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October 8, 1980

To: Vic Stello

From: Henry Myers

The following are comments and questions based on recent interviews:

1. In a conversation with Reading at approximately 9:30 a.m., Miller said something to the effect that:

"See the situation we're in is a delicate one because we actually have plant integrity. (Reading then interjects an "O.K." which is not on the transcript). If we had a leak, we'd be all right. (Reading then says something like "I understand" which does not appear on the transcript.)

Does this mean Gary Miller understood that he was cooling by the feed and bleed mode which was not provided for in the emergency procedures, and which he could not be certain was doing the job? Such an inference from Miller's comments to Reading on March 28 would be consistent with comments he subsequently made to the effect the plant was in a condition not anticipated in its design or operating procedures. (E.g. Miller, 9/5/80, p.31, p. 43, p. 133.)

2. I did not note discussion regarding the closing of the block valve at about 3:10 p.m., an act which appears to have terminated the depressurization strategy. Since this action represented a major change in strategy, was it discussed with Miller, and if not who ordered and/or concurred in it? Was this action a consequence of Chwastyk having convinced Miller on the basis of Chwastyk's concern resulting from his (Chwastyk's) recognition that the pressure pulse was a manifestation of the hydrogen burn?
3. While it would seem obvious that the strategy employed in gaining stability would depend upon what had happened previously, and upon the condition of the core, Miller has appeared adamant in denying this, saying that what had happened prior to his arrival was not something that need concern

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him. He said his primary concern was in establishing a stable cooling condition, and that he did not focus on the circumstances that had brought the reactor to its damaged state. (E.g. Miller, 9/5/80, p. 19, pp. 33-35.) The basic thrust of Miller's assertions (i.e. that prior conditions were not relevant to his current concerns) seems to be contradicted by Arnold, who appears to be saying that it might have been fortuitous that his recommendation to start the RCP's was in fact appropriate. (E.g. Arnold, 9/5/80, p. 40, where he said that under other circumstances he could have understood where following such advice might have brought about a worsening of the situation.) Is it the case that prior conditions (i.e. open PORV, throttling HPI, and open letdown) were in fact irrelevant to the strategy employed thereafter in bringing about a stable cooling situation?

4. PNO-79-67 issued on March 28 states that "Safety injection was secured manually approximately 5 minutes after actuation." Is PNO-79-67 an accurate reflection of the extent of information provided by Met-Ed to the NRC as of the time it was drafted?

Did Gary Miller get  
briefed on throttling of  
HPCI