

# Memorandum

April 5, 1994

TO: DISTRIBUTION

FROM: R.M. VENTURA *RMV*

SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  
MEETING MINUTES FOR FIRE PROTECTION (FP) 1994  
TASK EVALUATIONS

## DISTRIBUTION / ATTENDEES

J. Balla  
F. Bloise  
P. Borer (part time)  
T. Dougherty  
J. Dube

M. Licita  
J. Maurer (part time)  
K. Mavrikis (part time)  
S. Munoz  
L. Retzer

J. Tarpinjan  
C. Tessmer  
K. Vehstedt  
R. Ventura

The following are the Minutes of the subject meeting held in the White Plains Office at 1 PM on March 29, 1994.

T. Dougherty chaired the subject meeting discussions with above attendees. The purpose of this meeting was to solidify an Action Plan for fire protection tasks necessary to complete in 1994. The attached March 17, 1994 list of 21 tasks and the resource allocations, which were previously (1993) agreed upon for completion by 1994, were re-evaluated.

It was generally agreed upon that the following six (6) of the selected twenty one (21) tasks could be fully or partially postponed to 1995.

- Appendix R / Safe Shutdown Analysis Update (fully)
- New Suppression Systems (partially)
- Fire Protection Program Plan Update (fully)
- Staff Augmentation (partially)
- Resolution of Code Deficiencies (fully)
- Electric Fire Pump Power Supply (fully)

Attached is the revised March 30, 1994 list which reflects the above changes.

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It was further agreed that 20% contingency be added to the estimated O&M Budget for the cost of the remaining tasks selected to be completed in 1994.

It was also noted that there is a high risk of emergent work resulting from the completion of the following three (3) 1994 tasks:

- o Fire Hazard and Analysis Update
- o Emergency Battery Lighting (EBL) Testing
- o Update of the Hydraulic Calculations

Modifications resulting from EBL testing also have the added risk of possibly being outage related.

The following action items were committed to:

Responsible Person

Action Item

J. Dube

Pursue bids to install a commercial suppression system in the existing IP3 Administration Building by 1994.

F. Blaise/J. Balla

Revise the 21 task evaluations to include a clear statement of problem and its associated risk of completing task in agreed time frame.

encs.

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Page 2 of 2

EXHIBIT 8  
PAGE 7 OF 9

# PRELIMINARY 1994/1995 BUDGET

Last Revised March 17, 1994

*Discussed @ March 29, 94 Mtg*

Task No.	TASK	O&M vs Capital	Start -Up?	1994 (\$K)	Percent Complete 93 & 94
P I P 1 7 7	1 App R/ Safe Shutdown Analysis Update	O&M	N	\$250K <sup>(1)</sup>	0
	2 Fire Hazards Analysis	O&M	N	\$162K	75
	3 Suppression Effects Analysis		N		90
	4A <del>Electric Bldg. Suppression Syst.</del>	<del>CAP</del>	<del>Y/N</del>	<del>\$250K</del>	<del>10</del>
	4B New Suppression systems	O&M	N	\$247K	10
	4C 5' EL Turbine Bldg Transformer Water Curtain		N		
	6 Fire Pro-Plan Rev	O&M	N	\$10K	95
	7 FP Engineering Sds Development - part of A/E Home Office Support	O&M	N	<del>\$50K</del>	75
	10 Update Hydraulic Calcs	O&M	N	\$110K	0
	11 NFPA Code Compliance Walkdowns	O&M	N	\$140K	90
	18 Emergency Battery Lighting Issues <sup>(2)</sup> Field Engineering \$48K Design Support \$10K	O&M	Y	\$58K	80
P I P 1 7 7 1	5A Update of 1990 FPRM SSD Cable & Component Lists (Result of Review of Impact of Mods on SSD Capability)	O&M	N	\$50K	0
	7 HEMYC Wrap Effort <sup>(3)</sup>	O&M	Y	\$310K	40
	10 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals	O&M	Y	\$120K	95
AGG Tasks	21A FP Program Plan Update - part of Staff Augmentation	O&M	N	<del>\$100K</del>	0
	27 Cable Tunnel - Smoke & Hot Gas Analysis	O&M	Y	\$25K	50
	1 Staff Augmentation	O&M	Y/N	\$320K	50
	2 A/E Home Office Support	O&M	N	\$60K	25
	3 EBL Mods Resulting from Station Blackout Testing	O&M	Y	\$250K	10
AGG Tasks	4 Resolution of Code-Related Deficiencies - Mods/PIDr <sup>(4)</sup>	O&M	N	\$125K	0
	5 Electric Fire Pump Power Supply	O&M	N	\$50K	10
O & M				\$2240K	
CAPITAL				\$250K	
TOTAL				\$2490K	

## Notes:

- Task would cost \$500K if the analysis is done down to the subcomponent level.
- Cost includes 1994 NPS installation cost for ENG 334 HEMYC Wrap/Marinite Board Repair and the total cost (including installation) for separate HEMYC Wrap/Marinite Board Mod 93-3-373 FBAR.
- This task includes associated work for current transformers.
- An additional \$125K is estimated for 1995. The delay of parts of this task from 1994 to 1995 may involve some risk.

T. Niver A/ABUD-3.94 Printed: Fri 03/18/94 9:33

PAGE 8 OF 9 PAGE(2)

# PRELIMINARY 1994/1995 BUDGET

Last Revised March 30, 1994

Task No.	TASK	O&M vs CAP	Start-Up?	Percent Completed 93 & 94	1994 (\$K)	1995 (\$K)
P I P  1 7 7	1	App B/ Safe Shutdown Analysis Update	O&M	N	0	\$250K <sup>10</sup>
	2	Fire Hazards Analysis	O&M	N	75	\$162K
	3	Suppression Effects Analysis		N	90	
	4A	Admin Bldg Suppression Sys	CAP	N	10	\$125K
	4B	New Suppression systems	O&M	N	10	\$125K
	4C	5' El. Turbine Bldg Transformer Water Curtain		N		\$75K
	6	Fire Pre-Plan Rev	O&M	N	95	\$10K
	7	FP Engineering Side Development - part of A/E Home Office Support	O&M	N	75	\$5K
	10	Update Hydraulic Cakes	O&M	N	0	\$110K
	11	NFPA Code Compliance Walkdowns	O&M	N	90	\$140K
	11	NFPA Code Compliance Walkdowns	O&M	N	90	\$140K
P I P  1 7 7  1	5	Update of 1990 FPRM SSD Cable & Component Lists (Result of Review of Impact of Mods on SSD Capability)	O&M	Y	0	\$50K
	7	HEMYC Wrap Effort <sup>11</sup>	O&M	Y	40	\$310K
	10	Fire Barrier Penetration Seals	O&M	Y	95	\$120K
	18	Emergency Battery Lighting Issues <sup>12</sup> Field Engineering \$48K Design Support \$10K	O&M	Y	20	\$58K
	21A	FP Program Plan Update - part of Staff Augmentation	O&M	N	0	\$10K
	27	Cable Tunnel - Smoke & Hot Gas Analysis	O&M	Y	50	\$32K
			O&M	Y/N	50	\$465K
	1	Staff Augmentation	O&M	N	25	\$60K
	2	A/E Home Office Support	O&M	Y	10	\$250K
	3	EBL Mode Resulting from Station Blackout Testing	O&M	N	0	\$125K
	4	Resolution of Code-Related Deficiencies - Mods/PIDs <sup>13</sup>	O&M	N	10	\$50K
Add'l Tasks	5	Electric Fire Pump Power Supply	O&M	N		\$2017K
					\$250K	\$510K
					\$2267K	\$510K
O & M CAPITAL						
TOTAL						

## Notes:

- Task would cost \$500K if the analysis is done down to the subcomponent level.
- Cost includes 1994 NPS installation cost for ENG 534 HEMYC Wrap/Marinite Board Repair and the total cost (including installation) for separate HEMYC Wrap/Marinite Board Mod 93-3-373 FBAR.
- This task includes associated work for current transformers.
- The delay of parts of this task from 1994 to 1995 may involve some risk.



REPORT OF INTERVIEW  
WITH  
ALAN ETTLINGER

On May 17 and June 1, 1995, ETTLINGER was interviewed by the reporting investigator. The interview was conducted under oath at the New York Power Authority (NYPA), 123 Main Street, White Plains, NY. NYPA attorney Amy LEVINE represented ETTLINGER during the interview. LEVINE stated that she represented NYPA and ETTLINGER in his capacity as a NYPA employee. ETTLINGER stated that he asked LEVINE to sit in on the interview, and was under no pressure from his management to have LEVINE there. ETTLINGER understood that he had the right to be interviewed without LEVINE present, but again stated that it was his desire to have her there. ETTLINGER provided the following information:

ETTLINGER was born on [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. His drivers license number is [REDACTED]. He resides at [REDACTED]. His home telephone number is [REDACTED]. His social security number is [REDACTED]. He graduated from the City University of NY (CUNY) in [REDACTED] with a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering. In [REDACTED] he graduated from the NY Polytechnic Institute with a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering. In 1982 he graduated from NY University with a Master of Business Administration degree.

In May 1982 ETTLINGER was hired by NYPA. From 1990 until October 1994, he was the Manager of Configuration Management and Engineering Programs (CMEP). He is currently the Fire Protection (FP) Program Project Coordinator. ETTLINGER said that CMEP was abolished in a NYPA reorganization, and its functions were moved to the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) and Indian Point 3 (IP3) Nuclear Power Plants. To the best of his knowledge, none of the employees in CMEP lost their jobs.

While he was the manager of CMEP, Ulrich WITTE, Manager, Configuration Management, reported to him, and was responsible for the development of the NYPA design basis documents (DBDs). Included in that was the development of the FP DBD. They were to collect all design basis docs, and issue the DBD, and resolve any issues that came out of it. ETTLINGER said that the Safe Shutdown Analysis is a separate document and described it as a licensee's compliance strategy with 10 CFR Appendix R. ETTLINGER added that a DBD should not change over time, but the safe shut down analysis may change.

ETTLINGER does not know why Ken VEHSTEDT was transferred from the NYPA White Plains Office (WPO) to IP3. ETTLINGER did know that VEHSTEDT was working at IP3 for Joe DUBE, IP3 FP Manager. ETTLINGER said that there was a transfer of the FP design authority to DUBE from Frank BLOISE's Nuclear Engineering Design group. ETTLINGER was told that Paul BORER (former Vice President of Nuclear Engineering) approved that transfer. ETTLINGER said that Gus MAVRIKIS (former Director of Nuclear Engineering) and BLOISE did not agree with the design authority being transferred from WPO to IP3 under VEHSTEDT and DUBE. He added that there was no question that MAVRIKIS and BLOISE were upset with the decision.

ETTLINGER said that he was informed by WITTE that there were problems that arose out of the Deficiency Evaluation Reports (DERs) and Design Deficiency

Open Items (DDOIs). ETTLINGER specifically recalls DDOIs 10 and 14 because he was involved in their close out, but he did not get involved in the day to day activities of that resolution. WITTE was managing the day to day work on those issues. He was told by WITTE that he and TARPINIAN were having problems with VEHSTEDT and other IP3 personnel in getting the DDOIs issued. ETTLINGER described that as an abnormal occurrence because there usually isn't any difficulty in getting them issued. ETTLINGER said that the process should not have been that difficult. ETTLINGER believed that part of the problem was the personality differences between TARPINIAN, Andrew BARTLIK (FP Engineer), and VEHSTEDT.

ETTLINGER recalls meeting one on one with DUBE, and DUBE proposed that the money budgeted for the 1994 work on the FP Safe Shutdown Analysis should be used to resolve other FP issues. ETTLINGER said that he did not agree with DUBE's proposition because he believed the analysis had to be done, and that any outstanding FP issues could be resolved by completing it. ETTLINGER said that NYPA senior management had previously approved of the analysis. ETTLINGER said that he and DUBE have a pretty good relationship and the meeting was not adversarial. He added that there was no resolution on DUBE's proposal, but his (ETTLINGER's) group continued working on the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

ETTLINGER was informed by WITTE that VEHSTEDT, KLEIN and Roger LAURACELLA believed that the Safe Shutdown Analysis did not need to be done, and that if it were done, VEHSTEDT wanted it deferred from 1994 until 1995. ETTLINGER believed that if it was deferred, TARPINIAN and another contractor, Jim STRAUSSER, would have lost their contractor jobs at NYPA, but would have been rehired when the work began. ETTLINGER said that he has seen no evidence that would lead him to believe that VEHSTEDT, KLEIN, or LAURACELLA wanted it deferred because they wanted TARPINIAN to lose his contract with NYPA.

ETTLINGER recalls that after he became the FP Project Coordinator, he and VEHSTEDT had discussions wherein VEHSTEDT expressed his opinion that people were not looking at the 1984 Appendix R (safe shutdown) analysis correctly. VEHSTEDT told him that if people looked carefully enough in the IP3 "vault," the documents would be located that would answer the issues that were being raised. ETTLINGER said that the documentation that VEHSTEDT spoke of was not in the "vault." ETTLINGER offered as an example, where VEHSTEDT and KLEIN told him that a safety analysis existed, and that it was located in the "vault." ETTLINGER said that he went to the vault himself, and looked, but could not find the analysis. ETTLINGER said that from his standpoint, if a document can't be located, it does not exist.

As a result of the problems in getting the FP issues resolved, ETTLINGER met with NYPA's Chief Nuclear Officer, William CAHILL, the IP3 Resident Manager, Les HILL, and NYPA's Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, Tom DOUGHERTY. That resulted in ETTLINGER being named the FP Coordinator and head of the Task Force (TF), and being given the complete authority to do what had to be done to resolve the FP problems. ETTLINGER developed a procedure which identified a formal process to resolve the issues, which eventually numbered fifty eight. Consultants were brought in to assist in the resolution. They reviewed every issue, and had the final say on whether to approve or reject the resolution.

ETTLINGER said that if there was a differing professional opinion (DPO) on an issue, this process created a method for it to be resolved.

ETTLINGER said that HILL decided to not include VEHSTEDT in the FP task force, and that he agreed with that decision. HILL told him he believed that if VEHSTEDT were included on the TF, it would cause problems between VEHSTEDT and BARTLIK, and would negatively impact the resolution of the issues.

ETTLINGER was also interviewed regarding allegations that TARPINIAN was harassed and discriminated against because of his work on FP issues. ETTlinger said that TARPINIAN worked directly for WITTE. ETTlinger did not know TARPINIAN before TARPINIAN was hired as a contractor by NYPA in 1992 to work on the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant and IP3 FP DBDs. TARPINIAN worked first on the JAF DBD, and ETTlinger is not aware of TARPINIAN experiencing problems similar to those he experienced on the IP3 DBD work. ETTlinger said that TARPINIAN is a good, and conscientious worker, who is not unreasonable in trying to get issues resolved.

ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN informed him that Ebasco (now Raytheon) employee Walter WITTICH had inquired about who TARPINIAN was, and stated that TARPINIAN needed to be brought under control. ETTlinger does not recall the date when TARPINIAN first told him this. ETTlinger said that TARPINIAN did not say that he viewed the incident as a threat to his job, but TARPINIAN was upset, and he (ETTLINGER) believes that TARPINIAN felt it was a threat. ETTlinger said that TARPINIAN may have told him that he didn't want to lose his job at NYPA. ETTlinger told TARPINIAN that he didn't have to worry about that, and that he did not view it as a threat to TARPINIAN. ETTlinger explained that he told TARPINIAN that he was the person who had the authority to terminate TARPINIAN, and he had no intention of doing that. TARPINIAN asked him if he wanted him to back off on his work, and ETTlinger told him that he (TARPINIAN) wasn't being paid to back off. ETTlinger told TARPINIAN that he was to continue doing his job, and that if anyone had a problem with that, they should come to see him (ETTLINGER). As a result of TARPINIAN's concern, he met with TARPINIAN and TARPINIAN's supervisor, Rocco CAMPANELLA, Cataract Corporation. During the meeting, TARPINIAN expressed his concern over losing his job, and CAMPANELLA was concerned about his company losing a contract at NYPA. He believes that CAMPANELLA asked him if TARPINIAN was performing his job well. He told CAMPANELLA that TARPINIAN was doing his job well, and assured him that Cataract had no reason to worry about losing the contract.

ETTLINGER said that he was not at the March 29, 1994, meeting where VEHSTEDT patted TARPINIAN on the shoulder, and told him "see you later pal." ETTlinger did not find out about this incident until after he became the FP Program Coordinator in October 1994. ETTlinger said that TARPINIAN viewed the statement as a threat to his job. ETTlinger believes that TARPINIAN told him that he thought that VEHSTEDT was going to try to have him laid off. ETTlinger said that he assured TARPINIAN that was not going to happen, and that he was satisfied with his work. ETTlinger said that he reminded TARPINIAN of his earlier reassurance to him that he was not going to fire him. ETTlinger said that when he sat down with TARPINIAN, he told TARPINIAN that what VEHSTEDT said may not have been intended as a threat. ETTlinger said that based on what he knows of the incident, and although things might point



to it, he believes that it was not a threatening statement by VEHSTEDT, because getting rid of TARPINIAN would not have taken care of the problems that VEHSTEDT was having with BARTLIK on the FP issues. ETTLINGER is unaware of VEHSTEDT taking any actions that would cause TARPINIAN to lose his job at NYPA.

ETTLINGER said that he has known VEHSTEDT since 1986. He described VEHSTEDT as sincere, although his actions can be misinterpreted. VEHSTEDT's style is that he will do what he wants to do, and won't do something just to please someone else. VEHSTEDT is opinionated, and if he believes he is right on an issue, it will take a lot to convince him that he is wrong. ETTLINGER said that VEHSTEDT has admitted to him in the past that he was wrong on an issue, but not on any FP issues. ETTLINGER said that, at times, VEHSTEDT has been short and abrupt with him, but he never took it personally. VEHSTEDT has told him that he believes that TARPINIAN does what BARTLIK tells him to do.

ETTLINGER said that Hugh GILMARTIN (who filled ETTLINGER's old position) did not ask him for TARPINIAN's and STRAUSSER's resumes, and does not know if GILMARTIN conducted an investigation into TARPINIAN's and STRAUSSER's backgrounds.

Regarding Steve WILKIE's conversation with TARPINIAN about the Robert POLLARD letter to CAHILL, ETTLINGER said that TARPINIAN informed him of the conversation shortly after it occurred. TARPINIAN was concerned with why WILKIE asked him about the letter, but TARPINIAN did not tell him that he viewed it as harassment. During that conversation, TARPINIAN informed him that he feared that if his name was linked with contacting POLLARD, he would be "blacklisted" from further work in the nuclear power industry. ETTLINGER said that he reassured TARPINIAN that he had a job at NYPA under his current contract.

ETTLINGER said that he and DOUGHERTY met with WILKIE to get his side of the story, and based on what WILKIE told them, he felt that there was no intent by WILKIE to harass TARPINIAN. He and DOUGHERTY also met with TARPINIAN to discuss the incident. TARPINIAN was concerned with the incident, but did not feel that it was WILKIE's intent to harass him. TARPINIAN told them that he didn't want WILKIE to lose his job over the incident.

ETTLINGER was also interviewed regarding WITTE's allegation that he received a poor performance review and was demoted because he and his group identified and pursued the FP issues. WITTE was hired by NYPA in November 1991, and ETTLINGER was WITTE's supervisor until October 1994, when GILMARTIN became WITTE's supervisor. ETTLINGER said that WITTE was removed from his position as the Manager of Configuration Management in December 1994, as a result of a NYPA reorganization and downsizing, and his documented poor job performance. ETTLINGER said that in 1993, all but the FP DBD was taken away from WITTE and given to Navine MATHER. That work was taken away from WITTE, mainly because of a personality conflict that existed between WITTE and MATHER. ETTLINGER viewed WITTE as the problem, because MATHER was producing results on the work that he was given, and WITTE was not. Also, WITTE was experiencing problems on other issues with other people. This led ETTLINGER to tell WITTE of his intent to take away from him all but the FP DBD work. WITTE strongly objected



to that, and told him that he was making a big mistake. ETTLINGER told WITTE that they would see what happened and gave WITTE approximately one month to improve his performance. WITTE's performance did not improve.

ETTLINGER wrote WITTE's 1992 performance review (attached) and rated him as "Does Not Meet Expectations" (DNME). ETTLINGER said that WITTE did not object to the rating or the contents of the review. ETTLINGER added that during that review period, WITTE was not working on FP issues, except for some work on the JAF DBD, or on any real safety issues. He said that WITTE was mainly working on procedure revisions. During that review period, WITTE did not raise any safety issues, nor did he claim that he was being harassed or discriminated against in any way.

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: In the Reviewee Comments section of the review, WITTE wrote, "Alan: As per our discussion, I will make adjustments in my management style. I would like to reaffirm my desire to have frequent (monthly) feedback from you as well as others such as S. Zulla on progress towards these changes."

ETTLINGER said that on March 8, 1993 (attached), and May 13, 1993 (attached), he met with WITTE to discuss his job performance. In addition to that, WITTE received a mid cycle performance review in August 1993. That overall rating was "Meets Expectations", with a DNME for not meeting schedules. WITTE received another performance review for the August through December 1993 time period. That overall rating was "Meets Expectations." WITTE received DNME's in the "Meets Schedules," "Planning and Resource Management," and "Issues Status Reports" areas. ETTLINGER pointed out on that review that WITTE did not meet two ("Complete CM Reference manual" and "Complete IP3 ECRIS") out of the four areas of work that were to be completed by the end of 1993.

WITTE's 1994 performance review (attached) showed that WITTE received a DNME in eleven of the fourteen rated areas, with an overall rating of DNME. ETTLINGER said that since he supervised WITTE for ten out of the twelve month rating period, he wrote the draft review. GILMARTIN reviewed the draft, and agreed with its contents. DOUGHERTY concurred in the review, but WITTE would not sign it. ETTLINGER said that WITTE initially refused to meet with him and GILMARTIN to discuss the review, but eventually WITTE met with them to discuss it.

ETTLINGER opined that it is curious that WITTE did not begin alleging that he was being harassed for raising safety issues until after he received his 1994 review. ETTLINGER reviewed the 1994 review, and pointed out that FP is not mentioned at all. ETTLINGER said that throughout the 1994 review period, he counselled WITTE on the need to improve his performance. ETTLINGER said that Lori STEINMETZ, of the NYPA personnel department, met with him as a result of WITTE's allegation. STEINMETZ reviewed the 1994 performance review with him, and concluded that the DNME rating was justified.

ETTLINGER then discussed the NYPA reorganization and downsizing. ETTLINGER said that, as a result of that, the Configuration Management group disappeared, and many of its functions were moved to IP3 or JAF. Previously, there were three supervisors reporting to him. The reorganization eliminated

the Manager of Configuration Management position. ETTLINGER said that WITTE was not chosen to be one of the two other managers because of his poor job performance.

ETTLINGER was also interviewed concerning allegations that BARTLIK was harassed and discriminated against because he identified and pursued FP deficiencies at IP3. ETTLINGER said that he became BARTLIK's supervisor after BLOISE wrote a draft mid cycle performance review for BARTLIK (attached). ETTLINGER understands that BLOISE and MAVRIKIS wrote the review. ETTLINGER was shown a document written by BARTLIK, in which BARTLIK wrote that during a meeting, Carl JESSEN (IP3 Technical Specialist) referred to him as "scumbag Bartlik." ETTLINGER had not previously seen the document, nor had he heard of the alleged incident. ETTLINGER was also shown a document in which BARTLIK's technical issues are referred to as "Bartlikisms." ETTLINGER had not previously seen the document.

ETTLINGER said that BARTLIK and TARPINIAN see "eye to eye" on every FP issue, and thought that was odd. ETTLINGER has not personally seen TARPINIAN or BARTLIK being harassed by VEHSTEDT, but he has seen VEHSTEDT and BARTLIK screaming at each other about the FP issues. ETTLINGER said that BARTLIK and VEHSTEDT have the same opinions about each other, and they feel each other is "useless." ETTLINGER added that, "they really hate each other's guts."


ETTLINGER offered that he travelled to Baltimore Gas & Electric (BG&E) to review their FP program in an effort to improve NYPA's program. While at BG&E, ETTLINGER said that he was told by Cliff SINOPOLI (phonetic) that BARTLIK had encountered similar problems at the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant and at one of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plants. It is ETTLINGER's and others' opinion at NYPA that it is BARTLIK's philosophy that it is his job to raise issues and not to resolve them. ETTLINGER explained that BARTLIK defines a concern that he has, and when that concern is resolved, BARTLIK brings up a different part of the same concern.

ETTLINGER added that he learned that by going to other plants and to NYPA contractor EPM, that nuclear utilities were smarter now than they were when Appendix R first came out. He said that EPM (a contract company) put together IP3's first Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis in 1984 with VEHSTEDT's and KLEIN's assistance. He said that there is no question that the analysis was not kept up to date as it should have been. ETTLINGER opined that the personality problems that exist between VEHSTEDT, KLEIN, LAURACELLA, and BARTLIK and TARPINIAN, resulted from VEHSTEDT and KLEIN overseeing the original IP3 Safe Shutdown Analysis. ETTLINGER opines that VEHSTEDT and KLEIN felt that since they were involved in the original work, they knew more than anyone else about it, and that they were the best ones to answer any questions regarding it. ETTLINGER said that there were problems with the 1984 analysis, in that it did not include things that it should have by today's standards. He added that NYPA is not alone in that deficiency, and the inadequacy was not intentional on NYPA's part. He added that for the most part, the problems with the analysis resulted from a lack of documentation.

ETTLINGER said that the revised compliance summary for the Safe Shutdown Analysis was provided to the NRC in February 1995, and it was accepted. The

final Appendix R analysis was submitted by EPM to NYPA in early May 1995, and needs to be reviewed before it is signed by NYPA. ETTLINGER stated that NYPA did not commit to the NRC to have the safe shutdown analysis completed prior to the IP3 restart, but it was an internal start up commitment.

Jeffrey A. Teator, Investigator  
Office of Investigations  
Field Office, Region I



*BPL*  
Case No. 1-95-019

7

EXHIBIT 11  
PAGE 7 OF 83 PAGE(S)