

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2				
TITLE (4) IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF CONCRETE ANCHORS FOR CONTROL COMPLEX HVAC SUPPORTS																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES N/A						DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0									
0	5	0	1	8	5	8	5	0	0	4	0	1	0	7	1	6	8	5	N/A 0 5 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
6		20.402(b)				20.405(e)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)										
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0				20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)						
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)														
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)														
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)														
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME W. K. Bandhauer, Nuclear Safety Supervisor										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 0 4 7 9 5 - 6 4 8 6														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS														
B	V	I	S	P	T	K	2	0	4	N														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH		DAY		YEAR						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input type="checkbox"/> NO				0		8		3 0 8 5						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 25, 1985, while in a refueling outage, it was determined that at least one heating and ventilation ductwork support was improperly installed. Subsequent investigation completed May 1, 1985, revealed that approximately 55% of the supports in the safety related portion of the Control Complex HVAC System had "deceit bolts" installed. A "deceit bolt" is one which has the head cut from the stem and then the head is welded onto its mounting bracket so that it appears to be a complete and properly installed bolt.

The Architect/Engineer is conducting a reevaluation for seismic qualification. Repairs are underway for all identified deficiencies. The system will be restored to its design capability before startup following the refueling outage.

This revised report is submitted to correct an error in the component code on the original report.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 5	— 0 0 4	— 0 1	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On April 25, 1985, Crystal River Unit 3 was in a refueling outage with the reactor core completely unloaded. At 1800 it was discovered that some of the supports in the Control Complex Heating and Ventilation System (VI) were improperly installed. This placed the system outside of the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.7.1. The discrepancy was discovered by Quality Control Inspectors during the performance of required inspections in support of modification work in progress this outage.

The originally identified problem is that some of the bolts in a seismic anchor for the ductwork were either not long enough to properly secure the support to the wall or the bolts were cutoff and the heads were tack welded to the support frame. This gave the appearance that they were properly installed bolts when they were not. Subsequent inspection by an independent consulting firm determined that approximately 90 of the 160 supports had some bolting deficiency.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS


A determination of the impact on the seismic qualification of the system is being made by the Architect/Engineer (A/E).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A thorough inspection of every support in the safety related portion of the system has been conducted and each support has been individually certified as to whether it is built as designed or not. All identified discrepancies are being repaired and will be corrected before a mode change is made into a mode for which the referenced Technical Specification is applicable. A supplementary report will be filed when the A/E report is evaluated by FPC and appropriate actions determined.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

On October 17, 1983, three non-safety related supports were discovered in another section of the control complex ventilation system. Two supports were missing bolts and one support had a bolt head tack welded to the base plate. The missing and defective bolts were later correctly installed. No further investigation was documented as the "deceit" bolt was not considered generic.



**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

July 16, 1985
3F0785-21

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Licensee Event Report No. 85-004-01

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-004-01 which is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

G. R. Westafer
Manager, Nuclear Operations
Licensing and Fuel Management

AEF/feb

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

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