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COUNTY OF SUFFOLK



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PETER F. COHALAN  
SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE

MARTIN BRADLEY ASHARE  
COUNTY ATTORNEY

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS  
IN THIS MATTER TO:

July 11, 1985

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Fifth Floor (North Tower)  
East-West Towers  
4350 East-West Highway  
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Attention: Administrative Law Judges:  
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman  
Gary J. Edles  
Howard A. Wilber

In the Matter of  
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY  
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)  
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (Emergency Planning)

Dear Sirs:

By letter dated July 8th, I notified the Appeal Board that the Suffolk County Attorney felt constrained by pending New York State Court litigation from commenting on the "legal authority" group of issues now before the Appeal Board. I also requested the Appeal Board's indulgence with respect to a further submission in the event that future developments warranted.

Such developments have occurred and our position on these issues is as follows: The Suffolk County Executive continues to oppose the notion that LILCO, independent of any governmental involvement, would have the legal authority by itself to implement an emergency plan for Shoreham. The County Executive takes no position with respect to the "immateriality" argument advanced by LILCO.

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PDR ADDCK 05000322  
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With respect to LILCO's "realism" argument, the relevant developments are as follows:

1. On June 26, 1985, the Suffolk County Executive responded to a letter from W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq., one of counsel for LILCO, with respect to the issue of whether the Suffolk County Executive would respond in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. The County Executive replied that he would so respond "to the best of my ability and in accordance with the duties and obligations placed upon me by Article 2-b of the Executive Law". That exchange of correspondence comprises Enclosures 1 and 2 hereto.

2. On June 20, 1985, the Commission issued an Order in this case, CLI-85-12, denying a pending request from Suffolk County's former attorneys, the firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, that it perform a full-blown NEPA evaluation of low power operation of the Shoreham plant prior to issuance of a license authorizing 5% power testing. In rejecting that request, the Commission stated its expectation that, in the event a full power license were ultimately granted for Shoreham, governments would not refuse to take part, to the extent necessary to protect the public health and safety, in radiological emergency preparedness. CLI-85-12 at p.4. As can be seen from paragraph 1 above, the Suffolk County Executive does not disagree with the Commission's view on this matter.

3. On July 9, 1985, the New York Court of Appeals, by a 4-3 vote, upheld the trial court's invalidation of Suffolk County Executive Order 1-1985. The Court of Appeals' majority opinion included the following passages:

If the challenged executive order is merely a vehicle for the gathering of information to enable the County Executive to perform his statutorily mandated functions of taking "an active and personal role in the development and implementation of disaster preparedness programs" (Executive Law Sec. 20[1][b]) and giving "advice and assistance" to the local legislative body or other duly appointed planning authority (Executive Law Sec. 23[5]), it is clearly authorized under the statute.

The Court of Appeals went on to find that Executive Order 1-1985, as drafted, went beyond that function and rather constituted the "first step toward implementation of a plan". However, the Suffolk County Executive believes that the quoted portion of the

opinion permits him to take such steps as are necessary to gather sufficient information, during an exercise or otherwise, of an emergency response plan for the purpose of advising the County Legislature concerning the feasibility of the same. The Court of Appeals' slip opinion is Enclosure 3 hereto.


4. On June 20, 1985, the NRC Staff requested the Federal Emergency Management Agency to schedule as full an exercise of the Shoreham emergency plan as is feasible and lawful at the present time. That request is Enclosure 4 hereto.

Taken together, the developments recited above indicate that the Suffolk County Executive would respond in the event of an actual radiological emergency at Shoreham; that the New York Court of Appeals has recognized the existence of statutorily mandated duties on his part in this respect and has refused to proscribe his taking steps to gather information concerning any emergency response plan that would be in effect in such an event; and that an exercise of such a plan now appears to be actively in the planning stage. To this extent, we do not disagree with the "realism" argument advanced by LILCO.

Two issues related to that of legal authority are now before this Appeal Board: those of conflict of interest on the part of LILCO personnel exercising certain emergency response functions, and the absence of a New York State plan for Shoreham. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the Suffolk County Executive would ensure the response of the Suffolk County government in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. As to the absence of a State plan, the significance of that "defect" is greatly attenuated, given its applicability only to the region more than 10 miles from Shoreham, by the intended participation of the Suffolk County government in response to any actual emergency at Shoreham.

Respectfully submitted,

MARTIN BRADLEY ASHARE  
Suffolk County Attorney

By:   
Eugene R. Kelley  
Chief Deputy County Attorney

MBA: ERK: rg  
Enclosures  
CC: Service List

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June 17, 1985

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FILE NO.

DIRECT DIAL NO. 804-785-

Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.  
Suffolk County Attorney  
H. Lee Dennison Building  
Veterans Memorial Highway  
Hauppauge, New York 11788

Long Island Lighting Company  
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Dear Mr. Ashare:

Suffolk County Executive Cohalan was quoted in the June 15, 1985 New York Times to this effect:

In that event [i.e., Shoreham becomes radioactive], the county has a duty and responsibility to provide for the health and safety of the residents near the plant.

I write to ask if, in fact, the County Executive will respond fully, in cooperation with LERO, to protect the public health and safety in the event a radiological accident occurs at Shoreham.

Very truly yours,

*W. Taylor Reveley, III*  
W. Taylor Reveley, III

126/586

Enc. "1"

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK



OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE

PETER F. COHALAN  
SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE

JOHN C. GALLAGHER  
CHIEF DEPUTY

June 26, 1985

Hunton & Williams  
707 E. Main St.  
P.O. Box 1535  
Richmond, VA 23212  
Att: W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.

RE: Long Island Lighting Company  
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Dear Mr. Reveley:

This is in response to your letter of June 17, 1985. In the event of a radiological accident, I, as the County Executive will respond to the best of my ability and in accordance with the duties and obligations placed upon me by Article 2-b of the Executive Law.

Sincerely,

PETER F. COHALAN  
SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE

PFC:sm

Enc. "2"

## 10

## JULY 09, 1925

2 No. 440  
In the Matter of Wayne Peasport,  
et al.,  
Respondents,  
v.  
Peter F. Cochran, &c.,  
Appellant,  
Long Island Lighting Company,  
Intervenor-Appellant.

Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.  
Chief Judge Wachler and Judge Simons, Kaye and Alexander concur. Judge Titone dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judges Jasen and Meyer concur.

In the Matter of the Town of  
Southampton, et al.,  
Respondents,  
v.  
Peter E. Cohatan, &c.,  
Appellants,  
Long Island Lighting Company,  
Intervenor-Appellant.



# State of New York Court of Appeals

2 No. 440  
In the Matter of Wayne Prospect,  
et al.,

Respondents.

v.

Peter F. Cahalan, Ac.,  
Appellant,  
Long Island Lighting Company,  
Intervenor-Appellant.

-----  
In the Matter of the Town of  
Southampton, et al.,

Respondents.

v.

Peter F. Cahalan, Ac.,  
Appellant,  
Long Island Lighting Company,  
Intervenor-Appellant.

## MEMORANDUM

This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.

(-1) Robert H. Calica, Garden City, for Appellant.

K. Dennis Egan, Middletown, & David F. Marshall, NYC, for Intervenor-Appellant LILOCC.  
Irving Lipe & Lester E. Lippincott, Babylon, for respondent Legislators.

Stephen E. Lather, Riverhead, for respondent Towns.

Robert Bryant, Attorney General (Robert E. Marshall of counsel) & Peter Lou Levitt, Foughelmerville, for Intervenor-Respondent, ENLCC.

## MEMORANDUM:

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Article 2-B of the Executive Law, notwithstanding its articulated policy of involving local chief executives in the development and implementation of disaster preparedness programs (Executive Law § 20(1)(b)), does not vest in them the ultimate responsibility for the preparation of county disaster plans.

Section 23(1) specifically provides that "[e]ach county \*\*\* is authorized to prepare disaster preparedness plans". It is clear that the delegation of power to each county is to its

legislative, not its executive branch. In other sections of article 2-B, the context clearly indicates that references to the "county", without more, signify the legislative branch. Section 27, for example, provides in pertinent part that "[e]very county \*\*\* shall have the power to provide by local law \*\*\* for its continuity". Similarly, § 28-a provides that, in the event of a declaration of a state disaster emergency, "any county \*\*\* shall prepare a local recovery and redevelopment plan, unless the legislative body of the municipality shall determine such plan to be unnecessary or impractical". In stark contrast, when the Legislature intended to vest authority of any kind in a county executive, it has specified the role of the chief executive, defined as "a county executive or manager of a county" (Executive Law § 20(1)(1)) (see, e.g., Executive Law §§ 24(1); 25(1), (2), (3), (4), (6); 26(1)(3)).

Moreover, the use of the term "is authorized" in § 23(1) unequivocally signals a legislative intent that the preparation of county plans is optional, not mandatory. The provisions authorizing the chief executive of a county to act upon the declaration of a radiological accident do not necessarily presuppose the existence of a plan (Executive Law §§ 24; 25; 26; 28(1); 29-b(2)). We read Executive Law § 20(3)(b) as merely manifesting a policy preferring consideration of the county executive's views in the development of disaster preparedness programs, which policy implicitly recognizes that primary responsibility for such development is lodged elsewhere and agree with the conclusion of the Appellate Division that the term "county" in Executive Law § 23(1) does not include "county executive".



1. If the challenged executive order is merely a vehicle for the gathering of information to enable the county executive to perform his statutorily mandated functions of taking "an active and personal role in the development and implementation of disaster preparedness programs" (Executive Law §20(3)(6)) and giving "advice and assistance" to the local legislative body or other duly appointed planning authority (Executive Law §23(5)), it is clearly authorized under the statute. However, we read Executive Order 1-1985 as representing a first step toward the implementation of a plan and therefore we find it to be a clear usurpation of the legislative function (cf. Under 21 v City of New York, \_\_\_ NY2d \_\_\_ [dec'd June 28, 1985]).

MATTER OF PROSPECT v COHALAN

No. 440

V. J. T.

TITONE, J. (dissenting)

The issue before us is not whether Executive Law § 23(1) confers ultimate responsibility for the promulgation of a disaster preparedness plan upon the executive branch or the legislative branch of county government, for the challenged Executive Order does not purport to promulgate such a plan. It simply directs the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner of Planning to study a proposed plan that is not in effect and may never go into effect. The real question, then, concerns the proper role of the judiciary in this emotionally charged dispute. Because the County Executive clearly possesses express and implied authority to issue the Executive Order in question and

the alleged illegal acts sought to be enjoined have not taken place and are contingent upon future events that may or may not come to pass, the purported challenge is "nonjusticiable as wholly speculative and abstract" (New York State Inspection, Security & Law Enforcement Employees v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 240). Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the petitions dismissed.

This litigation revolves around a nuclear power plant located at Shoreham on Long Island. It appears that the plant cannot become operational in the absence of an emergency evacuation plan. The Suffolk County Legislature has consistently taken the position that no plan would be feasible and eventually passed a resolution, signed by the present County Executive, appellant Peter Cohalan, which "terminated" Suffolk County's "radiological emergency planning process" and directed that "no local radiological emergency plan \* \* \* be adopted or implemented."

Blocked by local governmental obstinance, the utility submitted its own plan to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. After the Commission rejected the plan as beyond the utility's legal powers, appellant Cohalan issued Executive Order 1-1985, which reads as follows:

"By the power vested in me under Article II-B of the New York State Executive Law and § 302 of the SUFFOLK COUNTY CHARTER, I hereby determine that it is necessary for me to cause to be reviewed and evaluated the Local Emergency Response Plan for Suffolk County presently before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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\* Although the parties have not urged nonjusticiability, since the issue implicates subject matter jurisdiction (New York State Inspection, Security & Law Enforcement Employees v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 241 n 3), we raise the issue on our own motion (Robinson v Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 112 NY 315, 324; Siegel, NY Prac. § 61).

"I therefore direct the Commissioner of Police and Commissioner of the Suffolk County Planning Department to use whatever resources of the government of the County of Suffolk are necessary in order to complete a review and evaluation of the above Local Emergency Response Plan and carry out and cause to be conducted a test and exercise of the above said Plan in conjunction with the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO). I further direct that agents of the County of Suffolk assume the function of command and control with implementation of police powers of the County of Suffolk over the conduct of said test and exercise."

Charging that Cohalan betrayed them, petitioners, several individual Suffolk County legislators and four Suffolk County towns, brought separate suits to annul the Executive Order on the ground that it usurps the power of the Suffolk County Legislature to develop and implement a disaster preparedness plan. They have been successful at Special Term and at the Appellate Division, obtaining a judgment, which the Appellate Division affirmed, declaring the Executive Order void and enjoining Cohalan, his agents and employees from taking any action "to enforce, implement or carry out the directives, policies, or terms" of the order "or any directive or instruction relating thereto." We conclude that the determinations below rest upon a speculative premise concerning future events and, therefore, would reverse.

There can be no doubt that the Suffolk County Executive has the power -- indeed the responsibility -- to review the utility's proposal. Executive Law § 20(1)(b) expressly declares state policy to be that "local chief executives take an active and personal role in the development and implementation of disaster preparedness programs and be vested with authority and responsibility in order to insure the success of such programs." In "preparing such plans," the State Legislature has specified that "cooperation, advice and assistance" be sought from "local

government officials, regional and local planning agencies, [and] police agencies \* \* \* (Executive Law § 23(5)). That is all Executive Order 1-1985 does.

Under the Suffolk County Charter, the County Executive is chief administrative officer and administrative head (Suffolk County Charter § 302), and, as such, is obligated "to manage the operations of the division of the executive branch" (New York State Inspection, Security & Law Enforcement v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 733, 739, supra). In addition to other responsibilities, the Charter directs the County Executive to "present to the county legislature from time to time such information and recommendations concerning the affairs of the county as he may deem necessary or as the county legislature may by resolution request" (Suffolk County Charter § 303(g)).

Although County Executive Cobelen has acted within the parameters of these statutory and charter provisions, the argument is made that since the Suffolk County Legislature has consistently expressed its intention not to approve any plan, the courts should now hold that, as a matter of statutory construction, the power to promulgate and implement a disaster preparedness plan is solely a legislative function, and, inasmuch as the Suffolk County Legislature will not do so, the County Executive's powers are vitiated. This begs the question.

County Executive Cobelen has not promulgated any plan. His Executive Order merely directs that a proposal be evaluated. After the proposal is studied, he may well conclude that it is not viable and that will end the matter. If, on the other hand, he concludes that the proposal is workable and should be implemented, he could submit it to the Suffolk County Legislature for its consideration and agree to abide by its determination. Again, the question of statutory construction would be moot.

Only if County Executive Cohalen implements the proposal by executive fiat in the face of legislative disapproval will the issue pressed upon us be ripe for judicial resolution. By no stretch of logistic legerdemain can it be read as some sort of first step toward a grandiose scheme to impose the plan on the county.

There are other "ifs" here as well. We are told that it is absolutely certain that the Suffolk County Legislature will withhold its consent. But the only thing absolutely certain in political matters is that nothing is absolutely certain. Attitudes are shaped by current events. Another energy crisis, with its long gasoline lines and brown-outs, may cause a quick change in legislative consensus. The legislators could, at least theoretically, be swayed by expert reports, especially if, by virtue of some sort of federal preemption, it is determined that the plant is to open (*cf. British Airways Pl. v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey*, 564 P2d 1007 [local noise limitation standard utilized to bar SST invalidated]). A resolution by definition, is "an act of a temporary character not prescribing a permanent rule of government" (*Matter of Collins v City of Schenectady*, 256 App Div 389, 392) (emphasis supplied) which "continues for a reasonable period only, and in such a case a formal repeal is not, of course, required to terminate its operation (5 *McQuillin*, *Municipal Corporations* [3d ed], § 15.42) (*Quaglia v Inc. Vill. of Munsay Park*, 54 AD2d 414, 419, *aff'd* 44 NY2d 772). Indeed, this litigation itself, fueled by the adoption of a more flexible posture by the County Executive, is itself tailing. In short, we are reminded of Byron's Julie, who "whispering, 'I shall ne'er consent,' consented" (*Don Juan*, Canto I, stanza 117).



All these "ifs" render it both unnecessary and improper for us to express any view on whether a disaster preparedness plan may be put into effect absent the imprimatur of the local legislature. Courts should not involve themselves in challenges to executive acts where "the harm sought to be enjoined is contingent upon events which may not come to pass [because] \* \* \* the claim to enjoin the purported hazard is nonjusticiable as wholly speculative and abstract" (New York State Inspection, Security & Law Enforcement Employees v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 240, supra). To paraphrase our holding in New York Public Interest Research Group v Carey (42 NY2d 527, 531, supra), until the County Executive attempts to implement a plan in the teeth of legislative opposition, any declaration on our part "would be premature" (quoting Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p 63; see also, Connor v Siebert, 56 NY2d 674). "Jurisdiction exists that rights may be maintained. Rights are not maintained that jurisdiction may exist" (Berkovitz v Ashlb., 230 NY 251, 272).

An actual antagonistic assertion of rights which are ripe for adjudication is an indispensable safeguard, essential to the integrity of the judicial process (see, Matter of State Ind. Comm., 224 NY 13 [Cardozo, J.]). "This is not merely a question of judicial prudence or restraint; it is a constitutional command defining the proper role of the courts under a common-law system" (New York Public Interest Research Group v Carey, 42 NY2d 527, 530-531, supra).

The Suffolk County Legislature's pertinacity cannot, in any sense, interdict the County Executive from undertaking his obligation to "take an active and personal role in the development and implementation of disaster preparedness programs" (Executive Law § 20(1)(b)). When the study is completed, the County Legislature must at least "listen" to his report, even if

it does not like what it "hears" (see, Suffolk County Charter § 303(g)). The Suffolk County Legislature's resolutions on the subject constitute but temporary, ministerial declarations, not legislation finally and unequivocally disapproving the proposed plan (see, City of Troy Unit of Rensselaer County Chapter of Civ. Serv. Employees Assn. v City of Troy, 36 AD2d 145, 147, aff'd 30 NY2d 549; Queglie v Inc. Vill. of Munsey Park, supra; Matter of Collins v City of Schenectady, supra; cf. Matter of Jewett v Luan-Hyack Corp., 31 NY2d 298, 305-306).

Perhaps the Suffolk County Legislature can curb the County Executive's ability to function in this area through the power of the purse, by refusing to allocate sufficient funds for the project. But even that question is not before us. At this stage, the County Executive is plainly within his powers, and the "lawful acts of executive branch officials, performed in satisfaction of responsibilities conferred by law, involve questions of judgment, allocation of resources and ordering of priorities, which are generally not subject to judicial review \* \* \*". This judicial deference to a coordinate, coequal branch of government includes one issue of justiciability generally denominated as the "political question" doctrine" (New York State Inspection, Security & Law Enforcement Employees v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 234, supra).

Acceptance of the Suffolk County Legislature's argument here would establish a far-reaching and mischievous precedent that cannot be confined to litigation involving a power plant in Suffolk County. It would abrogate the separation of powers doctrine at the local level, and, in its place, substitute a parliamentary system (see, People v Tremaine, 201 NY 1), because it would enable the legislative branch to turn a power of consent or confirmation into a power of appointment. To strip the

executive of his power to designate a police commissioner, for example, the legislature need only pass a resolution to the effect that it will not confirm anyone other than "X" and if the executive attempted to seek or interview other applicants, the legislature need only call upon the judiciary to enjoin him from acting in contravention of its resolution. Through this artifice, the executive would be compelled to nominate "X", the legislature's "nominee" (see, Suffolk County Charter § 1202(3); cf. Matter of County of Suffolk, 41 NY2d 968, rev'd 56 AD2d 301).

The United States Supreme Court recently rebuffed similar attempts by Congress to straightjacket the President through the use of the legislative veto (Immigration & Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919). In Chadha, the Court invalidated § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC § 1254(c)(1)) which authorized either House of Congress, by resolution, to overturn the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in this Country. It reasoned that this legislative veto provision violated integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. As so well put, "the hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches [of Government] to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted" (Immigration & Naturalization Service v Chadha, supra, 951). There is no reason why this Court should hold otherwise.

We would prefer not to express our thoughts on what the 1978 State Legislature thought on a question that they possibly never thought about. By applying established rules of nonjusticiability, we give time for the political process to operate. Having identified a gap in the legislation, it would be best to

allow the State Legislature to fill it (see, McKinney's Statutes § 193 (b)).

To find, as does the majority, that Executive Order 1985-1 constitutes an impermissible "first step" in implementing the plan, i.e. in actuality, an inquiry into the County Executive's state of mind. It is basic law, however, that the courts have no power to investigate the motives of the executive branch, absent a demonstration of fraud or the like (see, 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations [3d ed], §§ 10.35, 10.36, 10.37). On this record, petitioners have not overcome the presumption that the executive has acted with the sole purpose of accomplishing permissible constitutional and statutory goals (see, 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations [3d ed], § 10.35).

For those reasons, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the petitioners' dismissed.

\* \* \* \* \*

Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum. Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye and Alexander concur. Judge Titone dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judges Jasen and Mayer concur.

Decided July 9, 1985



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUN 20 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard W. Krimm  
Assistant Associate Director  
Office of Natural and Technological  
Hazards Programs  
Federal Emergency Management Agency

FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director  
Division of Emergency Preparedness  
and Engineering Response  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT: SCHEDULING OF EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE  
FOR SHOREHAM


In response to LILCO's standing request to schedule an exercise of its emergency plan for Shoreham, the Commission, in a memorandum to the Executive Director for Operations dated June 4, 1985 (Enclosure 1), stated that it sees no reason why the licensee (i.e., LILCO) should not be allowed to exercise those parts of the plan which may be legally exercised. Further, the Commission indicated that it does not disagree with the view that an exercise of the LILCO plan could yield meaningful results, even though such an exercise may not satisfy all of the requirements of NRC's regulations. The exercise could, as a minimum, identify the impact of the limitations of LILCO's plan when executed under the state and county restrictions.

Accordingly, we request that FEMA schedule as full an exercise of the LILCO Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) plan as is feasible at the present time giving appropriate consideration to the Suffolk County Executive's May 30, 1985 Executive Order and subsequent developments relating to emergency planning activities by the County. In determining those portions of the LERO plan that might be appropriate for inclusion in an exercise at this time, we suggest that FEMA emphasize evaluation of the functional areas of emergency preparedness related to the demonstration of response capabilities within the plume exposure (10 mile) Emergency Planning Zone.

Contact: F. Kantor, IE  
492-9749

*Enc. "4"*

In the event FEMA determines that an exercise is not currently possible, we request that FEMA provide a response which addresses the five issues identified in the memorandum from the Secretary of the Commission. Commissioner Asselstine's views on this matter are provided as Enclosure 2.



Edward L. Jordan, Director  
Division of Emergency Preparedness  
and Engineering Response  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum from the  
Secretary of the Commission  
dtd. 06/04/35
2. Commissioner Asselstine's Views



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board

In the Matter of )  
 )  
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY )  
 )  
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )  
Unit 1) )

Docket No. 50-322-OL-3  
(Emergency Planning)

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that copies of a letter to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, dated July 11, 1985, have been served on the following this 11th day of July, 1985, by U.S. Mail, First Class.

Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman  
Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Appeal Board  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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
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
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Sworn to before me this  
11th day of July, 1985.



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Term Expires March 30, 1986