

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Joseph M. Farley - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 8				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Both Trains of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System Inoperable																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 6	2 0	8 5	8 5	0 1 1	0 0	0 7	1 5	8 5	J. M. Farley - Unit 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 6 4			
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 9 8			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)				
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.38(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)				
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			X 50.38(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME J. D. Woodard										TELEPHONE NUMBER 2 0 5 8 9 9 - 5 1 5 6						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1700 on 6-21-85, with Units 1 & 2 operating in Mode 1, it was determined that both the A & B trains of the control room emergency air cleanup system were inoperable. The A train system was inoperable in that surveillance had not been performed following a design change, but would have functioned if required. The B train system was inoperable because the pressurization unit heaters, which control humidity, had been disconnected. This had been done inadvertently by technicians who had been assigned to work on the A train system. The B train system would still have performed the functions of filtration, recirculation, pressurization, and cooling.

Upon discovery, at 1700 on 6-21-85, that both trains were inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. The B train system was restored to operable status at 1835 on 6-21-85. Surveillance was completed on the A train system and it was restored to operable status at 2313 on 6-23-85. This event was caused by personnel error in that work instructions given to the technicians were not adequate and in that the technicians did not ensure that they were working on the proper train. To prevent a similar occurrence in the future, appropriate personnel have been counseled concerning this event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
J. M. Farley - Unit 1	05000348	85	011	00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1700 on 6-21-85, with Units 1 & 2 operating in Mode 1, it was determined that both the A & B trains of the control room emergency air cleanup system were inoperable. The A train system was inoperable in that surveillance had not been performed following a design change, but would have functioned if required. The B train system was inoperable because the pressurization unit heaters, which control humidity, had been disconnected. The B train system would still have performed the functions of filtration, recirculation, pressurization, and cooling.

The A train system had been removed from service at 1305 on 6-18-85 to install a pressurization unit heater bypass control circuit to allow testing of the heaters independently of the humidity controller thermostats. Upon completion of this design change, the applicable surveillance test procedure (STP) was performed to determine operability prior to returning the system to service. However, this test was unsatisfactory due to the heaters tripping on high temperature and a revision to the maintenance work request (MWR) used to perform the design change was initiated to investigate the problem. It was later determined that the unsatisfactory test result was due to a problem with the procedure rather than with the heater control circuitry. The STP had not been modified properly to reflect the addition of the heater bypass control circuit.

The technicians assigned to work the MWR began work at approximately 1700 on 6-20-85. They inadvertently performed the work on the B train pressurization heater control circuit instead of the A train. This rendered the B train system inoperable from a Technical Specification standpoint although, as stated above, only the humidity control function of the system was affected.

Upon discovery, at 1700 on 6-21-85, that both trains were inoperable, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. The B train system was restored to operable status at 1835 on 6-21-85. The error in the STP was recognized and corrected allowing satisfactory completion of testing on the A train system at 2313 on 6-23-85.

Upon investigation, it was determined that the following factors contributed to this incident:

1. The revised MWR did not designate properly the A or B train. This was true of all MWRs associated with this design change.
2. Plant conditions were not specified adequately in the appropriate block on the MWR form. For work on the A train, this block should have specified "maintain B train operable."
3. The technicians did not ensure they were working on the proper train.

To prevent a similar occurrence in the future, the appropriate personnel have been counseled concerning this event.

Mailing Address

Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street
Post Office Box 2641
Birmingham, Alabama 35291
Telephone 205 783-6090

R. P. McDonald
Senior Vice President
Flintridge Building



Alabama Power
the southern electric system

July 15, 1985

Docket No. 348

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Licensee Event Report No. LER 85-011-00 is forwarded in accordance with 10CFR50.73 to provide 30 day written notification of the occurrence.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Yours very truly,

R. P. McDonald

RPM/DSM:sam

Enclosure

xc: IE, Region II

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