NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Nine Mile Point Unit I

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0

PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4): Reactor Scram Due to Reactor Low Water Level

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 8	2 3	8 5	8 5	0 1 7	0 0	0 9	2 3	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): N

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 9 9

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

[ ] 20.402(b)	[ ] 20.405(c)	[X] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	[ ] 73.71(b)
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(i)	[ ] 50.36(c)(1)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(v)	[ ] 73.71(c)
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	[ ] 50.36(c)(2)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	[ ] OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(i)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(v)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: Robert Randall, Supervisor Technical Support

TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE 3 1 5 — 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	S J	F C V	1 3 0	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [X] NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH | DAY | YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

During normal operation on August 23, 1985, a reactor scram was initiated due to reactor low water level. The low level setpoint was reached because the number 11 feedwater flow control valve closed reducing total feedwater flow. This low level automatically initiated the High Pressure Coolant Injection mode of feedwater and a reactor shutdown proceeded normally. The number 11 feedwater pump was unable to deliver flow in the HPCI mode of feedwater due to the closed valve. However, the number 12 feedwater pump entered the HPCI mode of feedwater as designed and restored reactor water level to normal. A work request was issued to repair the number 11 feedwater valve controls. The problem was found to be a detached range spring and lock screw in the valve positioner. This screw and additional hardware were replaced. The lock screw in the valve positioners for all the feedwater flow control valves was checked for tightness and secured to avoid recurrence of this type incident.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit I	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	8 5	— 0 1 7	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

During normal operation on August 23, 1985, a reactor scram was initiated due to reactor water low level. This level automatically initiated the High Pressure Coolant Injection mode of feedwater. The reactor scram initiated a turbine and generator trip as designed. The reactor shutdown proceeded normally following the scram.

Reactor low water level occurred due to the closing of the number 11 feedwater flow control valve. This action reduced total feedwater flow and thus reactor water level. The feedwater valve closed due to the range spring locking screw vibrating loose in the valve positioner, which allowed the range spring to come loose from the spring lock. This altered the feedback mechanism of the valve positioner and caused the feedwater valve to fully close.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The initiation of the reactor scram resulted from a parameter monitored by the Reactor Protection System and this system reacted as designed. The initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection mode of feedwater was a designed response to reactor water level reaching the low water level setpoint. Due to the fact that the Reactor Protection System monitors reactor water level, there were no adverse consequences from the closing of the number 11 feedwater flow control valve. In this situation redundant feedwater system number 12 entered the High Pressure Coolant Injection mode of feedwater as designed and restored reactor water level to normal. Also due to back up systems, namely Automatic Depressurization and Core Spray Systems, any potential situations resulting from a further reduction in reactor water level are within the design basis of the plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A work request was issued to repair and recalibrate the number 11 feedwater valve controls. The range spring, spring lock, and spring lock screw of the valve positioner were replaced. These screws for all the feedwater valve positioners were checked for tightness and secured to avoid recurrence of this type incident. The number 11 feedwater flow control valve was calibrated and stroked to assure proper operation and then satisfactorily returned to service.

NMP-13811

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST
SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202

September 23, 1985

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 85-17

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 85-17 Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 0900 on 8/23/85.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/tg
Attachments
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator

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