



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 26, 1996

50-219

Mr. Michael B. Roche
Vice President and Director
GPU Nuclear Corporation
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Post Office Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF INTERGRANULAR STRESS-CORROSION CRACKING INSPECTION PLAN OF
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM PIPING WELDS OUTBOARD OF THE PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES - OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING
STATION (TAC NO. M93315)

Dear Mr. Roche:

The staff issued NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-01, "NRC Position on Intergranular Stress-Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," to address IGSCC near weldments in BWR piping. Supplement 1 to GL 88-01 provided alternatives regarding the inspection of reactor water clean-up (RWCU) system piping outboard of the containment isolation valves and recommended inspection of the subject piping on a sampling basis of at least 10% of the weld population each refueling outage (RFO) until completion of NRC GL 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," activities. By letter dated August 12, 1988, GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPU) provided a response to GL 88-01, where it informed the staff of its future plans for IGSCC inspection. Also, by letter dated June 7, 1990, GPU accepted the staff's position concerning ultrasonic inspections of at least 10% of the RWCU piping welds outboard of the secondary containment isolation valves for RFO 13. In addition, GPU indicated that it tentatively planned to inspect an additional 10% of these welds during future RFOs, depending on the results of the RFO 13 inspections.

In its submittal dated June 26, 1992, GPU proposed a change to the Oyster Creek IGSCC Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program and provided technical justification for not inspecting the RWCU system welds outside the second isolation valve. By NRC letter dated September 30, 1992, the staff indicated that even though GPU provided some reasons to support its proposal not to inspect the subject piping outside the second isolation valve, GPU should not reduce the minimum of 10% sampling during each refueling outage because it had not yet completed GL 89-10 recommended actions.

By letter dated February 17, 1995, GPU notified the NRC that it considered that the recommended actions of GL 89-10 were complete. Subsequently, by letter dated August 11, 1995, GPU provided additional information indicating that it had inspected all the RWCU welds inboard of the containment isolation valves and 29 of 85 welds outboard of the second containment isolation valves and found no IGSCC indications.

NRC FILE CENTER COPY *Drfd*

030041
9610030209 960926
PDR ADOCK 05000219
P PDR

Therefore, GPU requested NRC approval for eliminating the IGSCC inspection of the RWCU system piping welds outside the second isolation valve as part of its augmented ISI at Oyster Creek.


On December 4, 1995, a conference call between the NRC and GPU was held to discuss GPU's actions in response to the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI's) recent information to prevent potential damage to isolation valves that may be required to operate under blowdown conditions and EPRI's recommendations concerning sharp edges and clearances for gate valves. The staff emphasized that part of NRC's basis for allowing reduced weld inspections downstream of the second isolation valve is confidence that the isolation valves will be capable of isolating under blowdown conditions. Therefore, the NRC staff requested that GPU provide NRC with its plans to address the concerns regarding potential damage to the blowdown gate valves by measures such as rounding sharp edges and verifying proper clearances.

GPU prepared an internal memorandum that addressed plans for responding to the EPRI information but did not have a specific date for completion of its actions. The NRC staff did not agree with GPU's proposed plan to address EPRI's recommendations only if and when the particular valve failed a local leak rate test. By letter dated March 8, 1996; in response to the staff's request for additional information dated January 22, 1996, GPU indicated it planned to modify the RWCU isolation valves in accordance with the EPRI recommendations if the valves required disassembly for maintenance purposes.

Based on the staff's concerns regarding the isolation capability of the gate valves under blowdown conditions, and the uncertainty of when the modifications to these valves will be completed, the staff has determined that GPU's request of eliminating the IGSCC inspection of the RWCU system piping welds outside the second isolation valve should be denied at this time. GPU's request may be resubmitted after this new issue concerning the performance of the subject gate valves under blowdown conditions has been resolved.

This completes all action associated with and closes TAC No. M93315.

Sincerely,


Ronald B. Eaton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-219

cc: See next page

September 26, 1996

Therefore, GPU requested NRC approval for eliminating the IGSCC inspection of the RWCU system piping welds outside the second isolation valve as part of its augmented ISI at Oyster Creek.

On December 4, 1995, a conference call between the NRC and GPU was held to discuss GPU's actions in response to the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI's) recent information to prevent potential damage to isolation valves that may be required to operate under blowdown conditions and EPRI's recommendations concerning sharp edges and clearances for gate valves. The staff emphasized that part of NRC's basis for allowing reduced weld inspections downstream of the second isolation valve is confidence that the isolation valves will be capable of isolating under blowdown conditions. Therefore, the NRC staff requested that GPU provide NRC with its plans to address the concerns regarding potential damage to the blowdown gate valves by measures such as rounding sharp edges and verifying proper clearances.

GPU prepared an internal memorandum that addressed plans for responding to the EPRI information but did not have a specific date for completion of its actions. The NRC staff did not agree with GPU's proposed plan to address EPRI's recommendations only if and when the particular valve failed a local leak rate test. By letter dated March 8, 1996; in response to the staff's request for additional information dated January 22, 1996, GPU indicated it planned to modify the RWCU isolation valves in accordance with the EPRI recommendations if the valves required disassembly for maintenance purposes.

Based on the staff's concerns regarding the isolation capability of the gate valves under blowdown conditions, and the uncertainty of when the modifications to these valves will be completed, the staff has determined that GPU's request of eliminating the IGSCC inspection of the RWCU system piping welds outside the second isolation valve should be denied at this time. GPU's request may be resubmitted after this new issue concerning the performance of the subject gate valves under blowdown conditions has been resolved.

This completes all action associated with and closes TAC No. M93315.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Ronald B. Eaton, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2

Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-219

cc: See next page

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

Distribution

Docket File	CJamerson
PUBLIC	REaton
PDI-3 Plant	OGC
SVarga	ACRS
JZwolinski	RWessman
JStolz	TScarborough
PEselgroth, RI	

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\EATON\M93315.LTR

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE	PDI-2:PM	C	PD3-3:LA	C	PDI-2:D					
NAME	REaton		CJamerson	CJ	JStolz					
DATE	09/15/96		09/25/96		09/26/96					

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

M. Roche
GPU Nuclear Corporation

Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station

cc:

Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20037

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

BWR Licensing Manager
GPU Nuclear Corporation
1 Upper Pond Road
Parsippany, NJ 07054

Mayor
Lacey Township
818 West Lacey Road
Forked River, NJ 08731

Licensing Manager
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Mail Stop: Site Emergency Bldg.
P.O. Box 388
Forked River, NJ 08731

Resident Inspector
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 445
Forked River, NJ 08731

Kent Tosch, Chief
New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
CN 415
Trenton, NJ 08625