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March 25, 1980

The Honorable John F. Ahearne
Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Ahearne:

Your letter of March 21 and its attachments constitute an inadequate response to questions posed in my letters of January 21 and February 4. Unfortunately the Commission majority's statement about the Special Inquiry Group's answers is so vague that I am in doubt as to its meaning. Does the Commission majority believe that the Special Inquiry Group did adequately address my questions? Or is the Commission majority merely recognizing the indisputable fact that the Special Inquiry Group addressed the questions, making no judgement as to the adequacy of the answers?

I would appreciate a clarification of the majority position so that I can determine what action, if any, might be required to insure that the essential questions I have posed are answered in an appropriate fashion.

Sincerely,

MORRIS K. UDALL
Chairman

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D R A F T (4/3/80)

1 What effort was made following Gary Miller's arrival and establishing a command group to determine the primary system inventory loss during the period the PORV was open? If no such effort was made, does this constitute a violation of any explicit or implicit NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

2 In the view of I&E, which of the TMI supervisors present in the control room on March 28 believed that day that the core was uncovered for some portion of the period between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.? Which between 9:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.?

3 In the view of the I&E, what did Gary Miller infer from the fact that the core was hot, hot enough he said, that he was told new thermocouple junctions might have been formed?

4 How does I&E interpret Gary Miller's statement made to I&E investigators that "... the incore were reading anywhere from 2500 or so, I pick 2500 (;) it could have been higher?"

5 In the view of I&E, which of the supervisors who observed the temperatures indicating superheated conditions in the TMI primary system believed that these temperatures did not necessarily mean the core was or had been uncovered? To the extent that the supervisors did not believe the core was or had been uncovered how does I&E believe such supervisors explained the source of such high temperatures?

6 Does I&E believe that Ivan Porter did direct the technician to take a second set of thermocouple readings using a digital volt meter?

7 Does I&E believe that the technicians did inform Ivan Porter of all or part of the results of the second set of thermocouple readings; e.g. the set made using the digital voltmeter?

8 In the view of I&E what did Ivan Porter inform Gary Miller as to the reliability of measurements indicating temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees? In the view of I&E, did Miller and his colleagues infer from the thermocouple data that the core might be uncovered? That it might be damaged? That a steam-cladding reaction might have occurred?

9 Ivan Porter told the I&E investigators that he was afraid the thermocouple measurements (e.g. indicating temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees) were real. How does I&E reconcile this statement with others made by Porter to the effect that he discounted these measurements?

10 During the period March 28 through May 7 what happened to the sheet on which the March 28 in-core measurements made with the digital voltmeter were recorded? Did the failure of Metropolitan Edison to turn this sheet over to the NRC prior to May 7 constitute a violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

Computer printout sheets which we now have

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11 Was Gary Miller or any other TMI supervisor aware of Mr. Flint's monitoring the in-core themocouples during the day on March 28? Was it a violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions to not monitor the incore thermocouples during the day on March 28?

12 Did the failure to report any or all of the following represent an explicit or implicit violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

13 Did the failure to acquire periodic voltage measurements from the in-core thermocouple terminals during the day on March 28 constitute a violation of NRC regulations?

14 Does I&E believe that Mr. Illjes was informed of the pressure pulse after arriving in the TMI control room on the afternoon of March 28? Does I&E believe that Mr. Illjes discussed with others in the control room on March 28 the possibility that a hydrogen explosion had occurred on that day?

15 On March 28 to whom did John Flint report with regard to in-core thermocouple or other data that he observed on that day?

16 On March 28, did any employees of Metropolitan Edision or General Public Utilities make calculations as to extent of fuel failure based on data from the dome monitor or other instruments? Was any such analysis provided to the NRC?

17 Does the failure on March 28 to calculate the approximate extent of fuel failure constitute a failure to adhere to any NRC regulation or licensing condition?

18 On March 28, did TMI personnel monitor the chart recorders which displayed containment building temperatures? If so, what interpretation was assigned to the temperature increase that occurred approximately was assigned to the temperature increase that occurred approximately coincident with the reactor building pressure pulse at about 1:50 p.m.? Did the failure to monitor or interpret the temperature records represent a violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

19 On March 28, did TMI personnel monitor the printer that displayed the alarms received at about 1:50 p.m.? If so, what interpretation was assigned to these alarms? Did the failure to monitor or interpret the alarm printer data represent violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

20 What were the circumstances leading to recording of the 1:50 p.m. reactor building pressure pulse as 4 psi on one

log and about 5 psi on another? Was it a violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions to record such data incorrectly?

21 Was Mr. Frederick in the control room at approximately 1:50 p.m. on March 28 at the time of occurrence of the reactor building pressure pulse and related events?

22 Which of the TMI supervisors present on March 28 was aware of the following which occurred at approximately 1:50 p.m.: pressure pulse, actuation of containment sprays, increase in containment temperatures, alarm printer print-out, and negative pressure pulses on instruments that used containment pressure as a reference?

23 Which of the supervisors present on March 28 were aware prior to that day that actuation of the containment sprays required detection of a pressure pulse of at least 28 psi by at least 2 pressure sensors?

24 Does I&E believe that Gary Miller was informed of the 1:50 p.m. pressure pulse and associated actuation of the containment sprays?

25 Mr. Mehler has stated that on March 28, he was instructed not to start equipment. The apparent concern was that this might cause sparks that could initiate an explosion. Mr. Chwastky also recalled being told not to start equipment in the reactor building, but thought that the instruction had not been issued on March 28 because he had not been in the shift supervisor's office on that day where he recalled the instruction had been issued. Mike Ross, however, did recall Chwastyk being in the shift supervisor's office on March 28. Miller does not recall any such instruction not to start the pumps, whatever day such order was given. In the view of I&E, TMI employees were instructed that they should not start equipment in the reactor building; who issued such instructions; and on what day were such instruction issued? What reconciliation can be made between Mr. Chwastyk's recollection that he was not in the shift supervisor's office on March 28 and Ross' contrary recollection?

26 If Mr. Miller was not informed of the actuation of the containment sprays and subsequent termination of the sprays, did the failure to inform him constitute a violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

27 Who instructed Mr. Chwastyk to establish a bubble in the pressurizer which he tried to do sometime after 2:00 pm. during which effort the pressurizer block valve and/or PORV was closed at approximarely 3:10 p.m.?

28 With whom did Gary Miller conduct telephone conversations during the period when he was at the Lieutenant Governor's office on the afternoon of March 28? What was the substance of such conversations?

29 If Mr. Chwastyk sought to establish a bubble without receiving permission from Gary Miller, was this a violation of NRC regulations or licensing conditions?

30 In the view of I&E, did Mr. Miller and/or other Metropolitan Edison officials have an obligation to report on March 28, any or all of the following to State and/or Federal officials:

-- in-core thermocouple data indicating temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees F.;

-- computer print-outs of in-core thermocouple voltages indicating presence of superheated conditions (and partial core uncovery):

-- hot-leg temperatures indicative of superheated conditions prevailing for most of the period between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.;

-- the pressure pulse recording and other manifestations of a hydrogen detonation in the containment at 1:50 p.m.; and,

-- uncertainties during the day as to whether the core was uncovered?

31 With whom did Mr. Dieckamp confer regarding his statement in a May 9, 1979 mailgram to Mr. Udall that: "There is no evidence that anyone interpreted the 'pressure spike' and the spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage at the time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any information?" Does I&E believe that Mr. Dieckamp exercised due diligence, prior to composing the May 9 mailgram, in seeking to determine whether in fact some TMI personnel did interpret the pressure spike and spray initiation in terms of core damage? In that Mr. Dieckamp sent copies of his May 9 mailgram to the NRC, was he obligrated by explicit or implicit NRC regulations or licensing conditions to correct the record when he found his statement to be erroneous?

32 In the view of I&E, did the failure of Metropolitan Edison officials to report any of the foregoing constitute a violation of requirements imposed explicitly or implicitly by NRC regulations and/or licensing conditions?

33 To what extent has Metropolitan Edison and/or General Public Utilities conducted an inquiry into the causes of the failure of Messers Herbein and/or Miller to fully inform their superiors as to conditions at Three Mile Unit 2 on March 28?

34 Does any failure of Metropolitan Edison and/or General Public Utilities to conduct any such inquiry as mentioned above constitute a violation of requirement imposed explicitly or implicitly by NRC regulations and/or licensing conditions?