NIAGARA MOHAWK

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

September 9, 1985
(NMP2L 0487)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Reactor Projects
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Attached is a final report concerning problems identified previously with respect to the post-LOCA hydrogen recombiners. This report addresses three deficiency reports which were previously reported as a result of failure to meet the requirements of the qualification program.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Senior Vice President

CVM/GG/cla
(1224H)

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

Project File (2)

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report For Problems With The
Post-LOCA Hydrogen Recombiners

Description of the Problem

This report addresses the problems concerning the post-LOCA hydrogen recombiners manufactured by Rockwell International. The initial problems concerning the pressure transducer and disconnect switch were reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Niagara Mohawk on November 19, 1982, and a final report was submitted on February 11, 1983, (two corrective action items are still open). On March 28, 1983, Niagara Mohawk reported a problem to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning ITE Imperial circuit breakers and submitted interim reports on April 26 and August 9, 1983. On August 11, 1983, Niagara Mohawk reported a problem concerning the microswitch and submitted an interim report on September 1, 1983. Also mentioned in this interim report was the fact that the problem with the circuit breakers and the microswitch would be combined in one final report and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by September 9, 1985.

Analysis of Safety Implications

All deficiencies identified in the above referenced reports were detected as a result of the components failure to meet the requirements of the IEEE-323 qualification test program. Although no detailed analysis was performed, it was assumed that failure of any one of the components in question could have resulted in the failure of the recombiner to perform its safety function. Therefore, had these conditions gone uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant.

Corrective Action

Due to extensive redesign of the recombiner power cabinets and change in one supplier, the identified deficiencies no longer exist. The ITT Barton pressure transducer will be replaced with Gould pressure transducers. The ITE Imperial circuit breakers have been replaced by fuses. The disconnect switch and microswitch have been deleted by redesigning the circuits. The modified equipment is undergoing qualification testing. Successful completion of this testing will verify the adequacy of the redesign.