

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fermi 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 OF 0 3										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) Inadvertent RPS Actuation While Valving In Reference Leg																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0 5	0 1	8 5	8 5	0 1	4	0 0	0 5	3 1	8 5					0 5 0 0 0							
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
OPERATING MODE (9)		5		20.402(b)		20.406(c)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		80.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)									
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i)		80.38(c)(1)				80.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(a)									
				20.406(a)(1)(ii)		80.38(c)(2)				80.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
				20.406(a)(1)(iii)		80.73(a)(2)(i)				80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
				20.406(a)(1)(iv)		80.73(a)(2)(ii)				80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
				20.406(a)(1)(v)		80.73(a)(2)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(ix)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME A.E. Wegele, Compliance Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER											
										AREA CODE 3 1 3 5 8 6 - 5 3 1 3											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 1, 1985, with the plant in operational condition 5 and no core alterations in progress, an RPS actuation occurred on an erroneous indication of reactor vessel level 3. The plant responded as designed, initiating a full scram and isolation signals for valve groups 4, 13, and 15. A similar event was reported in LER 85-005-00.

The scram occurred when personnel misinterpreted the procedure for valving reactor level instrument (C32-N004B) back into service. The pressure difference between the reference leg and the instrument under test caused a perturbation in the indicated level when the instrument was valved back in.

The procedure has been further revised to clarify the importance of pressurizing the level instruments before returning them to service. Also, a mockup has been constructed to aid in training the instrument repairmen in the proper technique for returning the instruments to service. Training will be started as soon as more suitable valves can be installed in the mockup.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

On May 1, 1985 at 0647 hours, with the plant in operational condition 5 and no core alterations in progress, an RPS actuation occurred on an erroneous indication of reactor vessel level 3. The scram occurred while a reactor level instrument (C32-N004B) was being returned to service after calibration. No control rod movement occurred because all control rods were already fully inserted before the scram. The vessel level 3 signal also generated an isolation signal to valve groups 4, 13, and 15. Groups 4 and 15 were already closed. Group 13 isolated as designed.

Following the scram, the instrument repairmen restoring the level instrument to service informed the control room Nuclear Supervising Operator (NSO) that the scram occurred as they valved in the reference leg side of the transmitter. The NSO in the control room verified that reactor vessel was 200 inches and reset the scram.

The cause of the false level 3 signal was the difference in pressure between the reference leg and the instrument being returned to service. During calibration, the instrument is depressurized to atmospheric pressure. The pressure in the reference leg, however, was that of the head of water in the line, about 15 psig in this case. When the instrument was valved back in, the pressure difference caused a perturbation in the reference leg sufficient to reach the level 3 trip setpoint.

This problem was noted in a similar event which occurred on April 8, 1985, reported in LER 85-005-00. At the time of the May 1 event, corrective action identified in LER 85-005-00 was underway. Following the April 8 event, the procedure for removal and return-to-service of reactor vessel level instruments which have a common reference leg was revised to ensure that instruments are filled, vented, and pressurized before being returned to service. The instrument repairmen were using the revised procedure at the time of this event, but misinterpreted it. Because they did not drain the instrument being returned to service, they felt that they could skip the portion of the procedure addressing filling and venting of the instrument. However, these instructions also would have repressurized the instrument, as required before returning it to service. The procedure has now been revised further to clarify the need to pressurize the level instruments before returning them to service.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 288A's) (17)

Following the April 8 incident, Edison prepared a mock-up of the reactor vessel level instruments for training instrument repairmen in the proper technique for returning the instruments to service. However, no training had taken place as of May 1 because of concerns that the valves used to build the mockup did not provide the same response as those in the plant. More suitable valves will be installed in the mockup and training will be started as soon as possible.

**Detroit
Edison**

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May 31, 1985
NP-85-592

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


Reference: Fermi 2
NRC Operating License No. NPF-33

Subject: Transmittal of Licensee Event Report No. 85-014

Please find enclosed LER No. 85-014-00, dated May 31, 1985, for a reportable event which occurred on May 1, 1985. As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Region III office.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,



R.S. Lenart
Superintendent
Nuclear Production

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: Mr. P.M. Byron
Mr. M.D. Lynch

Regional Administrator
USNRC Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

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