

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Wolf Creek Generating StationDOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 4 1 8 2 1 OF 0 1 3

TITLE (4)

ESF Actuation and Reactor Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)													
0	6	0	9	8	5	8	5	0	4	1	0	0	7	0	9	8	5	0	5	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 01012	2	20.402(b)	20.406(s)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
		20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)					
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

3116 316141-1818311

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	S	J	P	I	G	0	8	0	N
A	B	A	P	I	T	1	4	7	N

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE):
X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 9, 1985, and on June 13, 1985, events occurred which were initiated by trips of Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) "A".

On June 9, 1985, at approximately 0015 CDT, an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation (AFAS) and Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation (SGBSIS) occurred when MFP "A" tripped during a start attempt. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 2, Startup, with a reactor power level of approximately two (2) percent and feedwater was being supplied by the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

On June 13, 1985, at approximately 0400 CDT, a Reactor trip, AFAS and SGBSIS occurred when MFP "A" tripped causing a low-low water level in Steam Generator "B". The Reactor trip coupled with a low Reactor Coolant System average temperature initiated a Feedwater Isolation Signal. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 2 at a reactor power level of approximately one (1) percent.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of these events. All required safety systems performed properly and at no time did conditions develop which could have posed a threat to the public health or safety.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0124

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Wolf Creek Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2 8 5 - 0 4 1 - 0 0 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
					OF		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A (9-83))

On June 9, 1985, at approximately 0015 CDT, an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) and Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation Signal (SGBSIS) were initiated when Main Feedwater Pump "A" (MFP)[SJ-P] tripped.

Prior to this event, the plant was in Mode 2, Startup, with the Reactor Control System [AB] at normal operating temperature and pressure, and approximately two (2) percent reactor power. MFP "A" had tripped previously at approximately 1950 CDT on June 8, 1985, and the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFP)[BA-P] had been placed in operation at that time. MFP "B" was not operating and had been placed in a tripped condition to facilitate troubleshooting of its discharge valve [SJ-FCV]. At approximately 0015 CDT on June 9, 1985, MFP "A" was being started and it tripped during this start attempt. With MFP "B" already in a tripped condition, this resulted in initiation of an AFAS and SGBSIS.

Since the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were already in operation supplying feedwater flow to the Steam Generators [AB-SG], there was no appreciable effect on plant conditions due to this event. All required Engineered Safety Features equipment responded properly. MFP "A" was successfully restarted at approximately 0100 CDT, and the MDAFPs were then secured.

On June 13, 1985 during initial loading of the main turbine generator [TA-TG], a turbine vibration condition required the turbine to be shutdown. At 0345 CDT, with reactor power at approximately 15 percent, the main turbine was tripped. Plant response to the turbine trip was normal. Following the trip, reactor power level was being slowly decreased and was at approximately 9 percent at 0353 CDT when the operating Main Feedwater Pump-"A" tripped. Auxiliary feedwater flow to the Steam Generators was immediately established via manual actuation of the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and reactor power was rapidly reduced by driving in the control rods. As Steam Generator water levels continued to decrease, the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump [BA-P] was manually started to provide additional feedwater flow, but it tripped on overspeed when the operator opened the trip/throttle valve before opening the steam supply valve.

At 0400 CDT, with reactor power at approximately one percent, Steam Generator "B" water level reached the low-low level trip set point and a Reactor Trip, Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal and Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation Signal were automatically initiated. The Reactor Trip coupled with a low Reactor Coolant System [AB] average temperature (Tavg) of 560 degrees F initiated a Feedwater Isolation Signal. The motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were already in operation and all other required Engineered Safety Feature and Reactor Protection System equipment responded properly.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Wolf Creek Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2 8 5 - 0 4 1 - 0 0 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

At approximately 0406 CDT, the Main Steamline Isolation Valves (MSLIV) [SB-ISV] were manually actuated in the slow-close mode to stop steam flow from the Steam Generators as a contributor to Reactor Coolant System cooldown. It was later noted that MSLIV "A" was not closing and at 0410 CDT a fast-close (Safety Feature) signal was manually actuated which immediately closed the MSLIV. Reactor Coolant System Tavg reached a minimum of approximately 542 degrees F.

Steam Generator water levels were returned to normal by approximately 0500 CDT and normal feedwater flow was re-established in accordance with plant operating procedures at 0910 CDT.

Subsequent investigation has not identified the cause of the initiating events - trips of Main Feedwater Pump "A". In conjunction with the pump turbine supplier (General Electric), the pump/turbine control and protective circuits have been tested for proper function and calibration with acceptable results. The pump/turbine has subsequently been operated for several hours with test instrumentation monitoring key parameters. No trips occurred and no abnormal conditions were identified. Additional test instrumentation has been installed to monitor and trend pump/turbine performance during its next operation. This instrumentation should aid identification of the cause of any trips which occur during this operation.

The overspeed trip of the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) during manual starting was the result of operator error when the mechanical trip/throttle valve was opened before the steam supply valve was opened. The mechanical overspeed trip was quickly reset returning the TDAFP to "operable" status. Instructions reiterating the proper sequencing of valves during manual starting of the TDAFP have been issued to operating personnel as required reading.

The failure of Main Steamline Isolation Valve "A" (AB-HV-14) to slow-close following manual actuation was due to low hydraulic oil reservoir level. A fitting leak due to the failure of an "O" ring was identified as the cause and the "O" ring has been replaced. The low reservoir oil level had no effect on the operability of the MSLIV in the fast-close (safety feature) mode of operation.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of these events. All required safety systems performed as designed thus preventing any adverse conditions which could have posed a threat to the public health or safety.



KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

July 9, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. R.P. Denise, Director
Wolf Creek Task Force
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
KMLNRC 85-175
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482
Subj: Licensee Event Report 85-041-00

Dear Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv) concerning an Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. Otto Maynard of my staff.

Yours very truly,


for Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear

GLK:dab

Enclosure

xc: PO'Connor (2), w/a
JCummins, w/a