

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 V A S P S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 5

CONT 01 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 9 1 8 8 3 8 1 0 1 7 8 3 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

012 With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown, during the performance of PT's 18.2A and 18.2B (S.I.
013 Test H & J Train), HCV-FW-255A ('A' feedwater bypass valve) would not fully close on
014 a S.I. signal. This is a non-conservatism with respect to T.S.3.7 and is being
015 reported per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Feedwater isolation, provided by feed reg. and bypass
016 valve closure and feedwater pump trips, upon S.I., mitigate the consequences of a
017 steam line rupture. Since the feedwater pumps would have tripped on a S. I. signal,
018 the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

09 SYSTEM CODE C H 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE B 13 COMPONENT CODE V A L V O P 14 COMP. SUBCODE D 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 3 21 EVENT YEAR 8 3 22 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 6 24 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 28 REPORT TYPE L 30 REVISION NO. 0 32

ACTION TAKEN E 18 FUTURE ACTION Z 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 37 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRO-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER F 1 3 0 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

110 The valves are controlled by changing air pressure on either side of a piston within
111 a cylinder attached to the valve. Pneumatic relays in the valve positioner, which
112 control air flow to either side of the piston were out of adjustment. The relays
113 were adjusted for proper valve action and the valve was satisfactorily stroked.

114 115 FACILITY STATUS H 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Performance Test 32

116 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36

117 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39

118 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41

119 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43

120 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION N/A 45

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NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 83-036/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 09-18-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: HCV-FW-255A FAILED TO COMPLETELY CLOSE DURING. S.I. SYSTEM TESTS.

1. Description of the Event

With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown, during the performance of PT's 18.2A and 18.23 (Safety Injection System Tests H & J Trains), HCV-FW-255A ('A' feedwater bypass valve) would not fully close on a S.I. signal. This is a non-conservatism with respect to Technical Specification 3.7 and is being reported per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

Feedwater isolation, provided by feed reg. and bypass valve closure and feedwater pump trips upon actuation of Safety Injection, mitigates the consequences of excessive heat removal in the event of a steam line rupture and stops feed flow into containment in the event of a steam line rupture in containment. Since the feedwater pumps would have tripped up S. I. actuation, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause

The bypass valves are controlled by changing air pressure on either side of a piston within a cylinder attached to the valve. Thus, air is required to open and close the valve. Pneumatic relays in the valve positioner, which control air flow to either side of the piston, were out of adjustment preventing the valve from completely closing.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

None required.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The pneumatic relays were adjusted for proper valve action and the valve was satisfactorily stroked.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

None.

7. Generic Implications

None.