

ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-382  
License No.: NPF-38  
Report No.: 50-382/96-12  
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.  
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3  
Location: Hwy. 18  
Killona, Louisiana  
Dates: September 1 through October 12, 1996  
Inspectors: L. A. Keller, Senior Resident Inspector  
T. W. Pruett, Resident Inspector  
G. A. Pick, Project Engineer  
C. A. Clark, Reactor Inspector  
Approved By: P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-382/96-12

This routine, announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. This report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.

#### Operations

- All observed activities were conducted professionally and were consistent with safe operation of the facility (Section O1.1).

#### Maintenance

- The failure of personnel to use measuring and test equipment (M&TE), as required by procedures, indicated that the licensee had not resolved previously-identified compliance deficiencies associated with the use of M&TE and is a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a (Section M1.2).
- The licensee-identified conditions related to the emergency feedwater (EFW) system were appropriately addressed. A noncited violation was identified for not performing a test before adjustment of the EFW pump turbine governor (Section M1.3).
- The fasteners for the limit switch covers on four safety-related, motor-operated valves (MOV) were of questionable material. The fastener discrepancies did not affect valve operability for these particular valves. The licensee identified suspect or missing fasteners on several safety-related MOVs applications that potentially affected operability. This issue remains unresolved pending additional NRC review of the fastener assessments (Section M2.1).
- The painting and preservation program failed to identify unacceptable corrosion on the seismic supports for Valve CC-134B (Dry Cooling Tower B bypass valve) air accumulator. The failure to properly maintain the seismic supports for the Valve CC-134B air accumulator is a noncited violation (Section M2.2).

#### Engineering

- Engineering provided good technical support and good teamwork was exhibited among the various disciplines in effectively resolving the Valve CC-134B air accumulator seismic support issue in the short time period available (Section M2.2).
- The inspectors concluded that the use of wet cooling tower (WCT) basins as a source of EFW, in lieu of the condensate storage pool, would be inappropriate due to the inability to meet the EFW design bases in terms of minimum temperature and inventory. The failure to ensure that the WCT basins met all EFW design bases requirements is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Section E8.4).

Plant Support

- All plant support activities observed were satisfactory (Section R1.1).

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power during this inspection period.

## I. Operations

### **O1 Conduct of Operations**

#### **O1.1 General Comments (71707)**

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, control room board walkdowns, and plant tours. All observed activities were conducted professionally and were consistent with safe operation of the facility. Operators displayed good knowledge of plant status and understood the reason why control room annunciators were lit.

#### **O2.2 Review of Operations Combined Deficiency List (71707)**

The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee had implemented appropriate measures and administrative controls for the following components on the operations combined deficiency list:

- Pressurizer Normal Spray Valve B
- Steam Generator 1 Outside Containment Blowdown Isolation Valve
- Containment Sump Level Indicators
- Accumulators for Valves CC-641 and CC-713
- Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) Crossconnect Valves

The inspectors determined that the licensee appropriately addressed the hardware deficiencies listed above. No concerns were identified with respect to system operability and/or the capability to respond to an emergency.

### **O8 Miscellaneous Operations Issues**

#### **O8.1 Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Report (71707)**

The inspectors reviewed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations report titled, "WAT-3 SES 3/96 Evaluation." The inspectors concluded that the report did not identify any operational or safety concerns that were not previously known by the NRC and, as a result, no additional followup is planned.

## II. Maintenance

### **M1 Conduct of Maintenance**

#### **M1.1 General Comments**

##### **a. Inspection Scope (61726, 62707)**

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following activities:

- WA 01151150: Calibrate CCW Header B Flow Loop
- OP-903-004: Boric Acid Pump Operability Check
- OP-903-904: Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (ESFAS) Subgroup Relay Test
- WA 01151341: Rework Rusted Accumulator Legs For Valve CC-134B

##### **b. Observations and Findings**

In general, the inspectors found the conduct of maintenance and surveillance to be adequate. All activities observed were performed with the work authorization (WA) package and/or test procedures present. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were implemented. However, certain activities violated NRC requirements or indicated performance problems, as discussed below.

#### **M1.2 Failure To Comply With Procedural Requirements For M&TE**

##### **a. Inspection Scope (61726)**

The inspectors reviewed completed inservice testing documents for Boric Acid Makeup (BAM) Pump A performed in accordance with Procedure OP-903-004, "Boric Acid Pump Operability Check," and Blowdown Isolation Valves BD-102 A(B) and BD-103 A(B) performed in accordance with Procedure OP-903-094, "ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test - Operating," to determine if testing of the components was consistent with regulatory requirements.

##### **b. Observations and Findings**

Procedure OP-903-004, Section 3.2, "Limitations," indicated that the full-scale range of pressure and fluid flow instruments shall be three times the reference value or less and that the reference value shall not exceed 70 percent of the range for digital instruments. The inspectors noted that the range of digital test Pressure Gauge ODPT 353.013 (0-50 psig) exceeded three times the reference suction

pressure of BAM Pump A (10.8 psig). The inspectors also noted that the documented suction pressure was consistent with past surveillance tests and that the pressure reading did not affect the test results.

Subsequently, the licensee acknowledged that the procedural requirements were not followed and initiated a condition report (CR) to document the inconsistency between pressure test gauges described in surveillance procedures and NUREG 1482, "Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants." NUREG 1482 recommended that the requirements in Operations and Maintenance Standards Part 6 for digital instruments apply during inservice testing. Specifically, digital instruments should be selected such that the reference value does not exceed 70 percent of the calibrated range of the instrument and the accuracy must be within 2 percent over the calibrated range. If these requirements for digital instruments are met, the licensee need not request relief from Subsection IWP of ASME Code, Section XI. The inspectors noted that the requirements for digital instruments as described in the Operations and Maintenance Standards were met during the BAM Pump A surveillance test.

The inspectors noted that NRC Violation 50-382/9508-01 (November 1995) resulted from failure to use the correct M&TE described in procedures for testing of main steam safety valves and electrical relays. NRC Violation 50-382/9509-01 (December 1995) resulted from failure to remove suspect M&TE from service. Because of the recent similar failures of personnel to follow procedures with respect to use of M&TE, the inspectors determined that failure to use the correct pressure gauge is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a (50-382/9612-01).

c. Conclusions

The implementation of surveillance requirements for BAM Pump A and Valves BD-102A(B) and BD-103A(B) were adequate. The inspectors identified one violation in which personnel used M&TE that did not meet the limitations described in the surveillance procedure. The failure to ensure that the correct M&TE is used by personnel indicated that the licensee had not fully resolved deficiencies associated with the use of M&TE.

M1.3 Review of Conditions Identified with the EFW System

a. Inspection Scope (92903)

The inspectors reviewed CRs 96-0841, -0819, -0877, -0919, -1321 to independently verify that the licensee had adequately resolved these documented EFW system deficiencies. The inspectors discussed the details of each CR with the system engineer.



b. Observations and Findings

The licensee had experienced problems with the governor for the EFW turbine-driven pump since startup from the last outage in December 1995. The governor had difficulty maintaining the turbine speed at a predetermined setpoint and, as a result, the speed remained slightly elevated. The increased turbine speed resulted in a pump discharge pressure of approximately 1440 psig, which exceeded the 1400 psig rating of the system discharge piping. The licensee completed an evaluation to establish that the greater pressure did not affect the operability of the system. This evaluation was reviewed, and no concerns were identified.

In an effort to reduce the pump discharge pressure below the operating pressure limit for the piping and return the system to its normal operating limits, the system engineer performed periodic turbine governor adjustments to reduce the turbine speed. Prior to adjustment of the governor, the pump is required to be operated to verify that the pump is still performing satisfactorily based on the previous baseline data. This verification test ensures that no equipment degradation occurred between tests and that readjustment of the governor would not mask a potential operational concern.

A test was not performed prior to adjusting the turbine governor to reduce the turbine speed on August 25, 1996. Subsequent to the performance of the test, it was noted that a test should have been conducted. Upon discovery of this error, the system engineer compared the data obtained after the governor was adjusted and previous test data. The engineer determined that no degradation concerns existed and that the pump remained fully operable. The inspectors reviewed the data and did not identify any concerns.

Section IWP-3110 in Section XI of the ASME Code allows a change to reference values, as long as an inservice test at the conditions of an existing set of reference values is performed and the results analyzed. When the results are verified as being satisfactory, then a second test is to be performed at the new reference conditions and these results are then used to establish the new set of reference values. The licensee failed to perform these actions, which is a violation of TS 4.0.3.

This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, was not willful, actions taken as a result of a previous violation should not have corrected this problem, and appropriate corrective actions were completed by the licensee (50-382/9612-02).

c. Conclusions

The system engineer adequately addressed the technical issues associated with each CR, except for CR 96-1321. A noncited violation resulted because engineers

changed the operating conditions for the turbine-driven EFW pump without verifying no degradation existed, as specified by Section XI of the ASME.

## **M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment**

### **M2.1 Fastener Issues**

#### **a. Inspection Scope (62707, 92903)**

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown to verify the effectiveness of corrective actions implemented to improve the material condition of the plant. Because of problems identified by the inspectors, and subsequently by the licensee, related to the use of questionable and/or missing fasteners, the inspectors reviewed the specific applications in terms of the impact on component operability.

#### **b. Observations and Findings**

On September 18, 1996, the inspectors noted that some of the fasteners installed on the limit switch cover for Valve SI-139B (low pressure safety injection header to Reactor Coolant Loop 1A flow control) appeared to be nonconforming. The valve operator manufacturer, Limitorque, specified that the hex head cap screw fasteners for the operator limit switch cover should be Grade 5 or better. Some of the cap screws (and associated lockwashers) installed on Valve SI-139B appeared to be manufactured from a brass or bronze material and were not magnetic, which indicated that these cap screws were probably not Grade 5 or better. Subsequent inspections noted that similar fasteners were installed on Valves SI-138A (low pressure safety injection to Reactor Coolant Loop 2B flow control), Valve SI-138B (low pressure safety injection to Reactor Coolant Loop 1B flow control) and Valve SI-139A (low pressure safety injection header to Reactor Coolant Loop 2A flow control) and that all four valves were missing at least one lockwasher.

On September 19, in response to the inspectors' observations and questions, the licensee issued CR 96-1455. CR 96-1455 noted that the limit switch cover fasteners of the subject valves did not appear to be Grade 5 material, but the fastener material for these particular applications was not an apparent operability concern. The inspectors agreed that no operability concern existed for these specific fastener applications but expressed concern over the generic implications for control of fasteners.

On October 1, licensee personnel initiated a walkdown of safety-related MOVs to inspect critical components for the presence of the correct fastener material. The licensee identified numerous MOV fastener deficiencies, including discrepancies associated with eight different valves, which potentially affected operability. Subsequently, the licensee either declared the valve out of service or performed an operability evaluation. As a result of Valves BAM-133A (boric acid tanks to charging pump suction), SI-120B (SI recirculating header to RWSP upstream



isolation), and SI-121B (SI recirculating header to RWSP downstream isolation) being declared out of service, the licensee entered TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.1.2.2, "Boration Flowpath," and 3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling System," respectively. The questionable fasteners on Valves BAM-133A, SI-120B, and SI-121B were replaced with qualified fasteners, the TS LCOs exited on October 3, and the questionable fasteners sent offsite for laboratory analysis.

Because of the identified MOV fastener discrepancies, the licensee formed a root cause analysis team to determine the root cause and identify the corrective actions for the specific issue of fastener controls with respect to MOVs, as well as determining any generic implications to ensure the issue was fully bounded. Since the root cause analysis team continued to evaluate this issue, review of licensee actions to resolve the use of fasteners in safety-related applications is an unresolved item (50-382/9612-03).

c. Conclusions

The inspectors reviewed the MOV inspection results and the completed operability evaluations and concluded that the licensee had entered all the appropriate TS LCOs. Additional NRC inspections/reviews are needed to determine the scope and implications of the use of fasteners in safety-related applications.

M2.2 External Corrosion Problems With a Safety-Related Air Accumulator

a. Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with Valve CC-134B being declared inoperable because of significant corrosion of the associated air accumulator.

b. Observations and Findings

On October 3, because of control of fastener issues (Section M2.1), the licensee inspected various fasteners throughout the plant. While attempting to remove paint from the supports for the Valve CC-134B air accumulator tank to inspect the fasteners, the licensee discovered that two of the four supports were completely corroded away and a third support had only a small percentage of metal remaining. The licensee declared Valve CC-134B out of service, which required entry into the TS LCO 3.7.3 for CCW Train B. Entering TS LCO 3.7.3 required declaring the Train B Emergency Core Cooling System inoperable and entering TS LCO 3.5.2, which has an allowed outage time of 72 hours. However, since this LCO had already been entered because of fastener problems with Valves SI-120B and SI-121B, only 20 hours remained to resolve the Valve CC-134B air accumulator issue before a plant shutdown would be required.

The licensee restored the Valve CC-134B accumulator to operable before the TS LCO expired by utilizing the supports from another nonsafety-related accumulator. The inspectors noted that engineering provided good technical support for this issue and that the various disciplines exhibited good teamwork in effectively resolving this issue in the short time period available.

Valve CC-134B bypasses sections of Dry Cooling Tower B following postulated damage from a tornado. The accumulator provides a 2-hour air supply for Valve CC-134B following the loss of instrument air and is bolted to the concrete basemat in the Dry Cooling Tower B area. This location is open to the atmosphere, is subject to rain water, and is subject to spray from the WCT basin. The licensee walked down both dry cooling tower areas to determine if any other components had significant corrosion. Several components had evidence of external corrosion but were not considered to be operability concerns. The inspectors conducted an independent walkdown and did not identify any operability concerns. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee was reviewing their inspection and preservation program for components exposed to the atmosphere.

The failure to properly maintain the seismic supports for the accumulator for Valve CC-134B in accordance with Procedure NOCP-210 "Maintenance and Construction Painting," is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a. Procedure NOCP-210 requires that oil, rust, grease, dirt, dust, and other foreign materials be removed prior to painting. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, was not willful, actions taken as a result of a previous violation should not have corrected this problem, and appropriate corrective actions were completed by the licensee (50-382/9612-04).

c. Conclusions

The painting and preservation program failed to prevent unacceptable corrosion on the seismic supports for the Valve CC-134B air accumulator. Engineering provided good technical support for this issue and the various disciplines exhibited good teamwork by effectively resolving this issue in the short time period available. The failure to properly maintain the seismic supports for the Valve CC-134B accumulator is considered a noncited violation.

**M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)**

- M8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-382/9403-04: Review licensee corrective actions for hoist drive failure. On March 9, 1994, during Refueling Outage 7, the refueling machine control element assembly (CEA) hoist box dropped unexpectedly and struck the fuel transfer system drive column. The licensee determined that the CEA hoist bearing retainer plate had failed causing the hoist reel to freewheel and drop the hoist box. The licensee determined that the existing CEA hoist would not be used for future CEA movement. Instead, a new design hoist would be installed

in accordance with Design Change 3435 prior to Refueling Outage 8. The inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented appropriate corrective actions to address this item.

- M8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-382/94402-01: Lack of formal documentation of quality process surveys. This item noted that during Refueling Outage 6, the quality assurance nondestructive examination survey observations were not formally documented at the time they were performed in the field. The inspectors were concerned that this practice would result in the audits not thoroughly describing the process surveys performed. The licensee noted that while observing activities in the field, quality assurance personnel used audit checklists and took notes, as required, to assist them later in preparing audit reports. The licensee also noted that when conditions requiring corrective action were observed during the process surveys, the conditions were promptly documented in accordance with the corrective action program. The inspectors determined that the current practice in this area was adequate.
- M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9513-03: Plant material condition deficiencies. This item noted examples of plant material condition deficiencies that had not been identified by licensee personnel. The licensee initiated various actions via various condition identification documents and CRs to address and correct the identified deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions implemented for the identified examples and toured various areas of the plant. The inspectors determined that adequate corrective actions were taken for the identified examples.

### Ili. Engineering

#### **E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment**

##### **E.2.1 Review of Facility and Equipment Conformance to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Description**

A recent discovery of a licensee operating a facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The following inconsistencies were noted between the wording of the UFSAR and the plant practices, procedures and/or procedures observed by the inspectors.

The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the UFSAR and Design Basis Document W3-DBD-007, "Chemical and Volume Control System," and noted that the normal operating temperature for BAM Pump A(B) in UFSAR Table 9.3-9 and W3-DBD-007 was 70°F and 150°F, respectively. The actual normal operating temperature of BAM Pump A(B) is approximately 100-110°F. The licensee stated

that the discrepancies would be corrected in the next revision of UFSAR Table 9.3-9 and W3-DBD-007. This identified discrepancy did not affect system operability.

## **E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)**

- E8.1 (Open) Inspection Followup Item 50-382/9325-03: Evaluation of the results of the CCW heat exchanger corrosion monitoring program. This item involved a review of the CCW heat exchanger corrosion monitoring program. The licensee reviewed the CCW heat exchanger corrosion monitoring program from December 11-15, 1995. The inspectors reviewed the results of this latest self-assessment, as documented in an inter-office correspondence dated February 3, 1996. The self-assessment identified areas for improvement in the CCW heat exchanger corrosion monitoring program. The licensee continued to implement corrective actions to improve the evaluative information provided by this program. This item will remain open pending review of the implementation of the latest corrective actions for the corrosion monitoring program.
- E8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9403-02: Failure to control approved design basis. This issue involved the failure of the licensee to ensure the design basis was maintained. The NRC-approved burnup for the specified acceptable fuel design limits was exceeded in Cycles 4 and 5 reactor core designs, as well as in the operational cycles. The licensee identified that the root cause as miscommunication between Waterford 3 and the NRC and a failure to follow procedures. The inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented adequate instructions to personnel on when specific license amendments would be required to be submitted to the NRC regarding approval of new higher fuel burnups.
- E8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9522-04: Failure to perform integrated leak test. This issue involved the failure to perform a surveillance test required by TS 6.8.4.a at each refueling cycle interval or less (i.e., less than 18 months). The licensee identified the root cause as the misapplication of the TS 4.0.2 interval extension to the Administrative Controls section of TS. The licensee noted repetitive tasks/tests scheduled in the System Information Management System had a 25 percent extension automatically added to the task interval, which established "late dates" for these tasks. The licensee performed a review of all repetitive surveillance tasks and revised the task intervals, as required, to ensure the TS surveillance "late date" did not exceed the interval specified in TS Section 6.0. The licensee also reviewed the Commitment Management System and verified no 25 percent interval extension had been added to the due dates in that system. A caution was also added to the procedure used for implementation of TS changes to ensure that a surveillance interval extension was not added to any TS surveillance other than those addressed by TS 4.0. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions were adequate.
- E8.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-382/9605-08: Review of the adequacy of the WCT basin as a source of water for the EFW system. The inspectors identified a concern related to use of the water in the WCT basins as a source of EFW because of the



potential for the basin water to decrease below the 70°F minimum assumed in the steam generator technical manual and the Waterford 3 Chapter 15 safety analyses.

The inspectors noted that TS 3.7.1.3 allowed the condensate storage pool to be inoperable for up to 7 days provided the WCT basins were available as a backup supply to the EFW pumps. Additionally, UFSAR Section 10.4.9, "Emergency Feedwater System," stated, in part, that the suction to EFW pumps is capable of being provided from two WCT basins, following emergency shutdown caused by the design-basis tornado. This event requires EFW exceeding the amount stored in the condensate storage pool due to postulated tornado generated missile damage to the wet cooling towers.

The inspectors noted that there were no temperature controls on the WCT basin; therefore, water potentially colder than that assumed in the accident analyses could be used by the EFW system. The inspectors also noted that the Combustion Engineering Technical Manual for the steam generators stated, in part, that cold feedwater at not less than 70°F may be introduced into the unit. The licensee stated that WCT basin temperature had been as low as 57°F. The licensee also indicated that the WCT basins had never been aligned to the EFW system.

Combustion Engineering confirmed that a minimum EFW temperature of 70°F was a design basis assumption and that a reduction in the minimum temperature would require reanalysis regarding steam generator structural integrity and the impact on the Chapter 15 safety analyses. Combustion Engineering anticipated being able to reduce the minimum assumed temperature to 40°F since this temperature was used for another plant of a similar design and found to be an acceptable condition. As of the end of this inspection period, Combustion Engineering had not completed the Waterford 3 plant specific analyses in order to reduce the minimum assumed EFW temperature to 40°F.

On September 17, 1996, the licensee identified in CR 96-1441 that the basis for allowing the WCT basins to be used as the EFW supply, in lieu of the condensate storage pool, was also unsupported from an inventory standpoint. Following a loss of cooling accident, the WCT can consume as much as 168,000 gallons of basin water to dissipate the heat required by the ultimate heat sink. Since the total capacity of each WCT basin is approximately 174,000 gallons, the requirement of 170,000 gallons of water for EFW would not be met following a loss of cooling accident, if the WCT basins were the primary source of EFW, assuming a single failure (i.e., ACCW pump) and the evaporative losses that would occur.

On September 26, licensing issued Interoffice Letter W3F1-96-0169 to operations which stated, in part, that during a design basis loss of cooling accident, a WCT basin does not contain enough water to supply EFW and perform its heat removal requirements for the ultimate heat sink. The letter indicated that if the WCT basins were aligned to EFW, there would not be enough water for EFW or the ultimate heat

sink and that both trains of ACCW (ultimate heat sink) would be inoperable, which is prohibited by TS. The letter went on to recommend that entry into TS 3.7.1.3 Action (b) be prohibited.

The inspectors concluded that the use of WCT basins as a source of EFW, in lieu of the condensate storage pool, would be inappropriate because of the inability to meet the EFW design bases in terms of minimum temperature and inventory. The failure to assure that the WCT basins were capable of meeting all EFW design bases requirements is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (382/9612-05).

#### IV. Plant Support

##### **R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls**

##### **R1.1 General Comments (71750)**

The inspectors made frequent tours of the radiologically protected area and noted good radiological housekeeping and worker awareness of radiological hazards. The inspectors also noted adequate radiological work practices during the jobs observed.

#### V. Management Meetings

##### **X1 Exit Meeting Summary**

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 15, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.



## ATTACHMENT

### **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

#### PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

##### Licensee

R. G. Azzarello, Manager, Maintenance  
C. M. Dugger, General Manager, Plant Operations  
J. J. Fisicaro, Director, Nuclear Safety  
T. J. Gaudet, Acting Manager, Licensing  
K. V. Le, Engineer, Maintenance Engineering  
D. C. Matheny, Manager, Operations  
M. B. Sellman, Vice-President, Operations  
D. W. Vinci, Superintendent, System Engineering  
A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering

#### INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

|       |                           |
|-------|---------------------------|
| 37551 | Onsite Engineering        |
| 61726 | Surveillance Observations |
| 62707 | Maintenance Observations  |
| 71707 | Plant Operations          |
| 71750 | Plant Support Activities  |
| 92902 | Followup-Maintenance      |
| 92903 | Followup-Engineering      |

#### ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

##### Opened

|                |     |  |
|----------------|-----|--|
| 50-382/9612-01 | VIO | Failure to follow procedure for M&TE requirements (Section M1.2)   |
| 50-382/9612-02 | NCV | Failure to perform a test before adjustment of the turbine (Section M1.3)                                  |
| 50-382/9612-03 | URI | Review the licensee's actions regarding the use of fasteners in safety-related applications (Section M2.1) |
| 50-382/9612-04 | NCV | Failure to maintain seismic supports for the Valve CC-134B air accumulator (Section M2.2)                  |

|                |     |   |
|----------------|-----|---|
| 50-382/9612-05 | VIO | Inadequate analysis for WCT basin water as a source of EFW (Section E8.4) |
|----------------|-----|---|

Closed

|                 |     |  |
|-----------------|-----|--|
| 50-382/9612-02  | NCV | Failure to perform a test before adjustment of the turbine (Section M1.3)                      |
| 50-382/9612-04  | NCV | Failure to maintain seismic supports for the Valve CC-134B air accumulator (Section M2.2)      |
| 50-382/9403-04  | IFI | Review licensee corrective actions for hoist drive failure (Section M8.1)                      |
| 50-382/94402-01 | IFI | Lack of formal documentation of quality process surveys (Section M8.2)                         |
| 50-382/9513-03  | VIO | Plant material condition deficiencies (Section M8.4)   |
| 50-382/9403-02  | VIO | Failure to control approved design basis (Section E8.2)  |
| 50-382/9522-04  | VIO | Failure to perform integrated leak test (Section E8.3)   |
| 50-382/9605-08  | URI | Review of the adequacy of the WCT basin as a source of water for the EFW system (Section E8.4) |

Discussed

|                |     |   |
|----------------|-----|---|
| 50-382/9325-03 | IFI | Evaluation of the results of the CCW heat exchanger corrosion monitoring program (Section E8.1) |
|----------------|-----|---|

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| ACCW  | Auxiliary Component Cooling Water            |
| ASME  | American Society of Mechanical Engineers     |
| BAM   | Boric Acid Makeup                            |
| CCW   | Component Cooling Water                      |
| CEA   | Control Element Assembly                     |
| CFR   | Code of Federal Regulations                  |
| CR    | Condition Report                             |
| EFW   | Emergency Feedwater                          |
| ESFAS | Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems |
| LCO   | Limiting Condition for Operation             |
| LOCA  | Loss-of-Coolant Accident                     |
| M&TE  | Measuring and Test Equipment                 |
| MOV   | Motor-Operated Valve                         |
| NRC   | Nuclear Regulatory Commission                |
| PDR   | Public Document Room                         |
| psig  | pounds per square inch gauge                 |
| QC    | Quality Control                              |
| RFO   | Refueling Outage                             |
| TS    | Technical Specifications                     |
| UFSAR | Updated Final Safety Analysis Report         |
| WA    | Work Authorization                           |
| WCT   | Wet Cooling Tower                            |