

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

D. C. COOK, UNIT ONE

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5 1 OF 0 1 1

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

INADVERTENT ISOLATION OF LOW PRESSURE CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	4	2	9	8	5	8	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																	
6			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)								
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)								
0			20.405(a)(1)(d)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)								
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)											
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)											

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

A. A. BLIND - ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

6 1 6 4 6 5 - 5 9 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ON APRIL 29, 1985, AT 0825 HOURS, WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IN MODE 6 (REFUELING), THE LOW PRESSURE CARBON DIOXIDE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM (IEEE/KQ) FOR QUADRANT ONE OF THE REACTOR CABLE TUNNEL, WAS ISOLATED WITHOUT FIRE WATCH COVERAGE AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.9.3. THE SYSTEM WAS RETURNED TO NORMAL AT 1120 HOURS, APRIL 29, 1985 AFTER IT WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE BEEN INADVERTENTLY ISOLATED.

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR. IT WAS THE RESULT OF; 1) UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE LOW PRESSURE CARBON DIOXIDE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ISOLATION POINTS, AND 2) INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CRAFT PERSONNEL REQUESTING THE ISOLATION AND SECURITY PERSONNEL WHO CARRIED OUT THE REQUEST.

WHILE THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS ISOLATED FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS, THE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM REMAINED OPERABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL DEGRADATION OF FIRE PROTECTION CAPABILITY DUE TO THIS EVENT, NOR DID IT CONSTITUTE A HAZARD TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.

THOSE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED ARE NOW AWARE OF CORRECT ISOLATION POINTS FOR AREAS WITHIN THE REACTOR CABLE TUNNEL AND HAVE BEEN COUNSELLED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER CONTROL OF THE LOW PRESSURE CARBON DIOXIDE FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.

PREVIOUS OCCURENCES OF A SIMILAR NATURE INCLUDE: 50-316/84-009 AND 50-316/84-027.

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