



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-269/85-25, 50-270/85-25, and 50-287/85-25

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and
DPR-55

Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3

Inspection Conducted: April 22 - 26, 1985, and July 3, 1985

Inspector: _____

B. T. Debs

7/11/85
Date Signed

Approved By: _____

B. T. Debs, Acting Section Chief
Operational Programs Section
Division of Reactor Safety

7/11/85
Date Signed

SUMMARY

This refers to an inspection conducted on April 22 - 26, 1985, and an Enforcement Conference held in Atlanta, Georgia, with members of Duke Power staff on July 3, 1985, to discuss the operability status of Unit 1 containment atmosphere hydrogen monitors as documented in Inspection Report 50-269/85-09, 50-270/85-09, and 50-287/85-09. The Enforcement Conference provided NRC Region II staff with a better understanding of the past operability status of the licensee's containment atmosphere hydrogen monitors. The Enforcement Conference also provided Duke Power staff with a better understanding of the regulatory requirements which apply to these monitors.

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DETAILS

1. Attendance at the Duke - NRC Enforcement Conference on July 3, 1985, at the NRC's Region II Office included:

Duke Power Company

H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production
K. S. Canady, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
M. Tuckman, Station Manager, Oconee
N. Rutherford, System Engineer, Licensing
K. R. Caraway, Supervising Design Engineer
R. Bond, Compliance Engineer
T. Glenn, I&E Support Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
Roger D. Walker, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
A. F. Gibson, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff
C. A. Julian, Acting Chief, Operational Branch, DRS
B. T. Debs, Acting Chief, Operational Programs Section, DRS
H. C. Dance, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DRP
W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire
L. P. Modenos, Enforcement Specialist
K. Sasser, Resident Inspector, Oconee
A. Bill Beach, IE, Enforcement
L. Trocine, Enforcement Specialist

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

- a. URI 269, 270, 287/85-09-03, Unit 1 Reactor Building Hydrogen Monitoring System Operability, (Closed)

On July 3, 1985, an enforcement conference was held with representatives of the Duke Power Company and the NRC in Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss the aforementioned item.

Duke Power Company representatives discussed Oconee's pre-TMI and post-TMI containment hydrogen monitoring capability. They also presented a historical description of Oconee's implementation of Item II.F.1.6 of NUREG-0737 to provide continuous indications of hydrogen concentration in containment. Additionally, Duke Power Company discussed their proposed technical specifications for the post-TMI containment hydrogen monitors and their current method of determining system operability. The presentation also provided a history of Oconee Unit 1 containment hydrogen monitor performance and operability.

In conclusion, Duke Power Company acknowledged that for a period of time in early 1985, both Trains A and B of Oconee's Unit 1 containment hydrogen monitoring system were technically inoperable due to failed calibrations, but that the system was functionally operable since there was hydrogen concentration indication although outside the existing calibration acceptance criteria. Duke Power Company maintained that the significance of having technically inoperable hydrogen monitoring during this time is mitigated since Oconee procedures suggest that containment hydrogen recombiners be operating shortly after an accident to preclude an explosive hydrogen atmosphere. Since Unit 1 containment hydrogen monitor trains A and B were technically inoperable from March 6, 1985, to March 26, 1985. This condition represents a violation of 10 CFR 50.44(b) (269, 270, 287/85-25-01).

As a result of this event, the licensee recognized the need for more definitive actions to assure operability of TMI related equipment which are not currently covered by existing Technical Specifications.

- b. URI 269, 270, 287/85-09-05, Reactor Building Spray Setpoint, (Closed).

At the conference described in the aforementioned item, it was concluded that the less than or equal to 30 psig setpoint for reactor building spray initiation as it appears in the licensee's Technical Specifications is technically correct for loss of coolant accidents. Licensee representatives stated that assumptions and values regarding this setpoint which appear in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report would be changed to accurately support the technical specification value. This item is therefore considered closed with no violations or deviations noted.