sequence resulting in an ESF containment isolation valve actuation. This ESF actuation caused isolation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

I. ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION

Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) admits to the alleged violation. The violation did not affect the health and safety of the public.

II. REASON FOR THE VIOLATION IF ADMITTED

On April 4, 1985, technicians were performing a monthly functional test. As the technicians neared the completion of the test, they requested an operator to restore a bypass switch to normal. The operator arrived at the Upper Control Room Panel and transferred the switch to normal. However, the technicians working behind the panel had not yet removed some test equipment installed while performing the test. The configuration of the test equipment was such that with the switch in normal, the circuitry initiated an RCIC isolation.

The cause of the violation was a misunderstanding between the operator in the Control Room and the technicians working in the Upper Control Room. The technicians were working behind the panel and were not seen by the operator when he arrived to place the switch in normal.

III. CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED

A memo was issued by the Operations Superintendent to his personnel informing them of the importance of ensuring action involving outside groups are well coordinated. It was further stressed that personnel being requested to perform activities must understand their role in the evolution.

A memo was issued by the Electrical Superintendent to the technicians involved. This memo stressed the necessity of ensuring adequate communications exist in order to prevent procedural steps from being performed out of sequence.

IV. CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS

MP&L considers the action taken in III above sufficient to prevent further violations.

V. DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Full compliance has been achieved.