



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE, REGION I
831 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

REPORT OF INQUIRY

SUBJECT: SEABROOK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (NGS)/IMPROPRIETIES IN THE
PULLMAN HIGGINS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM

REPORT NUMBER: Q-1-84-020

REFERENCE: NRC REGION I COMBINED SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-443/
84-12 AND 50-44/84-06

DATE CLOSED: November 20, 1984

An inquiry was requested by the Regional Administrator following receipt of an anonymous letter from an individual using the pseudonym of "David DAY" which delineated multiple allegations concerning the quality of work at the Seabrook NGS. The letter, which was received by Commissioner James ASSESLTINE on July 24, 1984, set forth a variety of concerns including faulty welding, piping mismatches, cracked concrete, poor documentation of welding and harassment and intimidation of Quality Control (QC) Inspectors (Exhibit 1 pertains).

A review of the allegations by Region I Technical Staff in conjunction with OI:RI resulted in an extensive reactive inspection (Reference B) by a Region I based team combined with an OI interview of the alleged to obtain specific information regarding both technical issues and concerns falling within the purview of OI.

Through the efforts of Commissioner ASSESLTINE, the anonymous alleged contacted OI:RI by telephone. The alleged declined to meet directly with OI citing concerns over the possible compromise of his identity. He continued this declination after being offered confidentiality and agreed only to participate in a telephone interview.

On August 24, 1984, a telephone interview was conducted with the alleged. During the interview, he provided additional information relating to the technical aspects of his concerns with respect to piping and weld locations, ASME code requirements and piping mismatch. The remainder of the interview focused on the extraction of any knowledge or evidence possessed by the alleged indicative of either the falsification of inspection records and/or reports, harassment and intimidation of QC inspectors, or other potential wrongdoing by the licensee or its contractors.

The alleged stated he has never knowingly been instructed by his superiors to intentionally perform improper work at the Seabrook NGS, nor was he able to identify any witnesses that may have knowledge of such activities. With one exception, the alleged said he was unaware of any acts of intimidation or harassment of QC inspectors by management, other individuals or groups. Regarding that exception, the alleged said it was his perception that a Pullman Higgins (P-H) QC Inspector, David BAKER (subsequently identified as Douglas BARKER) was harassed and intimidated because of his identification of "over 100 suspect welds" in the pipe tunnel sometime during January 1982. The

allegor acknowledged this perception was his own personal opinion and not based on confirmatory statements by either BARKER or any other individuals. The allegor said he formulated his opinion when BARKER was transferred to "a less desirable job on the second shift," immediately after the problem with the welds in the pipe tunnel had been identified. The allegor provided no additional information or evidence of records falsification, harassment of QC inspectors or other potential wrongdoing. A Report of Interview is appended to this report as Exhibit 2.

Douglas BARKER, a P-H QC Inspector, contradicted the allegor's assertion regarding harassment and intimidation. He confirmed that during the time period in question, (January 1982) there was a problem with welds that were performed with two diametric automatic welding machines in that the consumable inserts were not being completely consumed on the interior of the welds. He said this problem was occurring in a series of three to six inch pipes located in the tunnel between the Waste Processing Building and the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). BARKER said because the problem with the inserts was not identified until after they had actually completed a large number of welds, he requested that the earlier welds be "x-rayed" to determine if the inserts had been properly consumed. BARKER said he was unable to get the radiography performed because the area was designated as "B31.1" or nonsafety related. Because of this designation, BARKER said his supervisor, "Rick WISE", told him they were not justified in the expenditure of time and money to go back and radiograph these particular welds. BARKER continued that while he was still concerned about the welds, no one attempted to force, pressure, or otherwise coerce him into changing his inspection findings and opinions regarding these welds. He concluded by denying that he felt either harassed or intimidated as a result of this incident and noted that his transfer to the "second shift" was at his own request. A Report of Interview with BARKER is Exhibit 3.

A subsequent review of Reference B confirmed that the piping in question is in fact, nonnuclear, nonsafety related piping properly referred to as ANSI B31.1 piping. Reference B established that the NRC inspection team did not identify any unacceptable pipe or weld conditions in the area identified by the allegor. Based on the results of this inquiry and the Region I inspection, no further investigative effort is warranted.

Reported by:

R. K. Christopher
R. K. Christopher, Director
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Field Office, Region I

Approved by:

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Field Office, Region I

EXHIBITS

1. Anonymous letter from alleged to Commissioner ASSESLTINE/July 24, 1984.
2. Report of telephone interview with alleged/August 24, 1984.
3. Report of telephone interview with Douglas BARKER/November 14, 1984.