

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 VASPS2200-00000-00341111145

CONT

01 L605000281709188381017839

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown, during the performance of PT's 18.2A and 18.2B (S.I.
03 Test H & J Train), FCV-FW-2488 ('B' Feed reg. valve) would not fully close on a S.I.
04 signal. This is a non-conservatism with respect to T.S.3.7 and is being reported per
05 T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Feedwater isolation provided by feed reg. and bypass valve closure
06 and feedwater pump trips upon S.I., mitigate the consequences of a steam line rupture
07 Since the feedwater pumps would have tripped on a S.I. signal, the health and safety
08 of the public would not have been affected.

09 CH11 X12 X13 VALVOP14 D15 Z16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 83 —23 03724 /27 0328 L30 —31 032

ACTION TAKEN X18 FUTURE ACTION Z19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z21 HOURS 000022 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. Y24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C63526

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 The cause has not been determined. Electricians checked the valve and verified that
11 the solenoid valves, which de-energize on a S.I. signal and block air to the valve,
12 functioned properly and the valve closed satisfactorily.

15 H28 000029 N/A30 B31 Performance Test32

16 Z33 Z34 N/A35 N/A36

17 00037 Z38 N/A39

18 00040 N/A41

19 Z42 N/A43

20 N44 N/A45

8507310008 831017
PDR ADOCK 050002B1
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 83-037/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 09-18-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: FCV-FW-2488 FAILED TO COMPLETELY CLOSE DURING S.I. SYSTEM TESTS.

1. Description of the Event

With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown, during the performance of PT's 18.2A and 18.2B (Safety Injection Systems Tests H & J Trains), FCV-FW-2488 ('B' main feed regulation valve) would not fully close on a S.I. signal. This is a non-conservatism with respect to Technical Specification 3.7 and is being reported per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

Feedwater isolation, provided by feed reg. and bypass valve closure and feedwater pump trips upon actuation of Safety Injection, mitigates the consequences of excessive heat removal in the event of a steam line rupture and stops feed flow into containment in the event of a steam line rupture in containment. Since the feedwater pumps would have tripped upon S.I. actuation, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause

The cause has not been determined. Electricians checked the valve and verified that the solenoid valves, which de-energize on a S.I. signal and block air to the valve, functioned properly and the valve closed satisfactorily.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

None required.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

Electricians checked the solenoids and determined the valve closed satisfactorily.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

None.

7. Generic Implications

None.

Please substitute the enclosed cover sheet to Licensee Event
Report, Serial Number 83-073 dated October 17, 1983.

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1/1
CORRECTED
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