

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

35 APR 12 1983
April 10, 1983

BLRD-50-438/83-34
BLRD-50-439/83-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - FAILURE TO SPECIFY IEEE CLASS ON
PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATIONS - BLRD-50-438/83-34, BLRD-50-439/83-30 -
FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
Linda Watson on May 9, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN
EEB 8307. Related NCR BLN BLP 8324 was then reported and is being handled
jointly with NCR BLN EEB 8307. This was followed by our interim reports
dated June 9 and November 4, 1983 and August 13, 1984. Enclosed is our
final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



J. W. Hufham, Manager
Licensing and Regulations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE TO SPECIFY IEEE CLASS ON PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATIONS
BLRD-50-438/83-34, BLRD-50-439/83-30
10 CFR 50.55(e)
NCRs BLN EEB 8307 AND BLN BLP 8324
FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Limit switches, control valves, and solenoid valves for safety-related systems which are required to be class 1E components were procured in the 1976-1977 time period without specifying the IEEE classification in the procurement documents. Because of this error caused by a failure by TVA personnel to recognize that the equipment required class 1E qualification, the necessary documentation to verify the classification of these components was not provided.

Safety Implications

Failure to properly specify IEEE requirements during equipment procurement resulted in the purchase and subsequent installation of improperly qualified components in safety-related systems. Under accident conditions these components could fail and adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

TVA has completed its review of this equipment, has identified all the components which must be replaced, and has issued engineering change notice (ECN) 2674 to implement this requirement. To prevent a recurrence of this problem, TVA has issued instructions to all Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) electrical and mechanical employees that any electrical equipment with an A, B, D, E, F, G, or S division designation in its TVA UNID number is class 1E and must be specified as such for procurement purposes.

All replacement activities will be completed September 1, 1986, for unit 1 and October 1, 1989, for unit 2.