

VEGP PLANT REVIEW BOARD MEETING MINUTES

MEETING NO. 90-84 DATE 6/21/90 PAGE 1 OF 4
 MEETING CONVENED 1:00 AM/PM MEETING ADJOURNED 3:20 AM/PM
 (* VIA TELECON)

THIS MEETING CHAIRED BY:
 (X) CHAIRMAN () VICE CHAIRMAN W. F. Kitchens

VOTING MEMBERS PRESENT: J. E. Swartzwelder J. G. Aufdenkampe

PRB SECRETARY C. Cross Tynan

NON-VOTING MEMBERS PRESENT:

VOTING ALTERNATES PRESENT:

M. I. Hobbs FOR H. M. Handfinger

I. A. Kochery FOR R. L. LeGrand

NON-VOTING ALTERNATES PRESENT:

R. E. Polker FOR G. R. Frederick

FOR

FOR

FOR

FOR

CCT
 REVIEW/
 APPROVE
 JAE

GUESTS/TECHNICAL ADVISORS:

R. A. Moye

T. E. Webb

H. L. Beacher

F. J. Ealick

A. S. Parton

W. C. Guthrie

PRB ACTION ITEMS OPENED: None

PRB ACTION ITEMS CLOSED: None

PRB MINUTES APPROVED : 90-81, 90-82

9610070412 960827
 PDR FOIA
 WILMOTH95-81 PDR

PRB SECRETARY

PRB CHAIRMAN

PRB MEETING MINUTES CONTINUATION SHEET

A. Meeting Minutes 89-81 and 89-82 were unanimously approved as presented.

B. The following items were unanimously recommended for approval. No unreviewed safety question involved.

19010-C, Rev. 8

"E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant"

19223-C, Rev. 4

"FR-C.3 Response to Saturated Core Cooling"

TCP 18019-C-7-90-4

"Loss of Residual Heat Removal"

00700-C, Rev. 9

"General Employee Training"

LER 1-90-013

"Improper Application of Grace Period to Containment Air Lock Surveillance"

LDCR FS 90-026

Modify FSAR 3.11 - Revise current VEGP position on Environmental Qualification (EQ) of safety-related equipment located in mild environments.

LDCR FS 90-027

Revise FSAR 8.3.1, 9.5 and Tables 9.2.1-2 and 9.5.5.-2 to allow bypassing of High Jacket Water Diesel Trip

Unit 1 Cycle 3 Startup Report - NOTS-00420

LDCR TS 89-022

Revise Tech. Spec. 3.5.3.2 and associated bases to allow SIP's to be operable in Modes 5 & 6 for reduced inventory conditions.

Letter to NRC - Detailed Control Room Design Review -
ELV-01599

Responses to NRC Regulatory Issue (RIR) Review (RER) findings

93641-C, Rev. 1

"Development and Implementation of the Fuel Shuttle Sequence Plan"

- C. The following items were unanimously recommended for approval with comment. No unresolved safety question involved.

00404-C, Rev. 14

"Surveillance Test Program".
Section 4.5.3 (page 21) -
Reword to follow last
statement in 4.5.4

LER 1-90-12

"Inadequate Testing Leads to
Inadequately Performed
Surveillance". Add in the
Abstract/Corrective Actions -
"...are being prepared to test
the sequencer and determine
response times".

92030-C, Rev. 4

"Fire Drill Program". Step
4.3.1- Reword similar to the
following: "...should be
assembled by the FPE and
should include sufficient
manpower from Fire Brigade
Training Staff, Operations
Department staff and FPE (The
comment is to not specify the
exact number of individuals).

19251-C, Rev. 4

"FR-2.1 Response to High
Containment Pressure". The
Safety Evaluation should
be/could be improved
(wording).

13216-1, Rev. 19/
13216-2, Rev. 6

"Liquid Waste Release".
Steps 4.1.2/4.1.4 - Need
consistency in referring to
Waste Monitor Tank 009/09/19/9
in the procedure and tagging
in the field.

LER 1-90-6, Rev. 1 Rewrite

"Loss of Offsite Power Leads
to Site Area Emergency".
Corrective Action #4 - Change
"61" valid starts to "69".

00056-C, Rev. 10

"Safety and Environmental Evaluations". Step 4.6.3 - Reword such that Section B is an explanation for Yes to A2 should be written. Step 4.6 - Review for including Emergency Plan increase/decrease in effectiveness as Security Plan is included. Step 2.6 - Review and delete as preparer/reviewer definition should override. Unless evaluator is needed for Environmental Evaluation or preparer should be stated instead.

Note: The training on 00056-C is to be decided by K. R. Holmes. Procedure will not be signed/approved until that determination is made.

- D. The board unanimously concurred with the following items.

Event Report 2-90-002

"Reactor Trip Due to Loop 3 MSIV Closure"

Unit 1 - 1R2 Integrated Leak Rate Test Final Report

- E. The board unanimously concurred with the reportability determination for the following Deficiency Cards.

1-90-263	1-90-271
1-90-266	1-90-272
1-90-268	1-90-273
1-90-270	

- F. The board tabled DC 1-90-269, "Patrol checks that was initiated on 6-1-90 for system problems (see SR #'s 4086-90 and 4089-90) was not done correctly". The DC will be reviewed at a later meeting when a related LER is made available for review.

- G. The board tabled procedure 00410-C, Rev. 5, "Control of Computer Software", with the following comments:

- Minimize quality requirements for Category A software
- Change final approval from Assistant General Manager to Department Manager for Category B software changes.

- H. The board discussed the proposed revision to procedure 00400-C, "Plant Design Control". A suggestion was made to add a check sheet to list items required for Return to Service and this sheet should be a part of the MRP package.

PBB meeting on
6-21-90 that
approved latest
Rev of
90-006-01

12/4/8

Jun

25 1990

Review of undated ROGGE memo to Brockman

Algr met w/ Bockhold (Togge accompanied?)
on 6/19/90 at 9:30 am.

mtg called by Bockhold to solicit all of Algr's
concerns.

- 1) FAVA Quality Concern
- 2) Diesel Air Quality
- 3) Diesel Reliability

Need LER 90-006 submitted 04-19-90

5619
=

item
191

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

07-15-90

Original algtm rec'd anonymously: Reg RI-90-02⁰⁸
re violation of tech specs.

DOL case
open

On June 19, 1990, AM met w/ Backlund in the presence of JRoge To discuss technical concerns. AM provided 3 concerns at that mtg:

Conf \$

1. FAVA Quality Concern: AM submitted Quality Concern regarding PRTB approval of temporary mod which was the installation of the FAVA filter skid as a liquid radwaste treatment system in VESF for a period up to 6 months. AM felt that FAVA skid did not meet requirements of TRG 1.143. Also, eng review was not accomplished.

2. Diesel Reliability: AM concerned w/ the starts and failures of EDG 1A & TB from March 20 to present and how the issue was resolved. AM also questioned why a revised LER had not been submitted. GB responded that a "Complete revision" was being prepared and AM asked why that revision had been in corporate for over a month with no action.

* In a private conversation w/ JR, AM alleged the EDG information was false and significant. AM alleged the LER regarding the site area emergency, the COA response and slides used in the presentation were false as to the number of starts without failure was actually 11 instead of 18.

* On the morning of June 20, GB came to see JR to explain the resolution of EDG start count. also explained that a completely revised LER was necessary to properly present data.

2.
3. Diesel air quality: AM was concerned about diesel air quality, as far as the humidity or dew point. GB said info obtained from Cooper Industries. AM concerned that since VEGP did not know the air quality, history the effect on sensors and equipment could not be determined.

*no info discussed as to what Cooper Ind had advised the plant.

AM closed meeting by informing GB that he was not prepared to discuss any new concerns.

GB later advised JR that CEE GLENN was assigned to do an independent review of AM issues and AM was assigned to identify any further concerns.

On June 20, OI provided additional algtms received from AM on evening of June 19.

1. AM, in written document, claimed that info in LER 90-006 submitted on April 19, 1990 (re number of successful DG starts) was false. AM claimed that DG-1B from 3-27-90 to 4-19-90, DG-1B started only 11 times. For DG-1A, from 3-31-90 to 4-19-90, only 11 starts were made. AM claims this material false statement is similar to the one made in GPC 4-9-90 response to CAL. AM went on to explain GPC activity relative to LER revision.

2. AM, in written document provided to OI, further discussed air quality issue and claimed that GPC made two MFSS in correspondence to NRC re VEGP's DG's control and starting air supplies. AM claims stmt that air quality is satisfactory is materially false because there is no objective evidence to support the stmt. AM provided "history of air quality".

3.
AM alleges that based on the history, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that air quality for Unit 1 DGA is unknown and undetermined for the first 2 1/2 yrs of post license operation.

referred to OI 6-29-90
3. AM claimed that on the morning of 2-28-90 operations personnel at VEGP were performing TS surveillance on Containment Isolation Valves when it was determined the surveillance had not been done properly. AM claimed a coverup ensued so a forced shutdown would not have to be initiated.

referred to OI 6-29-90
4. AM another TS violation re SOURCE RANGE NEUTRON MONITOR was out when plant went from mode 5 to mode 6 and coverup through delay of submitting deficiency card.

referred to OI 6-29-90
5. AM claimed that a TS violation occurred on March 5, 1990 when B train RHR pump increased vibrations and should have been declared inop. A train RHR was out of service. LCO and action ptmt should have been entered.

AM alleges these examples portray operations approach to schedule versus compliance.

AM claims that VEGP has one of the highest LER rates in Region II, but also has one of the highest capacity factors in 1989, as well as some of the shortest outages. "These statistics may be related. The cost of an LER is small. The value of at power hours and critical path time is high."

NEW INFORMATION:

1. AM provided additional info re LER 90-006, "Loss of Offsite Power Leads to Site Area Emergency." And provided Copy of "Complete Revision" ordered by HAIRSTON.

AM told OI that he was concerned about "word-smithing" in the LER and cover letter and feels GPC is misleading NRC w/respect to the capability of DGs. For example, the word "VALID" is being misused to mean CONTROLLED. AM claims that GPC is responsible for misleading NRC and claims that HAIRSTON, MCCOY, STRINGFELLOW and SHEPMAN are involved.

AM still feels the COUNT is off. and that Birmingham is trying to work up some justification to keep DGs operational.

2. AM alleges that Sequencer out of service places plant in TS "motherhood" 3.0.3 action stmnt.

VEGP Load Sequencer has been out of service, inoperable or powered down for various reasons. AM concerned that Operations has historically determined that only a 72 Hour LCO was appropriate for having the load sequencer out of service. Engineering determines that when Sequencer out the plant should be in 3.0.3.

AM alleges that because of this the plant should have been in 3.0.3 repeatedly and that each 3.0.3 requires reporting to NRC under 50.73, and a forced shutdown initiated if restoration is not complete within one hour.

Engineering has brought this to attention of Ops and Mgmt and they have been arguing. To date nothing has been done by Mgmt to correct the problem.

→ * Provided draft letter on Waiver of Compliance.

3. AM provides info re backdating of documents to avoid going past PRB required date.

alleged violation of TS administrative requirements in Section 6.0 to have Temporary Change to Procedure (TCP) PRB approved within 14 days.

backdating to 6-12-90 falsifies + covers up the violation of TS.

rec'd from
OI 7-11-90

4. AM provided updated data on MFS re LER.

AM presents DG-1B start data.

07-16-90
11:00

07-16-90

MTG re VOGTLE
Raper, Robinson, Vorne, Craig, Uryc, Merschhoff, Herdt,
Jenkins, Brockman, Milhoan.

FAVA was looked at by DRS & DRSS
RI prepared 2 IRs.
Send pkg to DRS & DRSS for review

1230

RA

- 1) separate out those issues that can be verified by inspection
 - a) EDG starts (HUNT)
 - EDG Air Quality (HUNT)

OI / team on site next Wed.
Hunt, Aiello (TS knowledge)
2 investigators
(Len Welnis or Bill Deen)

mission is
to find out
if there is an
attitude
problem

Aiello/OI do CS interview this week!

Bill Deen will be requested
Dave Mathews to be team leader!

OI commits to 2 week turn around

RA wants backshift w/ NAC to review log entries
adjunct to

- session w/ RTs on what to look for, no
regular RT insps will catch this.
check the solutions.

06-26-90:1015

Disc re 90-A-0092

Reyes, Brockman, Herdt, Urye

ACTIONS:

BROCKMAN will go through algr's allegations and address, point by point, all issues as there was IZII/DRP contact with licensee regarding some of the issues raised by algr.

ten
112

6/13/90

6-29-80

My comments
& basis for meeting
with T. Green

Allen

B/S

- • Proposed revision 1-90-006-01 approved by the PAB on 5-8-90 stated what "completion of the comprehensive test program" was.
- • It was not completion of 1980-1
- • Proposed revision 1-90-006-01 stated the starts thru its submittal date and that information was and is correct.

ELV-01729
0470

Docket No. 50-424

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed revised report related to an event which occurred on March 20, 1990. This revision is necessary to clarify the information related to the number of successful diesel generator starts as discussed in the GPC letter dated April 9, 1990 and the LER dated April 19, 1990 and to update the status of corrective actions in the LER. It is the criteria for the completion of the test program is understood to be the first successful test in accordance with Vogle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) procedure 14980-1 "Diesel Generator Operability Test." Then there were 10 successful starts of Diesel Generator 1A and 12 successful starts of Diesel Generator 1B between the completion of the test program and the end of April 19, 1990, the date the LER 50-424/1990-06 was submitted to the NRC. The number of successful starts included in the original LER included some of the starts that were part of the test program. The discrepancy is attributed to diesel start record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program.

In order to correct the LER and to provide more useful and up to date information the LER has been revised to state the number of valid diesel generator tests in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 rather than the number of successful starts since the event. The number of valid tests was established by reviewing diesel generator testing data from March 21 through June 7, 1990.

Sincerely,

W. G. Hairston, III

• This is not the
cause.

WGH, III/HWM/gm
Enclosure: LER 50-424/1990-006-01

Alvin M. ... 6-29-90

7/6/90,, PHONE CALL W MOSBACH

6/7/2

SITE TO CORPORATE ITEMS STATUS

8-22-90

LER'S SPECIAL REPORTS AND VIOLATION RESPONSES


ITEM	DISC. DATE	DESCRIPTION	DEPT/INDIV/NSAC	CORP. DUE DATE	STATUS
SPECIAL REPORT 1-90-4	5-23-90	DIESEL GENERATOR 'B' FAILURES - TECH SPEC 4.8.1.1.3 REPORTABLE	ENG/KCS/TEW	6-18-90	TO CORP 6-11-90
DLER 1-90-17 (LER 1-90-013)	5-29-90	ESFAS RESPONSE TIME SUMMATIONS INADEQUATE - TECH SPEC 4.9.2.2 VIOLATION	ENG/DCG/TEW	8-21-90	TO CORP 6-21-90
DLER 1-90-18 (LER 1-90-4S)	6-01-90	UNCOMPENSATED DEGRADATION IN SECURITY SYSTEM COMPUTER	SEC/EMC/TEW	6-21-90	TO GM 6-22-90
DLER 1-90-19 (LER 1-90-013)	5-01-90	IMPROPER APPLICATION OF GRADE PERIOD LEADS TO MISSED SURVEILLANCE	WP/MCO/MRS	6-21-90	TO GM 6-22-90
RER INSPECTION COMMENTS	5-15-90	WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED BY RER INSPECTION	SEC/MCO/MCB	6-22-90	TO GM 6-22-90
VIOLATION RESP. 424/90-08	6-12-90	COMMENTS ON EOP/AM INTERFERENCE	WP/DCG/MCB	7-03-90	AWAITING OF RESPONSE
VIOLATION RESP. 424/90-10-01	5-14-90	FAILURE TO ENSURE PROPER ROUTING AND SLIP TO THE RCS TEMPORARY LEVEL INDICATION	ENG/RLM/MCB	7-07-90	AWAITING OF RESPONSE
LER REVISION (LER 1-90-006-01)		LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY	WP/RLM/TEW	NONE	TO CORP 5-15-90
LER REVISION (LER 2-90-001-01)		MISLEADING TASK SHEET LEADS TO INADEQUATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MAINTENANCE	WP/TEW	NONE	TO CORP 5-15-90

oldest one
by far.

13/53

Copy for Larry

Interoffice Correspondence

Georgia Power 

DATE: August 23, 1990

RE: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
NRC Areas of Concern
Log: SRBS-00044
Security Code: NC

413 100
RECEIVED

FROM: M. J. Ajluni

TO: Distribution

Attached for your information is a copy of the recent NRC Operational Safety Inspection areas of concern and VEGP's position.

Mark J. Ajluni

M. J. Ajluni

MJA/ghj

cc: W. B. Shipman
G. Bockhold, Jr. ✓
S. C. Ewald
L. K. Mathews
C. C. Miller
W. C. Ramsey
P. D. Rushton
NORMS
SRB File

NUCLEAR PLANT VOGTLE UNITS 1 & 2		
ROUTING	ACTION	COPY
GM		
AGM-OPS		
AGM-SUPPORT		
FIN SVC		
OPERATIONS		
MAINTENANCE		
HP/CHEMISTRY		YES
O&P		W.M.H.
ENG SUPPORT		R.L.
TECH SUPPORT		W.B.
TRAINING		W.M.H.
ISEG/SACR		LGA
ADMIN/SECURITY		W.M.H.
		GARY GAF
ACTION DUE		

6154

AUGUST 17, 1990

<u>AREAS OF CONCERNS</u>	<u>NRC</u>	<u>VEGP CONTACT</u>	<u>CORPORATE CONTACT</u>
* D/G Records Starts/Failures	Pete Taylor	G. Frederick	
* 3/1/90 S R Monitor Inop Mode Change	Neal Hunemuller	JES/D. Carter	
* Missed Surv. Cont. Isol.	Neal Hunemuller	JES/S. Swanson	
* March 15 RHR Train B	Ron Aiello	JES/J. Gasser	P. D. Rushton
* Temp. Change Notice to AOP 18028-C-7-90-1	Robert Carrol	JES/J. Cash	
* ESFA Sequencer Out of Service	Robert Carrol	JES/Horton	J. A. Bailey
* Alternate Radwaste Building	Ron Aiello	Ron LeGrand/JES	P. D. Rushton
* Snubber Reduction/ LCO Action Statement	Larry Garner	Gus Williams	Ward/Stringfellow
* Cont. Integrity Hydrogen Monitor Valve Opened	Morris Branch	Dean Gustafson	Ward/Stringfellow
* Precision Heat Balance	Morris Branch	Gus Williams	B. Florian
* Personnel Accountability Methodology for Reporting	C. VanDenburgh	JES/GB	
* Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 Philosophy	J. D. Wilcox	J. E. Swartzwelder	J. Stringfellow
* ESFAS Reportability	J. D. Wilcox	R. M. Odom	J. A. Bailey
* Plant Review Board (PRB) Composition	C. VanDenburgh	G. Bockhold	
* Tech. Specs. Interpretation	Morris Branch	J. E. Swartzwelder	J. Stringfellow
* Overtime/Training & Qualification	Larry Garner	J. E. Swartzwelder	
* Electrical Separation Zone 80	Larry Garner	M. Horton	P. D. Rushton
* I. S. 3.4.7.3 CCW	J. D. Wilcox	J. E. Swartzwelder	

- * Training Department Comments on OSTI
- * Shift Experience
- * Plant Equipment Operator Morale
- * Shift Communications
- * Analyzer Operation Following SI
- * Chilling Affect/Intimidation of PRB Members
- * Quality Concern Program
- * Conflicting Statements
- * While Containment Cooler is Inoperable
DGIB is Rendered Inoperable
- * Exit of Diesel Generator LCO
- *

the true
reason for
the error
made in the
COA

The error in the COA was made due to careless communication and instructions from George Bockhold to Jimmy Cash to count starts for the NRC presentations. Cash counted starts without regard to failures and problems and gave Bockhold only summary level information. Cash knew the details of the "critical" failures^{132 & 154} and counted them as successful starts anyway. Bockhold did not critically evaluate or independently confirm. There may have been willful bias on Bockhold's part to show a good story.

9 — The following discussions under (a) and (b) don't explain this simple and direct introduction^(2 Factors). They state almost everything/anything else.

The true
reason for
the error
in the ER

The error made in the ER 190-06 was made due to careless wording made at the last minute confirmed only by verbal assurance of George Bockhold on a telephone call (without doing a fundamental review of a listing of starts against the chosen wording) and in the face of questions raised by site personnel that there had been failures on 3-22 and 3-23.

NRC Concern

1. The NRC is concerned about the incorrect number of diesel starts reported in LER 1-90-06 and the number of starts presented to the NRC on April 9, 1990 and in the confirmation response letter of April 9, 1990. The major issue remaining is to try and determine through personal interviews, how the number of 19 for diesel 1B was arrived at in the April 9 letter to the NRC. The NRC believes the intent of the April 9 letter and the presentation discussed consecutive successful starts. The revised response to LER 90-06 did not clarify the number of starts reported to the NRC April 9, and did not clarify that the 19 starts were not consecutive.
2. The inspector noted that documentation provided by Operations to support diesel trending (14980-C and 13145-C data sheets) does not contain an adequate description of what happens during the start attempt. The plant is not interpreting Reg Guide 1.108 properly with regard to reporting valid and non-valid failures. There may be valid and non-valid failures that were not reported. The NRC does not consider the current status of reporting diesel failures to be in compliance with commitments made to the NRC in Violation 50-424/87-57.

NRC Documentation

The NRC has reviewed the diesel start log and supporting documentation (14980-C and 13145-C data sheets). The NRC currently believes some problems identified on 14980's and 13145's should be classified as non-valid failures and reported to the NRC. The NRC has requested and received written analysis to explain the disposition of the following 1B diesel starts: #'s 123, 124, 132, 133, 134, 136, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, and 190. LER 1-90-06, revision 1; QA Audit Report OP26-90/33; QA Audit Report OP09-90/31; and Special Report 1-90-05, dated August 7, 1990; GPC confirmatory action letter dated April 9, 1990.

VEGP Position

1. The error made in the number of diesel starts reported to the NRC on April 9, 1990, and in LER 1-90-06 is attributed to two factors:
 - a. The testing as described in LER 90-06, revision 0, was in the "context of" and "in reference to" the diesel control systems. The first two sentences of the 5th paragraph explain actions taken with regard to sensor calibrations and control system testing. In this context, the test program correlates to testing discussed with the NRC on April 9, 1990, and reported in the April 9, 1990, confirmatory letter. The LER 90-06 comment of "subsequent to the test program" was not intended to exclude successful diesel starts before declaring the diesel operable. As a result, diesel starts after testing of the control systems, but before a declaration of operability were counted. The transmittal letter for LER 90-06, revision 1, describes the confusion and attempts to clarify the concern by redefining the types of starts and the point of counting.

DIESEL STARTS AND FAILURE REPORTING

Page 2 of 2

- b. LER 90-06, revision 1, was intended to clarify any inadvertent "misleading" of the NRC on successful operation of the diesel control systems. When Vogtle Management was aware of the problem in LER 90-06, revision 0, management notified the NRC Residents. Also at the corporate office on 6/11/90, W. Shipman contacted Ken Brockman and on about 6/11/90, W. G. Hairston, III, contacted Mr. S. Ebner of NRC Region II. The revised LER was submitted on 6/29/90.

The 19 starts discussed on April 9 were based on operator assessments of the starts as successful using VEGP procedures. Additional review of these starts by both the NRC and Vogtle personnel indicates start #134, performed on March 23, 1990, could be counted as unsuccessful. If start #134 is not counted, only 14 successful starts occurred before April 9, 1990. This start will be reviewed in detail and an appropriate report to clarify the number of starts reported April 9, 1990 will be made.

2. After a thorough review of Reg Guide 1.108, Engineering Support (Mike Horton) agreed that all diesel start problems have not been reported as failures. GPC's response to NRC Violation 424/87-57 committed to report such equipment problems as failures; however, due to internal administrative problems, the commitment was not implemented. Engineering Support intends to review diesel start records for any unreported failures.

VEGP Documentation

- o LER 1-90-06, revision 1; QA Audit Report OP26-90/33; QA Audit Report OP09-90/31; and Special Report 1-90-05, dated August 7, 1990; GPC confirmatory action letter dated April 9, 1990.
- o 1B diesel start analysis available 8/15/90 and Reg Guide 1.108 position from Engineering Support.

and XCNPC Management

- ① Vogtle Management was made aware of the failures on starts #134 and #132 prior to submitting the LER. They were informed of the failures on about 4-19-90.

directly
Vogtle Management was made aware of the inaccurate information in LER-90 rev. 0 on 4-30-90 by memo to the general manager.

John Aufdenkampe contacted the NRC residents on his own (not at GB's direction or TVG's) on about 6-1-90.

A revised LER had been generated and sent to XCNPC by the PRB by 5-15.

- ② As a minimum, start #132 and #134 should be counted as unsuccessful as records clearly show the DG tripped. Also start #136 could be counted as unsuccessful.

Response to NRC Question Concerning
Diesel Starts Reported on April 9, 1990
and in LER 90-06, Revisions 0 and 1

8/22/90
Time: 13:00

Question #1

1. Who prepared the slide for the 4/9/90 presentation?

Answer: G. Bockhold, Jr., J. P. Cash, and K. Burr working as a group

2. Who approved use of the slide?

Answer: G. Bockhold, Jr.

J.P. Cash was fully aware and knowledgeable that start #132 resulted in a diesel trip when he counted the starts. He demonstrated that knowledge in the critique meeting on 3-23-90 and counted the starts on the weekend of 4-7-90.

Question #2

1. Who prepared the confirmatory letter of April 9, 1990?

Answer: C. K. McCoy, J. A. Bailey, W. G. Hairston, III as a group.

2. Who approved the letter?

Answer: W. G. Hairston, III

Question #3 (with regard to LER 90-06, revision 0, dated 4/19/90)

1. Who prepared the LER?

Answer: Several draft revisions of the LER were prepared by Tom Webb and others of the NSAC group of the Vogtle Site Technical Support. These drafts were reviewed and commented on by the Plant Review Board. The final revision of LER 90-06, revision 0 was prepared by a phonecon between site management and corporate management. Those participating are believed to be G. Bockhold, Jr., A. Mosbaugh, J. G. Aufdenkampe, W. Shipman.

When this sentence was discussed in meetings of week of 8-13-90 with McCoy present, McCoy did not identify himself to be added to the list.

2. Who reviewed the LER?

Answer: All revisions of the LER were reviewed by the PRB and the General Manager-Plant Vogtle. There were other participants than listed, including McCoy and Harriston and Jack Stringfellow. McCoy was continuing being briefed by Sovapco personnel and had direct input to revision.

3. Who approved the LER?

Answer: The LER was approved by W. G. Hairston, III. All revisions and (revisions to revisions) were not reviewed by the PRB prior to submittal. For example the final version discussed on the reference phonecon was not PRB reviewed before signed by Harriston on 4-19-90.

Question #4

1. Who prepared the cover letter for LER 90-06, revision 1?

Answer: The cover letter was prepared by H. W. Majors of the corporate staff. This letter was prepared under the guidance of W. G. Hairston.

2. What was the purpose (intent) in the wording of the cover letter with regard to the number of diesel starts?

Answer: The cover letter was intended to document discussions with NRC Region II to clarify the starts documented in LER 90-06, revision 0. By picking a well defined point to specify "subsequent to the test program" it was possible to identify a substantial number of successful diesel starts. This was intended to remove any additional ambiguity.

Question #5

1. Who in corporate added the words "subsequent to the test program" in LER 90-06, revision 0?

Answer: Corporate Licensing personnel in conjunction with the phone conversation described above made editorial changes as directed. Those present during the phone conversation are thought to be W. Shipman, G. Bockhold, Jr., A. L. Mosbaugh, J. G. Aufdenkampe, and J. Stringfellow.

Bill Shipman picked this phrase on the phone all.

There were others participants than listed including McCoy and Harriston and Jack Stringfellow.

9/6/90

MOSBALGH

MAILED ME PKG WITH GAN

PWR POS PAPERS — ON DIES
GEN

MARKED UP.

ISSUE

IN PKG
CLOSE TO
FINAL CORR
OF COA LTR
STARTS 132 & 134

B/55