

APPENDIX B

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/85-26

LP: NPF-42

Docket: 50-482

Licensee: Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)
Post Office Box 208
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Conducted: June 1 to July 31, 1985

Inspectors: R. P. Mulhahn
for J. E. Cummins, Senior Reactor Inspector,
Operations
(pars. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, and 13)

9/12/85
Date

R. P. Mulhahn
for B. L. Bartlett, Resident Reactor Inspector,
Operations
(pars. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13)

9/12/85
Date

R. P. Mulhahn
for H. F. Bundy, Resident Reactor Inspector,
Operations (pars. 4 and 13)

9/12/85
Date

Approved: L. E. Martin
L. E. Martin, Chief, Project Section B
Reactor Projects Branch

9/13/85
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted June 1 to July 31, 1985 (Report 50-482/85-26)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status; followup on previously identified items; operational safety verification, engineered safety features system walkdown; startup test witnessing, startup test data review; onsite followup of events; site emergency drill; enforcement conference (security); allegation followup; security; and plant tours. The inspection involved 450 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 67 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.

Results: Within the 13 areas inspected, two violations were identified, (failure to control measuring and test equipment in accordance with procedure, paragraph 4, and temporary changes not incorporated in procedure as required, paragraph 6). One unresolved item is identified in paragraph 12.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

#G. L. Koester, Vice President-Nuclear
+o#C. C. Mason, Director-Nuclear Operations
+o#F. T. Rhodes, Plant Superintendent
J. A. Zell, Operations Superintendent
+oH. K. Chernoff, Licensing
oM. G. Williams, Supt. of Regulatory, Quality, and Administrative Services
+oK. Peterson, Licensing
+o#O. L. Maynard, Licensing Supervisor
W. B. Norton, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
oR. M. Grant, Director-Quality
o#J. W. Johnson, Chief of Security
+C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist
+oW. M. Lindsay, Quality Systems Supervisor
+oR. Hoyt, Emergency Plan Supervisor
J. Houghton, Operations Coordinator
A. Freitag, Nuclear Plant Engineering Site
o+R. Flannigan, Site Representative, Kansas City Power & Light
+F. D. McLaurin, Startup Manager
G. D. Boyer, Superintendent of Technical Support
M. Nichols, Health Physics Supervisor
#D. R. Smith, Superintendent of Plant Support

The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.

+Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on July 1, 1985.

oDenotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on August 5, 1985.

#Denotes those personnel attending the Enforcement Conference held in Region IV on June 27, 1985.

2. Plant Status

On June 6, 1985, the reactor plant initially entered Mode 1 (power operation greater than 5%) and on June 12, 1985, the turbine generator was synchronized to the grid for the first time. During this inspection period, power ascension testing at the 20, 30, 50, and 75 percent power plateaus was completed.

3. Followup on Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Infraction (50-482/78-13): Failure to Meet Concrete Acceptance Criteria for Containment Base Mat

This item was transferred to NRR for evaluation. The NRR evaluation and conclusion is contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Wolf Creek Station (NUREG-0881) in paragraph 3.8.4. This item was incorrectly identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/84-22 as 50-482/78-04-B.

(Closed) Open Item (50-482/8427-03): Calibration Status of Installed Instruments

This open item tracked licensee actions to resolve inspector concerns over the controls associated with normally installed plant instrumentation used to support Technical Specification required surveillance testing. In response to these concerns, the licensee has prepared a list of all such instruments and cross referenced the instruments to the surveillances they support. The list has been incorporated into Procedure ADM 02-300 along with requirements for the instrument and control department to notify operations any time one of the instruments is found out of service or out of calibration. Operations is tasked with the responsibility for assessing the impact of the instrument problem on the validity of the surveillance tests that instrument supports. This item was closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/84-57 and 50-482/85-11 but was incorrectly identified as open item 50-482/8427-02.

(Closed) Open Item (50-482/8459-07): Corrections to 50% Pseudo Rod Drop Test Procedure, SU7-SF09.2

The 50% power pseudo rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) rod drop test was deleted from the Wolf Creek power ascension test program. By letter dated July 3, 1985, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation notified the licensee of its acceptance of the deletion of this test. Deletion of the test was based on successful performance of the test on other Westinghouse plants.

(Closed) Open Item (50-482/8509-02): Inclusion of Loop Resistance Temperature Detector Response Times in Preoperational Test Procedure SU3-SA01

Test Discrepancy Report No. 30 documented the inclusion of the required response times into Preoperational Test Procedure, SU3-SA01.

(Closed) Licensee Condition Attachment 2, Item 2.C(7) Qualification of Personnel:

This license condition required KG&E to certify the individuals who will be standing watch as shift advisors. A list of the certified shift advisors was provided to the NRC via KG&E letter KMLNRC 85-128, dated May 29, 1985, satisfying this license condition.

(Closed) SER Item (50-482/84-00-158): Alternative Shutdown Capability for the Control Room

This item tracked the installation of five new isolation switches and the modification of four existing isolation switches. These switch changes were required to provide isolation of equipment from a control room fire. To verify that this item was completed satisfactorily, the NRC inspector reviewed licensee documentation of the required switch changes, observed installed switches in the field, and reviewed Procedure OFN-00-017, Revision 3, Control Room Evacuation.

(Closed) SER Item (50-482/84-00-150): Seismic Qualification of Thermocouple/Core Cooling Monitor System

This item tracked the onsite completion of Westinghouse Field Change Notice (FCN) SAPM-10627. To ensure the field modifications were completed, the NRC inspector reviewed a signed off copy of FCN SAPM-10627, discussed the modifications with licensee personnel, and inspected portions of the completed modifications in the field.

(Closed) SER Item (50-482/84-00-52): Post Implementation Review of Emergency Support Facilities

This item was closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/85-11, but was incorrectly identified as SER Item 50-482/84-00-50.

(Closed) SER Item (50-482/84-00-151): Setpoint Adjustment of Barton Differential Pressure Switches

This item tracked the change in setpoint for Barton differential pressure indicating switches model numbers 288A and 581A. From discussions with licensee personnel and review of the WCGS Total Plant Setpoint Document, the NRC inspector determined that the required switch setpoints had been changed.

(Closed) Open Item (50-482/8427-04): Availability of Information in Auxiliary Shutdown Room

The NRC inspector verified that plant operating procedures, that provide instructions for required operations from the auxiliary shutdown room, have been placed in the room. The NRC inspector discussed the shutdown

accomplished from the auxiliary shutdown room during Power Ascension Test Procedure SU7-0014, "External to Control Room Shutdown," with the cognizant shift supervisor (SS), and the SS stated that adequate procedures and material were available in the auxiliary shutdown room.

4. Operational Safety Verification

The NRC inspectors verified that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility records. The NRC inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the security plan.

During a tour of the plant on June 26, 1985, the NRC inspector observed Pressure Gauge WC 9967 connected to BN-FI-968. This pressure gauge was out of calibration, not installed in accordance with a temporary modification order or approved procedure, and did not have a 10 CFR 50.59 applicability review. Failure to control this modification to plant equipment in accordance with procedures is an apparent violation. (50-482/8526-01)

5. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) System Walkdown

The NRC inspectors verified the operability of ESF systems by walking down selected accessible portions of the systems. The NRC inspectors verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required position, power was available, and valves were locked where required. The NRC inspectors also inspected system components for damage or other conditions that might degrade system performance. The ESF systems listed below were walked down during this inspection report period:

- . Auxiliary feedwater system
- . Emergency diesel generators
- . Reactor coolant charging system
- . Safety injection system
- . Residual heat removal system
- . Containment spray system
- . Safety Class 1E 4.16KV AC system

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Startup Test Witnessing

Selected portions of the startup tests listed below were witnessed to ascertain conformance of the licensee to license and procedural requirements, to observe the performance of the staff, and to ascertain the adequacy of test program records, including preliminary evaluations of test results.

- . SU7-BB04 - RCS Flow Coastdown Measurement Test
- . SU7-BB05 - Pressurizer Continuous Spray Flow Setting
- . SU7-0009.1 - Load Swing at 30%
- . SU7-0014 - External to Control Room Shutdown
- . SU7-0020.2 - Turbine Generator Test at 20%
- . SU7-0907.2 - Plant Performance
- . SU7-SC03.2 - Thermal Power and Setpoint Data at 30%
- . SU7-SE02.1 - Operational Alignment of Nuclear Instrumentation
- . SU7-SE02.4 - Operational Alignment of Nuclear Instrumentation
- . SU7-SE03.1 - Preliminary Axial Flux Difference Instrumentation at 50% Power
- . SU7-SE03.2 - Axial Flux Difference Instrumentation Calibration at 75% Power
- . SU7-SF03.3 - Hot Full Flow Rod Drops
- . SU7-SF03.4 - Hot No Flow Rod Drops
- . SU7-SF09.1 - RCCA or Bank Worth, 30% Pseudo Rod Ejection
- . SU7-SR01 - Incore Movable Detector
- . SU7-SR04 - Incore Instrumentation Operability
- . SU7-SR02 - Incore Movable Detector and Thermocouple Mapping at Power
- . SU7-AB01.1 - Automatic Steam Generator Level Control Test
- . SU7-AB01.4 - Automatic Steam Generator Level Control Test
- . SU7-0008.2 - Power Coefficient Determination
- . SU7-0012 - Rod Drop and Plant Trip
- . SU7-SF06.4 - Operational Alignment of Process Temperature Instrumentation at 75% Power
- . SU7-0010.1 - Large Load Reduction - 75% Power

NRC inspector findings are discussed below:

While observing the adjustment of power range nuclear instruments per Wolf Creek Work Request (WR) 91611-85, the NRC inspector determined that the calorimetric had been run with a copy of Surveillance Procedure STS SE-001, Revision 2, "Power Range Adjustment to Calorimetric," that did not have applicable temporary changes incorporated in it. This resulted in the nuclear instrument channels being adjusted to a power level of 23.6% when they should have been adjusted to 24.6%. A followup calorimetric was performed and the nuclear instruments were adjusted accordingly. Reactor power was maintained constant during this evolution.

Step 3.1.1 of the licensee's Administrative Procedure ADM 02-021, "Use of Procedures in Operations," requires that, prior to use, a procedure will be verified to insure that it has all changes incorporated in it. Performance of this surveillance using a copy of STS SE-001 that did not have the latest changes incorporated is an apparent violation.
(50-482/8526-02)

7. Startup Test Data Review

a. The following test data packages were reviewed by the NRC inspectors for:

- . Verification that all test changes, including deletions, were approved, reviewed, and incorporated properly.
- . Verification that all test deficiencies were resolved in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
- . Verification that deficiencies which constitute a reportable occurrence as defined by Technical Specifications (TS) have been properly recorded.
- . Verification that the as run copy of the completed test data package was properly completed.
- . Verification that the test summary and evaluation were completed in accordance with procedure.
- . Verification that the test results were properly approved.

SU7-SF03.1, "Cold, No Flow Control Rod System Testing,"
Revision 3, dated March 29, 1985.
SU7-SF03.2, "Cold, Full Flow Control Rod System Testing,"
Revision 2, dated April 6, 1985.
SU7-SF03.3, "Hot, No Flow Control Rod System Testing,"
Revision 2, dated April 26, 1985.
SU7-SF03.4, "Hot, Full Flow Control Rod System Testing,"
Revision 2, dated April 26, 1985.
SU7-SF09.1, "RCCA or Bank Worth Measurement at Power (30%
Power Pseudo Rod Ejection)," Revision 1, dated
June 23, 1985.
SU7-S011, "Initial Criticality and Low Power Test Sequence,"
Revision 3, dated May 17, 1985.
SU7-S012, "Initial Synchronization and 20% Power Test
Sequence," Revision 2, dated April 28, 1985.
SU7-S013, "Power Ascension and 50% Power Test Sequence,"
Revision 3, dated June 19, 1985.

- SU7-BB02, "Pressurizer Heater and Spray Capability Test,"
Revision 1, dated April 10, 1985.
- SU7-BB04, "Rx Coolant System Flow Coastdown Test, Revision 1,
dated May 19, 1985.
- SU3-BB13, "Special Test Procedure for Pressurizer Relief
Valve," Revision 0,

b. The following tests were reviewed by the NRC inspectors for:

- . Verification that the cognizant engineering function has evaluated the test results and has signified that the testing demonstrated that the system met design requirements.
- . Verification that the licensee specifically compared test results with established acceptance criteria.
- . Verification that those personnel responsible for review and acceptance of test results have documented their review and acceptance of the data package and the evaluation.
- . Verification of quality assurance/safety group (r other independent review of test results as prescribed in FSAR or other commitments.
- . Verification that those personnel charged with responsibility for review and acceptance of test results have documented their review and acceptance of the data package and the evaluation.

- SU7-BB03, "Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement,"
Revision 1, dated March 24, 1985.
- SU7-SR04, "Incore Instrumentation Operability Test,"
Revision 2, dated April 26, 1985.
- SU7-S010, "Post Core Loading Precritical Test Sequence,"
Revision 3, dated May 19, 1985.
- SU7-SE02.2, "Operational Alignment of Nuclear
Instrumentation," Revision 2, dated May 2, 1985.
- SU7-SE03.1, "Preliminary Axial Flux Difference Instrumentation
Calibration," Revision 1, dated June 28, 1985.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Onsite Followup of Events

The NRC inspector performed onsite followup of the nonemergency events listed below. The NRC inspector observed control room personnel response,* observed instrumentation indicators of reactor plant parameters,* reviewed logs and computer printouts, and discussed the event with cognizant personnel. The NRC inspector verified the licensee had responded to the event in accordance with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required in a timely fashion.

Engineered safety feature actuations that occurred during the report period are listed in the table below. The NRC inspector will review the license event report (LER) for each of these events and will report any findings in future NRC inspection reports.

*When availability of the NRC inspector allowed observation of these activities.

Summary of all ESF Actuations during June and July are listed below:

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event**</u> | <u>Plant Status</u> | <u>Cause</u> |
|-------------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| 6-2-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 6-4-85 | AFAS | Mode 3 | Loss of condenser vacuum |
| 6-5-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 6-6-85 | Rx Trip | Mode 1 | Lo-Lo S/G level |
| 6-7-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 6-9-85 | AFAS | Mode 2 | Main feedwater pump trip |
| 6-9-85 | AFAS | Mode 2 | Hi-Hi S/G level |
| 6-11-85 | AFAS | Mode 1 | Hi-Hi S/G level |
| 6-13-85 | Rx Trip/AFAS | Mode 1 | Lo-Lo S/G level |
| 6-14-85 | AFAS | Mode 1 | Hi S/G level |
| 6-23-85 | Rx Trip | Mode 1 | RTB "A" accidentally opened |
| 6-24-85 | Rx Trip/AFAS | Mode 2 | Lo-Lo S/G level |
| 7-2-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-5-85 | AFAS | Mode 1 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-5-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Hi-Hi S/G level |
| 7-7-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-8-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-8-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-9-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-9-85 | Rx Trip | Mode 1 | Lo-Lo S/G level |
| 7-10-85 | Rx Trip | Mode 1 | Lo-Lo S/G level |
| 7-10-85 | MFIVA | Mode 2 | Hi S/G level |
| 7-11-85 | AFAS | Mode 2 | Hi S/G level |
| 7-11-85 | Rx Trip | Mode 1 | Hi flux on IR |
| 7-12-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Broken detector tape |
| 7-12-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-12-85 | CRVIS | Mode 3 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-17-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Faulty bypass switch |
| 7-20-85 | D/G Start | Mode 1 | Relay accidentally bumped |
| 7-22-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Broken detector tape |
| 7-23-85 | Rx Trip/AFAS | Mode 1 | Loss of control power |
| 7-28-85 | CRVIS | Mode 1 | Spike on radiation monitor |
| 7-31-85 | Rx Trip/AFAS | Mode 1 | PR HI negative rate |

**Event

CRVIS - Control room ventiation isolation
AFAS - Auxiliary feedwater actuation signal
Rx Trip - Reactor trip
MFIVA - Main feedwater isolation valve actuation
S/G - Steam generator
RTB - Reactor trip breaker
IR - Intermediate range
PR - Power range

Specifics of the reactor trip and related events that occurred on June 13, 1985, are discussed below:

At 03:45 CDT on June 13, 1985, with reactor plant power at approximately 15%, the main turbine generator was manually tripped due to excessive vibration. Subsequent to the turbine trip at 03:53 CDT the operating main feedwater pump 'A' tripped. The operator manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and reestablished feedwater flow to the steam generators. When steam generator water levels continued to decrease, the operator attempted to start the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, but it tripped on overspeed when the operator opened the steam supply valves to the turbine out of sequence (i.e., the trip/trottle valve was opened prior to opening the main steam supply valve). At 04:00 CDT a low-low level condition in steam generator 'B' caused a reactor trip, an auxiliary feedwater actuation, and a steam generator blowdown and sample isolation. A feedwater isolation also occurred due to low reactor coolant system average temperature in conjunction with the reactor trip. At the time, the auxiliary feedwater actuation occurred the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were already running having been manually started as described above. All engineered safety features and reactor protection system equipment operated per design requirements. When the operator closed the main steam line isolation valves (MSLIV) manually in the slow-close mode to help reduce reactor coolant system cooldown, the 'A' steam generator MSLIV failed to close. The valve closed when the operator manually went to the fast-close mode.

Evaluation and applicable corrective actions that were taken by the licensee to correct the problems encountered during this event were as follows:

- . The cause of the main feedwater pump 'A' trip that initiated the event was not identified. Prior to restart following the trip, the licensee tested the main feed pump and its related control circuits for proper operation and calibration. The main feed pump was operated for several hours while key parameters were monitored with test instrumentation. During this operation of the main feed pump, no indication of a malfunction was detected. Additional test

instrumentation for monitoring key parameters was left installed on the pump during subsequent operations to trend pump performance and help identify any malfunctions.

- . All operators were instructed on the proper sequence of valve operations for starting the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
- . The failure of the main steam isolation valve in the slow-close mode was due to low hydraulic oil reservoir level caused by a leaking 'O' ring. The 'O' ring was replaced correcting the problem.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Emergency Drill Observation

On June 20, 1985, the NRC resident inspectors observed an emergency preparedness field exercise that was conducted by the licensee. The purpose of the drill was to train appropriate personnel to respond to a radiological emergency at WCGS. The players in the drill performed the actions they would be required to perform in an actual event and used emergency procedures where appropriate to respond to the simulated events that took place. Appropriate Coffey County personnel also participated in the drill and the Coffey County Response Center was activated. The WCGS training simulator was used to simulate reactor plant conditions and responses during the accident scenario.

The NRC inspectors observed drill activities in the technical support center, the emergency operations facility, and the simulator control room. The NRC inspector also attended the licensee's critique of the drill at its conclusion.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Enforcement Conference

On June 27, 1985, an enforcement conference with KG&E management was held in the NRC Region IV offices to discuss NRC concerns in the area of security at WCGS. The events that generated the NRC concerns had been identified during an onsite visit by a Region IV security inspector and by the resident inspector. Details of the NRC concerns were reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/85-27. Licensee representatives at the enforcement conference described corrective actions that were being taken in the areas of concern.

11. Allegation Followup

On June 3, 1985, an anonymous allegor, via a letter, related the following concern to the NRC inspector:

"Rainwater flows from a manhole through conduit into the health physics lab and if rain can flow into the lab there is a possibility that radioactive substances could leak out."

The NRC inspector in following up on the above concern determined the following from discussions with licensee personnel and a review of related documents:

- . Rainwater did flow into the hot chemistry lab (a radiologically controlled area) The flow was from a manhole through electrical conduit.
- . On May 28, 1985, Plant Modification Request (PMR) No. 01023 was issued. This PMR recommended that the conduit feeding into the hot chemistry lab from the manhole be plugged (sealed).
- . The Plant Safety Review Committee approved PMR No. 01023 on May 29, 1985.
- . Wolf Creek WR No. 08208-85 documents completion of the sealing of the conduits between the manhole and the chemistry hot lab. WR No. 08208-85 was completed on July 22, 1985.
- . Subsequent to the completion of the conduit sealing, health physics personnel performed a leak test on the hot chemistry lab and no leaks were detected.
- . Chemistry department personnel stated to the NRC inspector that the water no longer leaks into the chemistry hot lab.

The NRC inspector determined from the above that the allegation was substantiated and that the licensee had taken adequate action to correct the problem.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Security

The NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan was being implemented by observing:

- . The security organization is properly manned and the security personnel are capable of performing their assigned functions.

- . Persons within the protected area (PA) display their identification badges, when in vital areas are properly authorized and when required are properly escorted.
- . Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or controlled within the PA.
- . Persons and packages are properly cleared and checked before entry into the PA is permitted.
- . The effectiveness of the security program is maintained when security equipment failure or impairment requires compensatory measures to be employed.
- . Response to threats or alarms, or discovery of a condition that appears to require additional precautions is consistent with procedures and the physical security.

Selected NRC inspector comments are noted below:

- . On July 23, 1985, the NRC inspector observed an incident in which it appeared that a KG&E security officer failed to maintain control of a nonlicensee designated vehicle (LDV) within the PA as required by licensee procedures. Upon further followup, the NRC inspector determined that the security officer had maintained control as required. The vehicle had been left unoccupied and running, but within the line of vision of the escorting security officer. As a result of this incident, a meeting was held with licensee management in which the licensee voluntarily committed to:
 - a. Issue a letter that all non-LDV drivers would be required to sign that stated the rules and regulations which the driver would be expected to follow.
 - b. Better define and proceduralize the requirements to be followed before the driver of a non-LDV could leave his vehicle.
 - c. To investigate the desirability of further restricting the number of vehicles which can be escorted by a security officer.
- . On July 31, 1985, at approximately 6:40 a.m., the NRC inspector observed a contract security officer outside the door to the valve house to the condensate storage tank apparently sleeping. The NRC inspector requested a licensee security officer who had just exited the turbine building to awaken the contract officer. Upon questioning by the NRC inspector the contract security officer admitted to being drowsy but stated she had not been asleep. A

search of the immediate area revealed no unauthorized persons and the contract officer was relieved of her station. The NRC inspector verified that the area was not a vital area and that the physical security plan did not require a security officer to be posted at that location. The officer in question has been counseled by her supervisors on the seriousness of being inattentive to duty. Since the area was nonvital the security post was not required by procedure and it is no longer manned.

As a result of an NRC inspector's question concerning the security background investigation of a KG&E employee, it was determined that licensee's procedures do not define the limits under which a security background investigation should be performed for certain employees under certain conditions. The licensee committed to contact the Region IV security specialists to determine these limits and to proceduralize them. The NRC inspector will continue to follow this item until the limits have been identified and incorporated into procedures. This is an unresolved item.
(50-482/8526-03)

13. Plant Tours

At various times during the course of the inspection period the NRC inspectors conducted general tours of the reactor building, auxiliary building, radwaste building, fuel handling building, control building, turbine building, and the secured area surrounding the buildings. During the tours, the NRC inspector observed housekeeping practices, fire protection barriers and equipment, maintenance on equipment, and discussed various subjects with licensee personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Exit Meetings

The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection on July 1 and August 5, 1985. The NRC inspectors also attended exit meetings conducted by other region based NRC inspectors.