



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

July 8, 1985  
(NMP2L 0442)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
Division of Reactor Projects  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a revised final report, in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), for the problem concerning an ITT Grinnell weld that was accepted on the basis of an incorrect radiograph. This problem was reported via tel-con to P. Russ of your staff on September 13, 1984. Interim reports were sent on October 15, 1984 and February 11, 1985.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan  
Vice President  
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

CVM/GG/c1a  
(1101H)

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
Project File (2)

8507310357 850708  
PDR ADOCK 05000410  
S PDR

11  
1E 27

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION  
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem  
Concerning Incorrect Radiograph  
(55(e)-84-39)

Description of the Problem

During a review of ITT Grinnell weld radiographs, it was observed that radiographs for welds CSH 25-7 FW015 and CSH 25-7 FW017 were identical. Radiographic interpretation reports for both welds had been signed off as approved. Apparently, one of the welds had not been radiographed. The weld joint, not previously radiographed, has since been radiographed and found acceptable. The subject weld is located in the high pressure core spray system.

Evaluation of the duplication of radiographs determined that, prior to January 3, 1984, 691 full-penetration circumferential field welds were produced and radiographed. These welds were depicted on 122 different isometric drawings. Welds radiographed after January 3, 1984, were verified by Field Quality Control to ensure that the correct weld was being radiographed.

Analysis of Safety Implications

A sample of 60 welds from a lot size of 691 welds were selected at random, radiographed, and compared to the originals. It was confirmed by re-radiograph that each weld had been radiographed, hence no duplication of radiographs existed for those welds. The sample radiography did, however, identify that one weld had been misidentified.

As a result of the additional radiography, it can be determined statistically that there is a 98 percent confidence that 95 percent or more of the welds have been radiographed, and a 95 percent confidence that 94 percent or more of the welds were correctly identified. Because of the high confidence that each weld has been radiographed, and that weld radiographs are properly identified, no further investigative action is required. As originally stated in our previous report dated February 11, 1985, had these subject conditions remained uncorrected, it could not have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant.

Corrective Action

The misidentified weld will be re-radiographed in its entirety to properly identify the weld number.