


De Miranda

July 23, 1992

Memo To: J. Johnson, Acting Director DRP
Thru: ^{A2*} A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief Section 3, DRP
From: P. H. Skinner, Section Chief 3B, DRP
Subject: Assessment of Vogtle Tape Review

Region II personnel have completed a review of all tapes (77) obtained from A. Mosbaugh that were identified upon original receipt to be reviewed. The attached sheets show a summary of this effort.



Please note that the information contains pre-decisional information and is not for public release.

Pierce Skinner
Pierce Skinner

cc:w/o attachment

L. Reyes
D. Mathews
D. Hood
S. Vias
~~G. Jenkins~~ *244*
C. Evans

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 5
FOIA 94-208

B17

SPECIAL INSPECTIONS
TAPES MATRIX

TAPES NO.	DATE OF TAPES	TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS REVIEWED BY	SPECIFIC TOPICS OF INTEREST	SIGNATURE	DATE- SIGNED INFO	FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS	COMMENTS
9	3/23/90	O/R/V					
10*	3/23/90	B/O/R/V					
41	4/11/90	P/M/M/O/S					
42	4/11/90	O/V/S					
44	4/13/90	P/S/O					
57A*	4/18/90	P/M/M/S/O/ V					

July 23, 1992

011/02/22044179.PTS

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DRAFT - PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION

TAPS NO.	DATE OF TAPS	TAPS AND VOLUMES REVIEWED BY	SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST	SIGNIFICANCE	SAFE- GUARD INFO	FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS	COMMENTS
578*	4/19/90	P/M/N/S/O/ V					
58*	4/19/90	P/M/N/S/O/ V					
73	4/30/90	O/V					
74	4/30/90	P					
75	4/30/90	O/P					

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July 23, 1992

011/02/2200MATS.PYD

TAPE NO.	DATE OF TAPE	TAPE AND TELETYPE REFERENCE	ASSOCIATED TERMS OF INTEREST	SIGNIFICANCE	SAFETY-CLASS INFO	FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS	COMMENTS
155*	6/8/90	B/O/P/V					
156	6/8/90	O/P					
158	6/11/90	O/P					
159	6/11/90	O/P					
160	6/12/90	O/P					
165							
166	6/15/90	P					
167	6/15/90	O/P					

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July 23, 1992

211/6/9/23000000.070

NO.	DATE	REVIEWED BY	CLASSIFIED BY	DATE-CLASSIFIED	FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS	COMMENTS
199	7/11/90	O/P				
200	7/11/90	O/P				
201	7/11/90	P				
204	7/13/90	O/V				
205	7/13/90	O/V				
212	7/19/90	O/V				
213	7/19/90	O/V				
214*	7/23/90	B/O/P/V				
215	7/23/90	O/V				

July 23, 1992

811/BJW/2204mtr.pps

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DRAFT - PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION

225	7/30/90	O/V					
226	7/30/90	O/V					
227	7/30/90	O/V					
230	8/1/90	O/V					
234	8/3/90	O/V					
245	8/13/90	O/V					
246	8/13/90	8/0/9/9					

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DRAFT - PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION

July 23, 1992

1/8/92/11044470.070

Tape No.	Date of Tape	Tape and Transcripts Reviewed by	Significance	Sub-Grants Info	Follow-up Actions	Comments
253	8/15/90	8/0/8/V				
256	8/16/90	O/V				
257	8/16/90	V				
258	8/17/90	O/V				
259	8/17/90	O/V				
260	8/17/90	O/V				
261	8/17/90	P				

July 23, 1992

811/S/P/12064415.PTB

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DRAFT - PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION

Tape No.	Date of Tape	Transcribed Reviewed By	Associated Issues of Interest	Significance	Safe- Sources Info	Follow-up Actions	Comments
264*	8/28/90	8/0/8/V					
266	8/29/90	O/V					
267	8/29/90	O/V					
268	8/30/90						
269	8/30/90	O					
NOTES: 277 Tapes total 201 Tapes returned to Mosbaugh on February 21, 1991 76 Tapes retained by Region II * 13 Designated as priority by Mosbaugh			** TAPE REVIEWED BY S-Brockman M-Merschhoff P-Skinner M-Merdt V-Vias J-Milhoan O-OI M-MRR S-Security				

July 23, 1992

011/80/17060019.070

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 DRAFT - PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION

Exhibit 9) presented to NRC by BOCKHOLD on April 9, 1990 showed, under the sub-heading SPECIAL TESTING, two columns, headed 1A and 1B of phrases describing various types of "Starts", "Tests", and "Runs", with corresponding numbers when there was more than one "Start", "Test", or "Run". The first entry under the 1A column was the phrase "3/20 Event". The first entry under the 1B column was the phrase, "In Overhaul". This "In Overhaul" entry was on the same line as the "3/20 Event" entry, and accurately described the status of the 1B EDG on 3/20/90. Under each of these columns was a line. Under the bottom line below the 1A column was the phrase, "18 SUCCESSFUL STARTS". Under the bottom line below the 1B column was the phrase, "19 SUCCESSFUL STARTS".

There was no indication of any unsuccessful "Starts", "Tests", or "Runs" on this DIESEL TESTING transparency.

DI reviewed the VEGP, Unit 1 Control Log (Exhibit 10) and Shift Supervisor Log for the period 3/20/90 - 4/8/90. These were the logs used by Jimmy Paul CASH, Operations Superintendent, VEGP, to obtain, or verify, the 18 and 19 "SUCCESSFUL STARTS" used by BOCKHOLD in his presentation. During the aforementioned period, there were -- log entries that showed a start, or an attempted start of the 1A EDG after the SAE event itself. There were -- log entries that showed a start of the 1A EDG with no problems or failures associated with it. There were -- entries that showed some type of unexpected problem or failure associated with a given start regardless of the run time. There were -- entries that showed a start with an associated expected, or planned "trip" of the 1A EDG.

With respect to the 1B EDG, the logs showed -- starts, or attempted starts; -- starts with no problems or failures; -- starts with unexpected problems or failures; and -- starts with planned "trips".

Information in this record was compiled
in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act
NOT EXEMPTED FROM DISCLOSURE
FOIA 94-208

13/11

CASE BRIEFING

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP)

ALLEGED FALSE STATEMENTS REGARDING OPERABILITY OF DIESEL GENERATOR

BACKGROUND

On February 23, 1990, VEGP, Unit 1 commenced a scheduled, 45 day, refueling outage. On March 20, 1990 (25 days into the outage) the refueling had been completed, and the first pass to tension the reactor vessel head bolts had been made. At this point, a loss of offsite power (LOSP) occurred when a truck in the switchyard backed into a support column for an offsite power feed. Only one (1A) of the two Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) was operable at the time of the LOSP. The other EDG (1B) was down for maintenance. EDG 1A sensed the LOSP, started, ran for about 1 minute, and then tripped. 18 minutes later, after the EDG load sequencer was reset, EDG 1A started again, ran for about 1 minute, and tripped again. 36 minutes after the LOSP, VEGP personnel manually restarted the 1A EDG in its emergency mode. Many of the EDG protective trip functions are bypassed in this emergency mode, and the 1A EDG continued to operate. The licensee, Georgia Power Company (GPC), declared a Site Area Emergency (SAE), and initiated required SAE activities.

Region II, NRC immediately dispatched an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to VEGP. This team was supplemented by additional NRC personnel, and upgraded to an Incident Inspection Team (IIT).

On March 23, 1990, three days after the SAE, NRC;RII issued a Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) to the licensee. [REDACTED] this letter put a hold on the VEGP, Unit 1 return to criticality until the Regional Administrator (RA), RII was "satisfied that appropriate corrective action has been taken and the plant can safely return to operation."

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] April 9, 1990, [REDACTED] GPC Senior Managers (W. G. HAIRSTON, III, Sr. VP-Nuc Ops; C. K. MCCOY, VP-VEGP; G. BOCKHOLD, Jr., GM-VEGP; and J. A. BAILEY, Mgr-Licensing) were able to be present in the NRC;RII offices making a presentation to NRC, demonstrating the reliability of the Unit 1 EDGs, in an effort to obtain an NRC release on the hold on criticality. This oral presentation was followed by a letter to

6/2

NRC:RII, also dated April 9, 1990, which constituted the formal GPC request for such a release.

In this April 9, 1990 oral presentation to NRC, GPC presented a chart/overhead projection that depicted "18 successful starts" on EDG 1A, and "19 successful starts" on EDG 1B since March 20, 1990. No unsuccessful start attempts were depicted on this chart/overhead for either of the EDG's. The follow-up letter, also dated April 9, 1990, used the same numbers, and made the following statement, "Since March 20, the 1A DG has been started 18 times, and the 1B DG has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts."

[REDACTED] Three days later, on April 12, 1990, the NRC formally lifted the hold on VEGP Unit 1 criticality.

INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: [REDACTED]

- * The alieger, Allen MOSBAUGH, a former Acting Assistant General Manager of Plant Support at VEGP, states that on the weekend of April 7-8, 1990, BOCKHOLD, CASH, and K. BURR, an engineer from the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SONOPCO) Project, Birmingham, AL, worked frantically on the EDG start portion of the April 9 presentation to NRC, and that CASH got the diesel start numbers from the control room logs, not the diesel logs.

[REDACTED] CASH stated that BOCKHOLD had instructed him to go get the number of diesel starts without any significant problems, and CASH stated that he did just that, and that he got the data from the control room logs.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the control room logs show more than 19 start attempts on the 1B EDG between March 20 and April 9, but some of the additional start attempts had problems. It is noted that MOSBAUGH has no allegation of falsity regarding the 1A EDG start data.

- * In actuality, between March 20 and April 9, after the two trips that caused the SAE, the 1A EDG had been started successfully 28 times (per diesel start records and logs). [REDACTED]

- * Between March 20 and April 9, the 1B diesel had been attempted to be started 29 times (per diesel start records and logs) 8 of these attempts were unsuccessful. All of the unsuccessful attempts were prior to the Undervoltage (UV) run test and the subsequent declaration of operability of the 1B diesel. However, there were never 19 consecutive successful start attempts between March 20 and April 9.

[REDACTED]

TESTIMONY

JIMMY PAUL CASH

- * Knew there were diesel test failures after March 20, 1990 (the date of the Site Area Emergency)
 - * Knew that BOCKHOLD knew about diesel test failures after 3/20.
 - * Was not a diesel expert, and a diesel expert (BURR) was available to retrieve diesel test data for BOCKHOLD's 4/9 presentation to NRC.
 - * BOCKHOLD instructed him to get only the number of successful diesel tests from the logs, for this presentation.
- [REDACTED]

- * He started his count with the first diesel tests done after the event, on the night of March 31.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- * He helped BOCKHOLD's secretary put this count data into the format that BOCKHOLD wanted to use in his presentation to the NRC.

- * He gave his handwritten version of this data to BURR.

- * He mentioned to BOCKHOLD immediately after the 4/9 presentation that the starts BOCKHOLD was presenting were not all valid starts.
- [REDACTED]

GEORGE BOCKHOLD

* He instructed Jimmy Paul CASH, on 4/8/90, to "go get, from the logs" the number of successful diesel starts since the event. He never specified anything about the starts being consecutive, valid, or starting after some comprehensive control test program.

* Later that same day, on a conference call with at least MOSBAUGH, AUFDENKAMPE, and SHIPMAN on the line, McCOY asked BOCKHOLD to confirm that he hadn't started the diesel test count until after the "Comprehensive control test program." BOCKHOLD confirmed it, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on this same conference call, just prior to George HAIRSTON joining the call, SHIPMAN asked him (BOCKHOLD) how many starts he had used in his presentation to EBNETER (NRC) on 4/9, and he (BOCKHOLD) said 18 and 19. At this point, McCOY said, "We ought to use those numbers." We'll say "greater than 18."

* Then HAIRSTON spoke up on this conference call and talked about his conversation with the plant operator that first arrived at the diesel at the time of the event. The conversation then moved on to finalizing the wording of the description of the diesel testing in the LER, and HAIRSTON said, "So we got the starts. We didn't have no trips?" [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This 6/29 Revision said that the reason we made this mistake was due to poor "diesel start record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program."

[REDACTED]

** We issued the Rev to the LER on 6/29,


[REDACTED]

** On 8/30/90

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the cover letter [REDACTED] we explained the "confusion" between the April 9th letter and the original LER. We said there were two reasons for this "confusion"; (1) because of a confusion in the distinction between a successful start and a valid test, and (2) an error was made by CASH in his start count that was used in the 4/9 letter.


[REDACTED]



NORMAN JACKSON STRINGFELLOW

* Received a phone call from MOSBAUGH and AUFDENKAMPE, on 4/19, prior to the issuance of the 4/19 LER, in which MOSBAUGH advised him of diesel testing failures soon after March 20; and that the statement pertaining to successful starts in the 4/9 letter was false.

* I realized we had a problem, and got Bill SHIPMAN on the phone with MOSBAUGH and AUFDENKAMPE in order to have them explain it to SHIPMAN. SHIPMAN also

 suggested to MOSBAUGH that one way we could keep from carrying the problem over into the LER that was due that day was to talk only about valid starts in the LER.

7/6/96 PHONE CALL W MCSBALCH
WHO ALL PRESENT WITH YOU & MIKE KOHN
IN PIERCE'S INTERVIEW TODAY.

- IS IT A NEGOTIATING SESSION OR INTV?
- HAVE YOU TOLD LEE GLEN YOU PLAN TO GIVE MORE CONCLIST. ^{NR}
- HOW MUCH "PROTECTED ACTIVITY" OF YOURS
DO YOU WANT ME TO DISCUSS WITH
PIERCE? IF MORE THAN HAFA &
FALSE STNNTS IN LER, RESPONSE TO CCA, AND/OR
VERBAL PRESENT TO RII, ^{& LER COUR LETTER} IT MAY ID YOU
AS SOURCE OF ALLEG'S IN MY INVESTIG. OF
YOUR ^{APPL} I.S. ALLEG'S & YOUR "SEQUENCER" ALLEG'S.

SANDRA MICHAELS
524-2878
ATTY
10:30
40 MARIETTA ST. NW.

1:00

2/8 INTV ON SITE FELT

FAVA QC
STILL

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FOIA- 44-208

B/4
A83

7/14/93

T/C's. ROBINSON TO C. BARTH &
D. SHAPIRO^{OGC} (SEPARATE CALLS)

RE REGULATORY/ENFORCEMENT/
LICENSE AMENDMENT HEARING VALUE
OF OFFERING POLYGRAPHS.

BARTH LOOKING FOR OGC
PAPER ON THAT ISSUE.

SHAPIRO DOING OWN RESEARCH
WILL TRY TO GET BACK
TO ME WITH SOMETHING
TODAY

lib

11/6/21

11/6/21 J RYAN, SUPV. SEC AGENT, FBI

1/2 DAY'S WORK ON ENHANCEMENT OF EACH TAP

CAN GET STARTED IN "COUPLE DAYS" (HAS A
"FED. JUDGE ON HIM TO GET ANOTHER SIDE LINE

"AUTHENTICATION" A LONG, LABOR INTENSIVE PROCESS
USUALLY ONLY DONE WHEN PORTION OF TAPE
CHALLENGED - I AGREED TO WAIT UNTIL
AUTHENTICITY CHALLENGED.

RECEIVED IN PM 11/6/21
RECEIVED IN PM 11/6/21
RECEIVED IN PM 11/6/21

RECEIVED IN PM 11/6/21
RECEIVED IN PM 11/6/21
RECEIVED IN PM 11/6/21

Kilise

SPECIAL ARP (WYNNE, ROBINSON)

OI - reviewed tapes for irregularities

RII - see all tapes initially agreed upon.
 Via: Skinner listened to tapes followed
 transcription.

TABLE 10

SAE due to faulty calcons

- still an issue, pending OI's EDG report

* AWAITING CI

LTR to Wynn - written (safeguards)

- submit
- will take 4 to 5 letters

#578 technical issues have been inspected. inspection rpt. now?

See : discussed matrix

- concerned re: distribution
- staff's position (who's position?)
 - Ken Brockman's position
- RII will review position

#168 ESFAS SEQUENCER

158

223 - OI - determine speaker.

release

A/9 ORAL PRESENT

FACTS:

MANY (18 & 19) SUCCESSFUL TESTS
PICTURE OF ~~PROBLEM FREE DIESEL~~
WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF TESTS
~~TESTING~~ PRESENTED ON

DIESEL TESTING

TRANSPARENCY

(ONLY SUCCESSFUL TEST NO'S WERE OBTAINED)

NEXT TRANSPARENCY

QUARANTINE COMPONENTS

DESCRIBED THE TYPE

(TEMPERATURE OR PRESSURE)

AND NUMBER

OF SWITCHES

THAT HAD HAD PROBLEMS

AND HAD BEEN QUARANTINED.

51A
ALL FROM 3/20-4/9
START
ATTN
DIESEL RECORDS

31

CONTROL LOG

27

Relian

FINAL STATEMENT

1) RE: 4/9

THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MISCOMMUNICATION AND INADEQUATE INSTRUCTION CAUSING AN INNACURATE COUNT VERSUS SPECIFIC DIRECTION TO ONLY COUNT SUCCESSFUL STARTS FROM A UNIVERSE THAT IS KNOWN TO HAVE PROBLEMS AND FAILURES.

APPARENTLY IT IS NOT SIGNIFICANT THAT, IN BOTH THE 4/9 PRESENTATION AND LETTER, A PICTURE OF PROBLEM-FREE D6 TESTING FROM MARCH 20 WAS PRESENTED TO NRC BY GPC.

2) RE 4/19

WHY DID MCCOY HAVE THE IDEA, BEFORE HE ASKED BOCKHOLD TO CONFIRM IT, THAT BOCKHOLD DIDN'T START HIS COUNT UNTIL AFTER THE CTP?

MCCOY DIDN'T
SHED ANY LIGHT
ON THAT ISSUE, SO

THE ONLY LOGICAL ANSWER IS THAT

SHIPMAN/STRINGFELLOW TOLD HIM ABOUT THE EARLY TRIPS, AS REPORTED TO THEM BY MOSBAUGH/AUF, AND WE (MCOY) OR THEY (MCOY-SHIPMAN-STRING)

Re: 4/19

THOUGHT OF A WAY TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM CREATED BY THAT INFORMATION
BY GETTING BOCKHOLD TO "BUY IN" TO
A STARTING POINT AFTER THE TRIPS.

THEN, MCCOY & SHIPMAN (IN THE
PRESENCE OF STRINGFELLOW); KNOWING
THAT THEY HAD CREATED LER
LANGUAGE TO ELIMINATE THE TRIPS,
"PROTECTED" HAIRSTON FROM BEING
DIRECTLY AWARE OF THEIR SOLUTION
TO THE "PROBLEM". BY THE
"LET ME... I'LL TESTIFY TO THAT"
"JUST DISAVOW."

EXCHANGE.

3) THE "AUDIT" AND THE 6/29 REV TO LER

FREDERICK SHOULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR
DOING A BAD AUDIT FOR TWO MAIN
REASONS:

1) AS FAR AS HAIRSTON WAS
CONCERNED (AND PROBABLY ALL UNI
ALSO) THE ISSUE WAS THE SPECIFIC
NUMBER OF DIESEL TESTS, — NOT
WHY WERE JUST SUCCESSFUL TESTS
COUNTED.

4/7/93

AL HERDT
PIERCE SKINNER
LLR

DAVE MATTHEWS
DICK HOEFLING
DAN MURPHY

JIM LEAMAN
DARL HOOD

ED REESE
COUNSELS NOT
TO GO AHEAD
W/ LICENSE
UNTIL ALONG.
AMEND
FURTHER

C.I.R.C.
2. 206 (AS DRAFTED)
FOR
RE-CONCURREN
COMMENTS
FROM
OI



REQ A LETTER
FROM DOJ
DIRECTLY TO NRC
RE DEFERRAL
OF EDG INVESTIG.
TO OUR ADMIN

MATTHEWS

* SEE IF HAYES
WANTS TO LET
MOSBAUGH (KCHW) INTU GPC WITNESSES

1 1/2 WKS
TO ASLB
PRE-HEARING
CONF

GOING TO OBJECT
TO DISCOVERY OF
NRC "STUFF"

BUT NOT GOING
TO OBJECT TO MOSBAUGH
"DISCOVERING" GPC.

Relax

- 4/9
LIR { g. Since March 20, 1990, GPC has performed numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), extensive logic testing, special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs under various conditions. Since March 20, the 1A DG has been started 18 times, and the 1B DG has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test without air roll was conducted on April 6, 1990 and the 1A D/G started and loaded properly.

4/19
LER { Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs were performed under various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control systems of both engines have been subjected to a comprehensive test program. Subsequent to this test program, DG1A and DG1B have been started at least 18 times each and no failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test without air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DG1A started and loaded properly.

8/11/93
INTERVENOR
RESPONSES TO
GPC
INTERROG. -

GPC INTERROG. -

7/26/93

885-3964

3900

CUSTOMER
SVC

\$ 2715.00
588-

JEDORAH
ROGERS

SHERY
TRUST CO
588 861

LAMBERSKI

885-3360

Please

18

11/12 : T/C W LAMBERSKI

8/11/93

RESP # 1 (i)

CONTRAST A
STMENTS BY
ALLEN ON TAPE
19 (3/28/94)

#18(b)(2)

"DID NOT RECEIVE
DRAFT COPY OF
4/9 LTR BEFORE
4/10"

TSUA
HAS

4/6 DRAFT
W ROUTING
INT.

#15

FOOTNOTE 4

NO WAY
OF KNOWING
WHETHER
HAIRSTON WAS
ON LAST
CALL.
(LOOK @ RESPONSE

11/12 T/C w/ LAMB

*

6(b)

6(f)

6(h)

1E(c)

(2)
(3)
(4)

ON 4/19
AM WAS
AWARE OF
PROBS

- TOLD MGR'S

- INFO DEMONSTR
THAT FBI L STMT
IN LER WAS
FALSE

LAMB. SAYS
SHOWS
AM STATED
OF 5/9
ONLY
THING
WRONG
W LER
IS THE
NO.

AM. PROPOSED REVISION
LANGUAGE FOR REV TO
LER - BASICALLY SAME
AS 4/19 LER - ONLY CV
SMALLER NO'S.

"AM EVOLUTION"
OF ALLEGS.

1/12 T/C W LAMB.

#7

FILLED W LIES

P9

2/3 DOWN

" MOSBAUGH PROVIDED
REVISED LER

GET DIESEL BACKGROUND ON VOGTLE

NRC INSPECTION DATA IMMED AFTER 3/20/90
SITE AREA EMERG.

COPY OF NRC COA LTR ✓

✓ COPY OF GPC RESPONSE TO COA ✓

RESULTS OF ITT TEAM (INTV'S OF NRC
ALCHAMTEL
PEOPLE INVOLV'
(492-1168)

NRC RESTART APPROVAL (LETTER?)

GPC'S PETITION TO BYPASS THE "AUTO. SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS"
NRC APPROVAL TO BYPASS CAL-CON
SWITCHES? (AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS?)

Phone

10/3 DECISION TO DO AFFIDAVIT FOR
D.O.L. TESTIMONY

BEN., ROGER, DAN, NIEL JENSEN,
VORSE, C. EVANS,

klene

1/14 MTG.

AUSA'S O'LEARY & YATES

VERSE, LLR

EARLY 11/92 — TESTIMONY IN
GRAND JURY

SCHEDULE

→ MID-OCT SUBPOENAS

SACOT^{FOR} GPC PRES 9/1

MON 8/17 "EDUCATION
PERIOD STARTS

KICK-OFF = PLANT TOUR

Release

SHOW SOME EVIDENCE, ASIDE FROM
BOCKHOLD'S TESTIMONY, THAT

- 1) THE IDEA OF STARTING HIS DIESEL
COUNT AFTER THE COMPLETION OF
SOME "COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL TEST
PROGRAM" EVER ENTERED HIS
MIND UNTIL MCCOY PUT IT
INTO HIS MIND ON THE GROUP
PHONE CALL ON 4/19.
- 2) THAT

Release

BACKGROUND -

BRING DIFFICULT
W MAT'LITY
UP EARLY

- STATUS

CI INTV'S OF NRC STAFF & PERT.

GPC/SONOPCO EXECS COMPLETE.
PERT. TAPE & DOC REVIEW COMPLETE
DUE TO CONFLICTING AND ILLEGAL TESTIMONY
GIVEN BY GPC/SONOPCO EXECS, OFFER
GPC/SONOPCO EXECS (AUFDENKAMP,
STRINGFELLOW, SHIPMAN, MCCOY, BOCKHO,
HAIRSTON) HAVE FORMALLY REFUSED
TO SUBMIT TO POLYGRAPH

MOSBAUGH HAS STATED THAT HE WOULD
WILLINGLY TAKE POLYGRAPH IF GPC OFFICIALS DID
CONVERSE IS NOT TRUE GPC
WON'T NECC TAKE IF MOSBAUGH TAKES

DO NOT PLAN TO POLYGRAPH MOSBAUGH.

CORPORATE ATTORNEYS CLAIM TO HAVE
ADD EXCULATORY EVIDENCE WILL
LISTEN TO THEM & IF ADD'L INTV'S
NECC, - WILL CONDUCT.

NON-ESSENTIAL TRIPS ON 06 VALUED OUT
BY NRC -

- BIG PICTURE

- PRELIM.

CONCLUSIONS

1. IN 4/9 PRESENTATION ^{ON DIESEL TEST} & ~~LETTER~~
GPC (BOCKHOLD) DELIBERATELY
~~PRESENTED~~ INACC & INCOMP.
^{RE DIESEL TEST RESULTS}
INFO IN THAT HE ONLY PRESENTED
SUCCESSFUL STARTS WHEN HE
KNEW THERE HAD BEEN ^{TEST} FAILURES

Release

2. IN 4/9 LETTER, AN INACCUATE
^(CORP STATE)
STMT WAS MADE TO NRC, BASED
UPON 1. ~~THE~~ ABOVE BUT INSUFF EVR

TO CONCLUDE DELIBERATE

ALL DRAFTS UP TO
4/19 SAID "SINCE
MARCH 20, - ^{WIRE WANTED} BASED ON
TO ADD A COUPLE STARTS ^{DATA -}
IN 4/19 AM. 5 JGA ^{DATA}
"OLD HANDED SHIPMAN"
"STRONG ABOUT RAHUNES"
AFTER 3/20

WCOY DOESN'T ASK BOCK
WHEN HE STARTED THE
COUNT - HE TELLS HIM &
THEN BOCKHOLD WILLINGLY
VERIFIES.

WCOY SAID HE STARTED
HIS COUNT ON 3/30
& BOCK SAYS HE TOOK
WASH'S ADS.

SHIP'S STRONG KNEW
TRIPS WERE TROUBLED
STARTING & EARLY 3/22-23
SO

HANSTON ASKED ABOUT
TRIPS - SHIP - WCOY
"I'LL TESTIFY"
"JUST DISAVOW"

SHIP KNEW THAT IF
START ANYTIME AFTER
3/20, THERE'D BE
LESS THAN WHAT
WAS TOLD EARLIER

3 ON 4/19/90, THE INACCURATE
AND INCOMPLETE INFO OF 4/9/90
WAS DELIBERATELY COVERED UP
IN LER 90-01 BY THE STATEMENT
SUBSEQUENT

4 ON 4/19/90, IN THE SAME
STATEMENT AS (3) ABOVE,
INACCURATE INFORMATION WAS
PROVIDED TO ARC, WITH CARELESS
DISREGARD, IN THAT "AT
LEAST 18 STARTS ON EACH
MACHINE ~~WAS~~ WITHOUT PROBLEMS
OR FAILURES" COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN VERIFIED ON 4/19 BECAUSE AT
THAT TIME, NO GPC/SCNORCO REP WHO DESIGNED
THAT LANGUAGE (TO INCLUDE BOCKHOLD)
COULD DEFINE THE ENDING POINT OF
THIS "COMPREHENSIVE TEST PROGRAM"
STATEMENT
THE ~~STATEMENT~~ WAS UNVERIFIED,
AND UNVERIFIABLE AT THE TIME
IT WAS MADE.

5. 6/29/90 REV TO LER (COVER LETTER)
"THE DIFFERENCE (BETWEEN COUNT IN ORIG
LER & REV TO LER) IS ATTRIB TO
DIESEL START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES
AND DEFINITION OF END OF TEST
PROGRAM

THE TRUTHFUL STATEMENT WOULD BE, " THE
DIFFERENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FACT
THE THE 18 : 19 COUNT IN THE 4/9 LETER
WAS DERIVED BY USING ^{THE FIRST TESTING AFTER THE SA} (3/20) AS A
STARTINE POINT. WHEN WE WERE
PUT ON NOTICE ^{ON 4/19} THAT THERE WERE
FAILURES ON 3/22-23, WE CHANGED
THE STARTING POINT TO SOME UNDEFINED
POINT AFTER 3/20 (PROBABLY AFTER 3/22-23
SINCE WE WERE CALIBRATING CALCON SWITCHES
UP THRU 4/2), BUT WE STILL WANTED
TO USE THE NUMBERS THAT WERE
STATED ON 4/9. " AND NOW (ON 6/29) THAT
WE HAVE GIVEN IT A DEFINITION. WE'RE GIVING
YOU A COUNT FROM THAT POINT AND ~~SAIDING~~ THAT ANY
DIFFERENCE IS INADVERTENT - CAUSED BY AN EARLIER USE OF
DIESEL START RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES HAD <sup>AN
UNDEFINED
STARTING
POINT</sup>
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE DIFFERENCE
IN COUNT BETWEEN THE 4/19 LER AND
THE 6/29 REV TO THAT LER.

THE ONLY CONNECTION THAT
THE DEFINITION OF THE TEST PROGRAM HAD
TO DO WITH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
4/19 : 6/29 COUNTS IS THAT IT WAS
UNDEFINED ON 4/19, AND ANY VERIFICATION
OF ANYCOUNT, TO INCLUDE "GREATER THAN
1E ON EACH MACHINE" WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO,
AND WAS NOT DONE.

THE 8/30/90 "CORRECTION TO COAR"

"THE CONFUSION IN THE 4/9 LETTER AND
^{ERRORS}
(~~INACCURATE~~ INEQ)

4/19 CER ^{TO BE} APPEAR (WHY NOT ARE?) ~~THE~~ THE
RESULT OF TWO FACTORS.

"FIRST THERE WAS CONFUSION ^{IN THE DISTINCTION} BETWEEN
A SUCCESSFUL START AND A VALID TEST.

BOTH CASH & BOCKHOLD TESTIFIED THAT,
AT THE TIME THE 4/9 DATA WAS
OBTAINED (WHICH WAS USED ON 4/19)
THERE WAS NO CONFUSION IN THEIR MINDS
BETWEEN A SUCCESSFUL START AND
A VALID TEST.

"SECOND, AN ERROR WAS MADE BY THE
INDIVIDUAL WHO PERFORMED THE COUNT
OF DG STARTS FOR THE 4/9 LETTER"

CASH WAS THE COUNTER. HE DOESN'T
ADMIT TO MAKING ANY ERRORS. HIS
INSTRUCTIONS (BY BOCKHOLD) WERE SO
GENERAL THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO MAKE AN ERROR. ("GO GET ME THE
NO OF STARTS W/O ANY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS
~~OR PROBLEMS~~")

JUSTIFYING THE "GREATER THAN 20" LANGUAGE IN 4/6/90 LTR: ASSUMING 18 & 19 FROM 4/9 LTR IS CORR., AND ADDING STARTS BETWEEN 4/9 & 4/19.

BUCK: SEES THAT THE 18 & 19 NO'S HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY SITE DRAFTERS OF LER, & SUPPORTS THE ">20" LANGUAGE.

MCCOY: INSISTS ON KNOWING STARTS AFTER COMPLETION OF COMP TEST PROGRAM

2 QUESTIONS:

- 1) WHERE DID THAT LANGUAGE/IDEA COME FROM? (IT'S NOT IN THE LATEST DRAFT SENT FOR REVIEW)
- 2) WHY DO YOU NEED TO KNOW THE NO OF STARTS FROM THAT POINT?

(THIS LANGUAGE IS NEW TO THE LER. IT HAD TO BE INJECTED BY CORPORATE, AFTER AM'S CALLS TO JGS & WBS. LOGICALLY,

- IT REPLACES "SINCE MARCH 20"
- IT "SOLVES" THE PROBLEM CREATED BY WHAT AM TOLD JGS & WBS.

AUF: SAYS HE HAS AN ONGOING REVIEW OF STARTS FROM "RC" LOGS (A COMP. REVIEW WOULD HANDLE ANY STARTING POINT FOR A CUMULATIVE OF STARTS

BUCK: (SPECIFICALLY NOT ADDRESSING ANY PARTICULAR STARTING POINT - WHICH HE DID NOT ADDRESS IN 4/6-7-8/90, EITHER!) SAYS CASH VERIFIED, THE NO'S PRESENTED AT MTE (4/9)

McCoy: SAYS WE OUGHT TO USE THOSE NO'S.

WHY?

- 1) ^{LOGICALLY,} BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT WE SAID
IN THE 4/9 MTG (9 LTR)
- 2) HOW CAN YOU BE SURE TO USE
THOSE NO'S IF YOU DON'T KNOW,
AT THAT POINT, THE NO OF
STARTS AFTER COMP CONTR. TEST
PAGE?

BOCK: WAS READY TO SAY "> 20", BUT HEY,
IF MCCOY WANTS TO USE NO'S I USED
IN CONE (4/9), WE'LL SAY "> THAN
THOSE NO'S. I CAN JUSTIFY THAT
TO MYSELF, AFTER ALL, IT'S LESS THAN
SAYING "> 20"!

MCCOY: TELLS BOCKHOLD THAT BOCK'S NO'S WERE
AFTER "COMP CONTROL TESTING"

THIS IS NOT A QUESTION
ON THE TAPE THIS IS
A STATEMENT! (BEGGING,
IF NOT FORCING, VERIFICATION FROM
BOCKHOLD.)

BOCKHOLD: AGREES W MCCOY! WHAT'S HE
GONNA DO? - TELL HIM HE HAS NO
IDEA WHEN ~~THE~~ CASH STARTED HIS
COUNT (WH

IT IS, EMINENTLY LOGICAL, AND THERE
CONTRADICTORY EXPLANATION,
IS NO ~~TESTIMONY TO THE~~ ~~CERTAINLY~~,

THAT THE "SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMP.
WAS CONCEIVED BY CORPORATE AND
CONTROL TESTING" LANGUAGE ~~REPLACED~~

THE "SINCE MARCH 20" LANGUAGE
IN ORDER TO "SOLVE THE PROBLEM" CREATED
BY THE REALIZATION, BY CORPORATE, THAT
THERE WERE FAILURES AFTER MARCH 20.

NOW IF YOU STILL WANT TO ~~ADDRESS~~ ^{EXPRESS}

A PERIOD OF STARTS WITH LC PROBLEMS
OR FAILURES — FINE! BUT YOU NEED

^{DO}
TO WHAT MCCOY FIRST STATES (~~END~~ ^{GO} COUNT
STARTS AFTER COMP TEST PROC) (MCCOY KNEW'S

AT THAT POINT THAT THAT NO. IS PROBABLY DIFFERENT
AND PROBABLY LESS, THAN THE LC IN THE
"CONFERENCE" 4/9 LTR)

BUT THEN HE ESSENTIALLY COUNTERMANDS

WHAT HE JUST SAID BY SAYING "WE OUGHT TO
USE THOSE NUMBERS"

AND, EVEN IF YOU ARE GOING TO GIVE
YOURSELF ^{WIGGLE} ROOM ON THE HIGH SIDE OF
"THOSE NUMBERS" BY SAYING "AT LEAST
18 TIMES EACH", YOU STILL HAVE TO

AFFIRMATIVELY DEFINE THE STARTING POINT AND GET
"AT LEAST 18" BEFORE YOU ISSUE AN LER
THAT SAYS THAT IS FACT!

CAN'T RECALL BEFORE OR
AFT. MY INTV.

DOMBY KNOWING SOME W/HSE
HISTORICAL LIFE — STARTED TRYING TO
"SELL" AM. THAT W/HSE
HAD REVIEWED DILUTION
ISSUES, PREVIOUSLY.

DOMBY
(TSLA) → MET W SWARTZ & LITCH
"PREP'ING THEM PRIOR
TO INTV'S

LOGICAL THAT GPC "HANDLED" WITNESSES
IN TWO SETS EVENT — PRB
GROUP — GROUP

~~THE~~ REPRESENTATION ISSUE

BOCKHOLD COVERED IN STAFF
MTGS.

Relme

JUST BECAUSE ROCK
DISCUSSES CONSECUTIVE
AND AFTER THE
SENTENCES BOTH

IF ROCK GAVE THE
IMPRESSION THAT THE
18, 19 WERE CONSECUTIVE

DURING HIS PRES. ON
4/9, HE WAS MISLEAD
THE NRC BECAUSE HE
HAD NO IDEA AT THAT
TIME WHETHER THEY
WERE CONSECUTIVE

OR NOT! IT'S
EASY FOR HIM TO
SAY ^{HE DID NOT} CONSECUTIVE AFTER
THE FACT WHEN HE

WHY DO YOU THINK

WHY DID MR. ROCKHOLD
NOT GIVE ANY INSTRUCT.
TO CASH ABOUT
STARTING POINT

OR
CONSECUTIVE

RATHER JUST GET
SUCCESSFUL STARTS?

HIS OBJECTIVE WAS
TO GET A HIGH NO
OF SUCC STARTS, AND
PUTTING ANY LIMITATION
ON CASH COULD ONLY
DECREASE THE NO.

BELIEVE THAT IF
THAT STARTING POINT
HAS ALWAYS BEEN
IN HIS MIND, HE
CARELESSLY OR INADVERT-
ENTLY FORGOT TO
SPECIFY IT TO CASH
AT THE TIME THE
COUNT THAT "COUNT"
WAS TO BE DONE.

SURE, HE WANTED
TO GIVE THE
IMPRESSION TO ARC
ON 4/9 THAT THESE
SUCC. STARTS WERE
CONSECUTIVE, BUT
HE DIDN'T ASSURE
HIMSELF THAT THEY
"WERE" AND IN HIS MIND

HAS A BETTER HANDLE
ON THE START SEQUENCE.

HE MAY HAVE TALKED
ABOUT SUCCESS. STARTS
AFTER THE CTP

BEFORE 9/9 TO THE
EIT AND ON 4/19
WHEN MCCOY PUT
IT INTO HIS MIND,
BUT HE'D DEUB
DIDN'T MENTION IT TO
CASH ON 4/7-8

BECAUSE HE WANTED
A BUNCH OF SUCC.
STARTS.

I DON'T THINK IT'S
REASONABLE TO

IRONICALLY, IF ~~THE~~
NO PHONE CALL FROM
AUX/HQS TO SHIP/STRIN
ABOUT POST 3/20 TRIPS
THE DECEPTION WOULD
HAVE STILL BEEN ALL
ON BOCKHOLD'S HEAD,

HOWEVER BOTH SHIP &
STRIN'G LOOKED AT
THE POST 3/20 TRIPS
AS A PROBLEM, AND
THE WHEELS STARTED
TURNING TO FIND A
SOLUTION.

THE SOLUTION ORIGINATED
IN BIRMINGHAM, AND
WAS FIRST VERBALIZED

IF HUSBAND & AUFEREN
HAD NOT TOLD SHIP/HQS
5 STRING FELLOW OF
THE DGB FAILURES/
PROBLEMS AFTER 3/20,
THE IER CANCELLAGE
REGARDING SUCCESSFUL
STARTS WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN CHANGED, WITH
THE EXCEPTION, PERHAPS
OF USING THE TERMINAL
"GREATER THAN 20 STARTS
EACH" HOWEVER,
WITH HAINSTON'S CONCERN
ABOUT WHAT WAS
PRESENT ON 4/9, IT
PROBABLY WOULD HAVE
SAID 70 & 19, OR
210 ON EACH.

18:19 NO'S CAME
AFTER THE CTP
HE WOULDN'T HAVE
FELT THE NEED TO
MAKE THAT STATEMENT,

THEN, LATER IN THE
CALL, AFTER HE
GETS BACK TO
CONFIRM ~~THE~~
THE "SOLUTION"
STARTING POINT
HIS (MCCOY'S) ONLY
CONCERN IS THAT
WE "USE THOSE
NUMBERS" (PRESENTD
ON 4/9)

WHEN MCCOY
FIRST SAYS
"WE NEED TO
KNOW THE NO
OF STARTS AFTER
THE CTP." IT
SHOWS THAT HE
THINKS THAT HE
GOING TO BE A
DIFFERENT NO.
THAN WHAT WAS
GIVEN ON 4/9.

WHY BECAUSE
HE KNOWS HE'S
CHANGING THE
STARTING POINT. IF
HE THOUGHT ALL
ALONG THAT THE

STARTED UNTIL AFTER
THE CTP!

IF BOCKHOLD IS
WILLING TO TRY TO
INDICATE, ON 4/9,
TO ARC THAT THE
18 & 19 SUCC STRIS
WERE CONSECUTIVE,
HE SURE WOULDN'T
HAVE ANY PROBLEM
CONFIRMING SOME
UNDEFINABLE STINT
ABOUT WHEN THE
COUNT WAS STARTED
TO HIS BOSS, WHOM
HE (BOCKHOLD) KNEW
WANTED TO HEAR
THAT ANSWER!

BY MCCOY (IT MAY
HAVE BEEN HIS,
SHIPMAN'S OR
STRAINFELLOW'S IDEA)

SOLUTION:

TAKE THE TRIPS
OUT OF THE UNIVERSE
OF COUNTS BY
SAYING ~~THE~~ THE COUNT
WASN'T STARTED
UNTIL AFTER THE
CTP!

MCCOY DOESN'T ASK
BOCKHOLD WHEN HE
STARTED HIS COUNTS -
HE ASKS BOCKHOLD TO
CONFIRM THAT THE
COUNTS WEREN'T

UPON, HARRISTON
WINS THE CONVERSATION
McCoy KNOWS HE
HAS THE PROBLEM
SOLVED AND WHEN
HARRISTON ASKS ABOUT
TRIPS - MCCOY
VOLUNTEERS TO
"TESTIFY TO THAT"
ISSUE. SHIPMAN
REMINDS MCCOY
THAT HE SHOULD
"JUST DISAVOW"
ANY TRIPS (NOW
THAT THEY'RE OUT OF
THE UNIVERSE OF COURSE)

HARRISTON WISELY
DOES NOT PURSUE

BUT MOST BECAUSE
BOCK CONFIRMS,
DOESN'T TAKE
MCCOY - SHIP-
STRING OFF THE
"COVER UP" HOOK,
BECAUSE THEY
THOUGHT OF IT.

AND MCCOY ISN'T
CONCERNED ABOUT
GETTING ANOTHER
COUNT VERIFICATION
HE'S INSISTENT
ON USING THE
A/Q NOS.

SO, ONCE THE
LANGUAGE IS DECIDED

THOSE COMMENTS
BY MCCOY & SHIPMAN
BECAUSE THE RECORDS
THAT THEY ARE GOING
TO HANDLE ANY ARC
INQUIRIES ABOUT 'TRIPS'
AND HE WON'T HAVE
ANY SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
IF HE DOESN'T PURSUE
IT.

SHIPMAN HELPS
HIM OUT BY
"NO. 2 ONE THINGS
RIGHT ALONG, "WHAT
ELSE HAVE WE
GOT, JACK."

SHAPIRO — GIVE ME

PAPER THAT

CERTIFIES 50.9

AS BEING UNDER

161 (b)(1)(c)

MCCOY — NEED TO GET HIM TO
TESTIF. ABOUT
BROCKMAN'S CALL TO
HIM PRIOR TO 4/9

DOES NORMS — IDENT.
CONTRIBUTOR OF DOC'S.

IF YES: 10 CONTRIB.
OF 4/9, 4/19, 6/29, 8/30

Release

THE NRC KNEW ABOUT CALCON SWITCH

PROBLEMS DURING THE DIESEL TESTING

BEING DONE SUBSEQUENT TO THE EVENT

FROM CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN GPC & NRC.
(IIT TRANSCRIPTS)

HOWEVER, ~~THE~~ GPC HAD

NOT PROVIDED NRC, AS LATE AS 4/10,
(THE DAY AFTER THE RESTART PRESENTATION)

DOCUMENTATION OF SPECIFIC, ITEMIZED

DIESEL TESTS BETWEEN 3/20 AND 4/9,

SO THE NRC HAD TO RELY UPON THE

"DIESEL TEST" INFO IN THE 4/9 PRESENTATION

(PLUS THE NRC OBSERVATION OF OPERABILITY

TESTS) TO MAKE A DECISION ON RESTART.

NRC REPS AT 4/9 PRESENTATION GOT

THE IMPRESSION OF 18 & 19 CONSECUTIVE

SUCCESSFUL STARTS SINCE FAILURE

THE 6/29 & 8/30 DOCUMENTS DON'T
EVEN GET WRITTEN UNLESS THERE IS A
PROBLEM (OR A PERCEIVED PROBLEM) WITH
THE 4/9 & 4/19 DOCUMENTS.

SO WE HAVE TO ELICIT
TESTIMONY ABOUT WHAT REALLY
HAPPENED ON 4/9 & 4/19 BEFORE
WE CAN EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS
6/29 & 8/30.

POINT OF " SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMPLETION
OF THIS TEST "PROGRAM" SUDDENLY
APPEARED! WHY?

WHO IS PREPARING THE
VARIOUS DRAFTS OF THE
ISSUES : COVER LETTER TO THE
"CLARIFIED" CER? WHO IS
HWM?

REALLY
IS THE LICENSEE CONFUSED ABOUT

WHAT DATA TO REPORT REGARDING THE
DIESEL GENERATOR STARTS & FAILURES,

OR

IS THE LICENSEE TRYING TO OBFUSCATE

THE ISSUE BY ⁽¹⁾ ACTING CONFUSED

ABOUT THE SAMPLE SPACE (E.G. FROM
EVENT TO 4/9, OR FROM "END OF TEST PERIOD" TO

4/9); (2) ADDRESSING "VALID" TESTS

WITHOUT DIFFERENTIATING THEM FROM

OTHER-THAN-VALID TESTS; (3) ARE THEY

COUNTING ONLY "VALID" FAILURES, BUT

ALL STARTS?

Helem

FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 20, 1990
THROUGH APRIL 9, 1990, PROVIDE
INFORMATION TO FILL IN THE FOLLOWING
MATRIX.

	DIESEL GENERATORS	
	1A	1B
NO. OF VALID TESTS:		
NO. OF VALID STARTS:		
NO. OF VALID FAILURES:		
NO. OF OTHER-THAN-VALID TESTS:		
" " " " " STARTS:		
" " " " " FAILURES:		
MAXIMUM NO. OF CONSECUTIVE VALID STARTS WITHOUT A VALID FAILURE		
CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM NO. OF OTHER-THAN- VALID STARTS WITHOUT AN OTHER-THAN-VALID FAILURE		
CONSECUTIVE MAX NO. OF VALID STARTS WITHOUT ANY TYPE OF FAILURE.		
CONSECUTIVE MAX NO. OF OTHER-THAN- VALID STARTS WITHOUT ANY TYPE OF FAILURE		

1. FALSE STATEMENT IN VERBALE PRESENT
2. FALSE " IN RESPONSE TO COA LTR
STARTS
AIR QUAL
3. FALSE STATEMENT IN FIRST (REV-0) LER
STARTS
4. ATTEMPTED OBFUSCATION DURING
ITERATIONS OF REV-1 OF LER
5. " " " " " " COVER LTR
6. ATTEMPT TO CORRECT RESP. TO COA LTR
IN COVER LTR OF LER (REV-1)

ABSOLUTE

THE ADG COUNT NUMBERS DON'T

MATTER MUCH TO EITHER NRC

OR GEORGIA POWER!

EVEN THOUGH THE
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
THEY MATTER TO NRC MORE THAN

THEY MATTER TO GEORGIA POWER

~~BUT THE ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ARE
NOT THE POINT!~~

IT IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH

THESE NUMBERS ARE FIRST ~~PRESENTED~~

WE HAD

(ALL SUCCESSFUL STARTS FROM THE
DAY OF THE EVENT TO 4/9)
NO PROBLEMS!

WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBERS ARE 18 : 19,

0612, OR 26 : 27 MAKES NO DIFFERENCE.

IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE

~~NO MATTER~~ WHAT THE NUMBERS ARE; ~~THE POINT IS~~ THEY ARE
USED TO INDICATE NOTHING BUT SUCCESSFUL TESTING FROM 3/20
TO 4/9.

AND THEN

(TOBPC) ~~Belum~~
HOW THESE SAME MEANINGLESS NUMBERS

ARE DELIBERATELY USED, IN A SUBSEQUENT
DOCUMENT (4/19 LER) IN A SENTENCE
THAT IS CONSCIOUSLY "WORD ENGINEERED"
TO APPEAR TO BE A MERE REPEAT OF
THE 4/9 LANGUAGE, BUT SUBTLY
UTILIZES A PHRASE (SUBSEQUENT TO
THIS TEST PROGRAM,....) THAT TAKES
FAILURES, KNOWN TO THE "WORD ENGINEERS",
OUT OF THE PERIOD OF THE COUNT.

GPL/SCNIPCO VERY AWARE OF FOLLOWING
MISREPS, & CONCERN BY NRC

- 1.) FALSE STMT IN 4/9/90 CCA RESPONSE
SINCE 3/20 1A 1E 1B 19 NO PROBS OR FAILS
- 2.) FALSE STMT IN 4/19/90 LER
SUBSEQ TO CCMF TEST EACH AT LEAST 16 THRU
NO PROBS OR FAILS

THEY ARE PROBABLY AWARE OF

- 1.) ORAL FALSE STATEMENT IN 4/9/90
ORAL PRESENT TO NRC (SAME STMT
AS IN 4/9/90 LETTER, SUPRA)

THEY MIGHT NOT BE AWARE OF OI'S INTEREST
IN

- 1) 6/29/90 LER, REV 1
"DIFF IN CCA RESP & LER ATTRIB TO
DIES START REC. KEEP PRAC & DEFIN.
OF END OF TEST PROG.

- 2) 8/31/90 LTR "CORRECTIVE" CCA RESP.
"CONFUSION IN 4/9 LTR & LER IS (1) CONFUS
IN DISTINCT BETWEEN SUCC START & VALID TEST, AND
(2) ERROR MADE BY INDIVID. WHO PERFORMED
COUNTS.

PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF CI'S PURSUANCE

CF: FALSE STATEMENTS IN GPL'S CORPORATE
RESPONSE TO MOSBAUGH/HERRY 2.206

- 1) McDONALD, AS SIGNATORY ON RESPONSE
SAYS HAIRSTON NOT ON 4/19
PHONE CALL RE LER WORDING
- 2) "IF LER WOULD HAVE SAID "SUBSEQ TO EVENT
RATHER THAN "SUBSEQ TO TEST PROC", WOULD
HAVE BEEN "CONSISTENT" (WELL CHASED HARD)
WITH 4/9 LTR. (RIGHT, CONSISTENT BUT STILL
A LIE!)
- 3) MCCOY STMT ABOUT HIS LACK OF
INVOLVEMENT IN CORP POSITION PAPER
VOLUNTARY
CONSENT INTO IMMEDIATE ACTION
STATEMENTS

NEED QUEST BY
WED 10/27

QUES FOR MCSBAUGH INTV

WHAT DID YOU DO TO ~~VERIFY~~ WITH KOCHERY "
AFTER

DID MCSBAUGH EVER SPECIFICALLY ASK
CASH ^{BOCKHARDT} ABOUT HIS ARRIVAL AT
HIS NO OF "SUCC. STRTS"

WHY DIDN'T YOU OBJECT (IN E/29-30) PRB
TO THE ELIMINATING OF THE
SENTENCES THAT SPECIFICALLY POINTED
OUT THE TRIPS ON THE "B" MACHINE?

WHAT LIST DID YOU HAVE ON 4/19

WHY WEREN'T YOU ~~CONCERNED~~
ABOUT THE A DIESEL TRIP
ON 3/30 WHEN YOU
CALLED SHIPMAN, STRINE

A/28
B/5

Question for Mosbaugh

① According to various documents - There is
EDG counts being done by Kockery, Cash,
Wible, Odom, and ~~AM~~ ^{page 57} "someone try to get
control of valid starts", ~~AM~~

Did any list other than Cash's show up
and did any of these lists, if developed
agree?

② On page #58 page 36 line 4 - After JA & Shipman
conclude discussion on LER final counts
JA asks AM if he takes exception to the
data - ~~there appears no answer -~~
~~What was his response to question.~~

③ On page #58 page 38 line 6 - JA & AM
are talking after meeting with Cash -
JA asks AM "where do you want to go
with this"
AM responds "There's no place to go. Hairston
has already submitted letter right?"
Why as a manager ~~was~~ ^{did} you not at that
time contact Sr. Mgmt with conclusive
proof/data that count in LER was wrong?

10 TAPES HAVE SEGMENTS (KHA)
 A OF THESE " " (NEED)

[REDACTED]

TAPE #	# OF SEGMENTS
184 *	111 11
460	11
57 *	111 111 1
75 *	11
76 *	1
159 *	1
460	11
269 *	1
41 *	111
58 *	111 111
253 *	111 (OAKLAND CSI - CAL ATTY'S POSS REPRESENT)
258 *	111 (" " " " " ")
10 *	11
186 *	111
100 *	111 111

MICROMINI
 CASSETTES

BOTH SIDES

1 HR EACH SIDE

FBI ENG. RES. FAC.
 DAVE ALLWINE - WORKER

DOV RITTENHAUER }
 ...

GET STATEMENTS
FROM:

MOSBAUGH

HOBBY

TYNAN

WILLIAMS

Fin. rec

BOB LIDE, ENGRNG SUPT

GOSHER

SRS

SAV. RIV. SITE (BECHTEL)

MIGHT HAVE SOME INFO ON PRE-DISC. OF
CONFLICT W T.S.

DESKOSIERS "SQUEEZED OUT"

HAND PRESSURED

CHARLIE MEYER — DON'T TRUST

DID SOME "SQUELCHING"
OF SOME PRIOR PRB
DISCUSSIONS — \$ HAD
TO GO TO QA.

REACTOR OVERPOWER ISSUE

\$ REMOVED FROM ALL ASPECTS OF PRB.

GOT CALL FROM TOM GREEN

MAY 11

John

FAVA

REVIEW Q.C. ~~FILE~~ FILES 2/20

3/16

RESIDENT, SHOULD REVIEW FAVA 5 -

~~FRONT A~~ FILE 6 -

~~RAD U.A.~~ AGAIN

UPDATED SUBMITTALS

SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALC. — OPS DOING
\$'s WRONG
NUC. ENG FOUND MISTAKE

IN MEETING WITH KITCHEN'S "USE LICENSE"

BEASLEY
BELLAMY (~~OWNER~~ AETA 3633 WHEELER) IN CONNECTION
BOCKHOLD 855-9600 WITH DILUTION
GREEN OR CHEM ADD
HELVIN GRIFFITHS VALVE;
AUFDENKAMPE
LIDE — (\$ CR'D OUT - NO RECALL)
~~HADFINGER~~

MCCOY BLACK BAILING AETA (BELLAMY'S
CRC)
WITH A NAVY BUDDY AT COMMANDE PK.

RELEVANT
BULLET

LOCATION ON TAPE / ~~TRANSCRIPT~~

TAPE	PG	LN	DATE	SIDE (A or B)	INDEX
184	6	24	8/30/90	A	NO WHERE SET (START)
269	1	25	8/30/90	A	BEGINNING
267	41	9	8/29/90	B	WHERE SET
266	18	2	8/29/90	A	JUST BEFORE END
258	22	15	8/17/90	B	JUST PAST START
253	5	3	8/15/90	A	CLOSE TO BEGINNING
187	18	18	6/29/90	A	JUST PAST HALF-WAY
				B	JUST PAST BEGINNING
186	34	23	6/29/90	B	WHERE SET (2/3 THROUGH)

Release

10/25 MOSB. @ OFFICE

SCHAUDIES BADGERING MOSB. ABOUT
SAFEGUARDS INFO. AT TAPE PLACE.

(MOSB DIDN'T ANSWER)

TECH RENTALS - P'TREE RD.
LARRY STAVIS

^{SANDRA}
MOSB TELLS MICHAELS - MICHAELS

UPSET - SAYS TOTALLY IMPROPER
FOR SCHAUDIES TO QUESTION A.M.
W/O A.M.'S ATTY PRESENT. -

A.M. & MICHAELS WENT BACK OUT
TO TECH RENTALS & TOOK AFFIDAVIT
FROM STAVIS ON INTERCHANGE
BETWEEN SCHAUDIES & A.M.

JOHN SENDING LTR TO TROUTMAN
SANDERS

B. 11.2

0) DIESEL RECORDS & TABLES

1) BOCKHOLD & CASH'S ^{OSI} TRANSCRIPTS

BOCK. SAID: (a) CASH TOLD HIM HE GOT
DATA FROM OP LOGS

(b) "GET INFO ASSOC WITH NO.
OF SUCC. STARTS."

(c) USED THIS TEST DATA TO
TELL NRC "WE USED BEST
INDUS PRAC. TO DECLARE
DIESEL - OPERABLE"

(d) p. 8 "WE HAD SOME SENSOR
PROBS BUT NONE THAT
WOULD MAKE IT INOP."

(e) JUST A SUBJECTIVE FEELING TO
SAY "WE RAN THE ENGINE
ALOT, & IT PROVED TO BE
RELIABLE."

(f) TOLD MCCOY THAT
REWORDING FROM "SUCCESS"
TO "STARTS W NO PROBS OR
FAILURES" WAS JUST A
REWORD OF SUCC STARTS
FOR THE LETTER (4/9)

Return

BOCK SAID: (g) CARRIED "ERROR" FORWARD
INTO 4/9^{LTR.} & 4/19 LER

(h)

CASH SAID (a) BOCK SAID "DETERM HOW
MANY STARTS WE HAD w
NO SIGNIF PROBS. THE
TERM VALID DID NOT ENTER
INTO CONVERSATION.

WAS NOT LOOKING AT
STARTS FROM "VALID"
ASPECT. — JUST STARTS
w/ NO SIGNIF PROBS.

MOSTLY TRBSHT STARTS AT
THAT POINT ANYWAY.

* KEY (DID NOT HAVE
SUFF. VALID STARTS
TO STATE RELIABLE
BY 4/9)

(b) "THE START POINT IS
NIGHT OF 3/20 WITH THE
1A EDG TRBLSHING STARTS"

(i.e. THAT'S WHAT 4/9
OVERHEAD & LETTER SAY)

(c) SHORT ON TIME — NO GREAT
DETAIL IN RESEARCH —
JUST GOT SUCC. MAINT STARTS.

HOSBROUGH'S BEFFER

(404) 826-3025

NO: PAGER 200

②

HOSBROUGH'S
DIRECTOR (404) 3/43
OF 826-3/43

9/12/90

PERSEC
DORBY
ISSUE

FUNCT: DIGIT 7

③ 826-3366 THERESA MOORE

ENVT: NO. TO BE DISPLAYED 999-9999

WAIT UNTIL IT SAYS "THANK YOU" TO HAVE
UP

PER

IF JUDGE WAS CONTACTED BY NRC CEO
NOTIFY ORDER
RIGHT NOW

BERNARD GILDAY, JR.

USDC
OFC OF ADM LAW JUDGE

525 VINE ST
PHONE

CIN, OH. 45202

(513) 684-3252

FAX (513) 684-6108

1/1/11

VEGP-QA AUDIT
OF EDE STARTS
6/11-29/90

P.3 DEFINES WHEN
"SUBSEQUENT TO
COMPLETION OF TEST
PROGRAM" IS.

P4 SAYS COULD NOT
SPECIFY CAUSE FOR
THE #18 USED IN
THE LER

YET COVER LTR TO
6/29 LER REV. PROB CAUSED
BY EDE RECORD KEEP
PRAK & DEFIN. OF END
OF TEST PROG.

release

Case Brief - Plant Vogtle: False Statements regarding Emergency Diesel Generator

For
NRC Staff
December 19, 1991

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions 5
FOIA- 94-208

Office of Investigations
Region II

03/6
A/89

VEGP SITE AREA EMERGENCY

March 20, 1990

- Mode 6 - Refueling completed
- Loss of off-site power (LOSP)
- "A" Diesel fails (twice)
- "B" Diesel inoperable (maintenance)
- "A" Diesel - Manual reset
- Thirty-six minutes without power
- NRC AIT/IIT (report issued 6/90)
- NRC Operations Special Inspection Team (OSI)
 - EDG issues
 - Technical Staff/OI, August 1990
 - Report issued Jan 91/Supplement Nov 91

3/20/90 VEGP SAE "A" EDG fails; "B" out for maint
 3/22/90 HI Lube Oil Temp Trip-EDG "B"
 3/23/90 Low Jckt Wtr Press Trip-"B"
 3/27/90 Successful UV Run EDG "B"
 3/28/90 EDG "B" Declared Operable
 4/7-8/90 VEGP Prep Oral EDG Present
 4/9/90 GPC Oral EDG Present to NRC;
 4/10/90 COA Response Letter to NRC;
 4/12/90 Scheduled VEGP Return to Mode 1
 4/19/90 NRC Authorizes Restart
 6/11-29/90 LER re:VEGP SAE issued to NRC
 6/29/90 Rev to LER issued
 8/30/90 GPC Ltr corr
 COA Response






NRC AIT/IIT
 3/20/90-4/2/90

NRC OSI
 8/6-17/90

RII OPBLTY OBSRV
 "A" & "B"
 3/26/90-4/7/90

Key Management Structure Early-Mid 1990





4/9/90 ORAL PRESENT.

DIESEL TESTING

- * NORMAL 36 MONTH OVERHAUL AND INSPECTION
- * SPECIAL TESTING

1A

3/20 EVENT
5 STARTS, TROUBLESHOOTING

1B

IN OVERHAUL


SENSOR CALIBRATION
LOGIC TESTING
E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING
MULTIPLE STARTS (14)
UV RUN TEST
6 MONTH RUN SURVEILLANCE
DIESEL OPERABLE

LUBE OIL DCP RUN
DCP UV RUN FUNCTIONAL

UV RUN TEST
SENSOR CALIBRATION
LOGIC TESTING
E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING
MULTIPLE STARTS (5)
UV RUN TEST
6 MONTH SURVEILLANCE
DIESEL OPERABLE
HI JACKET WATER RUNS (3)
DCP UV RUN TEST

18 SUCCESSFUL STARTS

19 SUCCESSFUL STARTS



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ELV-01516
Page Three

- g. Since March 20, 1990, GPC has performed numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), extensive logic testing, special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs under various conditions. Since March 20, the 1A DG has been started 18 times, and the 1B DG has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test without air roll was conducted on April 6, 1990 and the 1A D/G started and loaded properly.

4/19/90 LER

Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs were performed under various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control systems of both engines have been subjected to a comprehensive test program. Subsequent to this test program, DG1A and DG1B have been started at least 18 times each and no failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test without air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DG1A started and loaded properly.

The number of successful starts included in the original LER included some of the starts that were part of the test program. The difference is attributed to diesel start record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program.

The confusion in the April 9th letter and the original LER appear to be the result of two factors. First, there was confusion in the distinction between a successful start and a valid test. For the purpose of this letter, a start was considered successful when the DG was started and either ran or was intentionally shut down due to testing in progress, as identified on the attached tables. Our use of the term "successful" was never intended to imply a "valid successful test" in the context of Regulatory Guide 1.108. Many start attempts were made to test the DG's 1A and 1B using applicable operating procedures. These procedures and data sheets do not contain criteria for determining if a start is successful which resulted in determinations of success which were inconsistent with the above definition. Second, an error was made by the individual who performed the count of DG starts for the NRC April 9th letter.

³The wording was reviewed by corporate and site representatives in a telephone conference call late on April 19, 1990. Although Mr. Hairston was not a participant in that call, he had every reason to believe the final draft LER presented to him after the call was accurate and complete.

The June 29, 1990 0755 (Exhibit 18) draft and 1142 draft (Exhibit 19) of the same date are each longer than the preceding draft, accurately describe the substance of the April 9, 1990 letter and focus on the wording "subsequent to the test program" in the original LER. In both instances, the draft transmittal letter explains that if the report had stated "subsequent to the event," rather than "subsequent to the test program," the LER would have been consistent with the April 9 COAR and the "18" and "19" numbers included in the transparencies provided by GPC to the NRC on April 9. This is a correct statement of fact.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY

2-90-020

- [REDACTED] 4/9/90 oral presentation re: Successful Starts.
- [REDACTED] 4/9/90 COAR letter re: EDG starts w/o failures.
- [REDACTED] 4/19/90 LER re: comprehensive test program/starts.
- [REDACTED] 6/29/90 letter of transmittal to the Rev to 4/19/90 LER.
- [REDACTED] 8/30/90 letter correcting 4/9/90 COAR letter and LER.
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] 2.203 Response re: HAIRSTON'S participation in conference call regarding wording of LER.
- [REDACTED] 2.206 Response re: HAIRSTON'S belief in accuracy of LER.
[REDACTED]