



Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-270/83-02

Report Date: March 9, 1983

Occurrence Date: February 7, 1983

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: The Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitors became inoperable due to inoperability of the operational aid computer.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 2 58% Full Power

Description of Occurrence: At 1759 120 VAC was supplied to Unit 2's computer causing one of the input boards to malfunction and the computer to become inoperable. With the computer inoperative, the unit lost both reactor coolant system subcooling monitors.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this incident was a deficiency in procedures. An input board to the digital computer was found with several input points burned up. In checking these inputs, the 2E2 feedwater heater level indicator that had recently been installed was measured at 120 VAC. The expected input voltage is 48 VDC. It was discovered, when the old level indicator was compared to the new, three wiring changes were needed. One of these wiring changes would prevent 120 VAC from being directed to the computer.

The Yarway level indicator was not ordered to conform to Oconee OM drawing 267-154A and a note was not attached to indicate an internal wiring change was required. In addition, nowhere in the procedures was it written that the level indicator should be rewired prior to installation.

Analysis of Occurrence: Although the subcooling monitors were out of service longer than the four hours allowed by Technical Specification 3.1.12.1(c), the control room had indication of Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure which could be plotted on a saturation curve to ensure that the Reactor Coolant System did not go below saturation temperature or pressure during a plant transient. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not endangered by this incident.

Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action was to repair and restart the computer. In addition, the level indicator was inspected to determine why a 120 VAC signal was being sent to the computer. The inspection revealed that the indicator needed to be rewired, which was done prior to reinstalling the new indicator. All appropriate personnel will be made aware of this incident and the importance of checking all notes on drawings. A method will be developed to ensure that Yarway level instruments are properly wired prior to their installation.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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HAL B. TUCKER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

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March 9, 1983

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly: *B*

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/83-02. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

*H.B. Tucker / BT*

Hal B. Tucker

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Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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NRC Resident Inspector  
Oconee Nuclear Station

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Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.  
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