

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1) Fermi-2															DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 1					PAGE (3) OF 0 8				
TITLE (4) Secondary Containment Not Established Prior to Starting Core Alterations																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	4	2	7	8	5	8	5	0	1	3	0	0	5	2	8	8	5	0	5	0	0	0		
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
5			20.402(b)			20.408(a)			60.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)												
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.408(a)(1)(i)			60.38(a)(1)			60.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(a)												
0 0 0			20.408(a)(1)(ii)			60.38(a)(2)			60.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 356A)												
			20.408(a)(1)(iii)			60.73(a)(2)(i)			60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)															
			20.408(a)(1)(iv)			60.73(a)(2)(ii)			60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)															
			20.408(a)(1)(v)			60.73(a)(2)(iii)			60.73(a)(2)(ix)															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME												TELEPHONE NUMBER												
A.E. Wegele, Compliance Engineer												AREA CODE 3 1 3 5 8 6 - 5 3 1 3												
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs														
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												NO												

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On the morning of April 28, 1985, with the plant in Operational Condition 5 and control rod drive friction testing in progress, operators became aware that secondary containment integrity had not been maintained during core alterations, as required by Technical Specification 4.6.5.1.a, for a period of approximately 7 hours on April 27.

Plant personnel misinterpreted the wording of surveillance procedure 24.000.03 and incorrectly considered a secondary containment differential pressure of 0.100" Vac WG to meet the acceptance criterion of vacuum greater than or equal to -0.125" Vac WG. To prevent recurrence of this event, procedure 24.000.03 has been revised to clarify the wording of the acceptance criterion and the setpoints on the annunciators for high and low differential pressure have been revised to ensure more reliable annunciation. This event will be reviewed with all licensed personnel through the required reading program and the regualification training program.

8506060308 850528  
PDR ADCK 05000341  
S PDR

ΣΕ22/1

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Fermi-2	0500034185	0	13	0	0	2	OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

On the morning of April 28, 1985, with the plant in operational condition 5 and control rod drive friction testing in progress, operators became aware that secondary containment integrity had not been maintained during core alterations, as required by Technical Specification 4.6.5.1.a, for a period of approximately 7 hours on April 27.

During the performance of the mode 5 daily surveillances on April 27, 1985, the patrol Nuclear Supervising Operator (NSO) recorded a secondary containment differential pressure of 0.100" Vac WG from instrument T41-R800A. The NSO and the STA who reviewed the data thought this value met the acceptance criterion of "pressure greater than or equal to 0.125" Vac WG" specified in the checklist. According to Technical Specification 4.6.5.1.a, this differential pressure requirement is not applicable in operational condition 5, except when irradiated fuel is being handled in secondary containment, or core alterations are being performed, or operations with the potential for draining the reactor vessel are taking place. For this reason, the NSO had marked the acceptance criterion as "N/A" for the then existing plant conditions. The Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) did not notice that the recorded value was below the minimum acceptable vacuum and, like the NSO, considered the requirement for secondary containment integrity to be "N/A" in the then existing plant conditions.

Later on April 27, at 0545 hours, control rod drive friction testing began. Under the definition of Core Alterations given in Technical Specifications, withdrawal of a control rod for this test constituted a Core Alteration. Under Specification 3.6.5.1, therefore, secondary containment integrity was required, but as described above was not maintained. This error was discovered on the morning of April 28 when the same NSO returned to duty. On the morning of April 28 he recorded a secondary containment differential pressure of 0.300" Vac WG and, concerned that this value did not meet the acceptance criterion, the NSO brought this to the attention of the NSS. The NSS checked Technical Specification 4.6.5.1.a and determined that the acceptance criterion concerned maintaining a vacuum of at least 0.125" WG, rather than a pressure of 0.125" WG. At this time, the NSO realized his mistake and informed the NSS that the previous night's reading had also been below the Technical Specification minimum. Reviewing the chart from recorder T41-R800A, personnel determined that secondary containment differential pressure remained below the Technical Specification minimum until approximately 1230 hours on April 27, 1985. Thus, contrary to Technical Specification 3.6.5.1, secondary containment integrity was not maintained for

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Fermi-2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 8 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		-01	3	-00	01	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

approximately seven hours during which core alterations were performed.

A contributing factor in this event was that the setpoints for the annunciators for high and low differential pressure were such that the annunciators did not sound during this event. A design change (EDP 1749) has been implemented to modify the setpoints for these annunciators so that they will alarm at  $-0.125''$  Vac WG and  $-0.5''$  Vac WG.

To prevent recurrence of this event, procedure change request number T1638 was written to clarify the wording of the acceptance criterion in Procedure 24.000.03. This event report will be reviewed with operations personnel through the required reading program and the requalification training program.

**Detroit  
Edison**

2000 Second Avenue  
Detroit, Michigan 48226  
(313) 237-8000

May 28, 1985  
NP-85-0578

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


Reference: Fermi 2  
NRC Operating License No. NPF-33

Subject: Transmittal of Licensee Event Report No. 85-013

Please find enclosed LER No. 85-013-00, dated May 28, 1985, for a reportable event which occurred on April 27, 1985. As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Region III office.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,



R.S. Lenart  
Superintendent  
Nuclear Production

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: Mr. P.M. Byron  
Mr. M.D. Lynch

Regional Administrator  
USNRC Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

IE22  
1/1