U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No:	50-155
License No:	DPR-06
Report No:	50-155/96005(DRP)
Licensee:	Consumers Power Company
Facility:	Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant
Location:	10259 U.S. 31 North Charlevoix, MI 49720
Dates:	June 8 - July 26, 1996
Inspectors:	R. J. Leemon, Senior Resident Inspector C. E. Brown, Resident Inspector J. R. Roton, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved by:	W. J. Kropp, Chief, Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Big Rock Nuclear Power Plant
NRC Inspection Report 50-155/96005

This integrated inspection covered a 6-week period and included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.

Operations

- The inspectors considered the licensee's identification, tracking, and resolution of operator workarounds and concerns appropriate. However, the inspectors considered the licensee's view of what may or may not be a workaround to be narrowly focused. Additionally, agreement on and understanding of the rules for operator workarounds and operations concerns appeared to be issues requiring further attention (Section O2.1).

Maintenance

- The inspectors observed good procedure adherence practices. The inspectors concluded that walking down work activities and implementing a 13-week rolling schedule was a positive initiative to improve the planning and scheduling process.

  During this inspection period, licensee performance in limiting condition for operation (LCO) maintenance varied. In the diesel fire pump (DFP) planned-LCO maintenance, the work was planned in detail, communicated to the participants, coordinated fully, and worked to completion within the scheduled time line. However, performance during emergent-LCO maintenance was mixed. The reactor depressurization system (RDS) emergent work was well coordinated; however, in the radiation monitors emergent-declared-LCO maintenance, the LCO requirements were not communicated to the workers, the work was not coordinated between operations and maintenance, and it was not worked continuously to completion (Sections M1.1 through M1.5).

- The inspector observed several material condition and/or housekeeping issues (Section M2.1).

Engineering

- The inspector concluded that the first decision reached by the CARB to continue to use a low temperature value for heat balance calculations was not adequately evaluated and did not demonstrate a conservative operating philosophy to the plant operators (Section E1.1).

- The inspector concluded that the introduction of the system engineering quarterly reports was a positive initiative; however, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these reports (Section E1.2).

Plant Support

- Good ALARA and radiation protection practices were followed (R1.1).

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant was operated at near the full released rated thermal power throughout the period. There were no events to challenge the control-room operators during the period.

I. Operations

O1 Conduct of Operations

O1.1 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.

O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

O2.1 Operator Workaround and Operator Concerns

a. Scope

The inspector reviewed and discussed the identified operator workarounds and operator concerns.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector reviewed and discussed the "Operator Workaround List" and "Operations Concern List" with various members of the operations and engineering departments. There were three identified operator workarounds and 14 identified operations concerns. The "Operator Workaround List" was, in general, a subset of the "Operations Concerns List." Two of the issues carried on the operator workaround list had been determined to be issues which will not be remedied during the operational life of the plant (high amps on station power bus, No. 1 and reactor cooling water system relief valves setpoints near system operating pressure). The inspector reviewed the licensee's assessments and evaluations of these issues and found the licensee's decisions to be appropriate. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's action plans for each of the identified operator workarounds and concerns. The plans appeared to be comprehensive and were directed at either determining or resolving the root cause of each issue. Additionally, the action plans were periodically updated and reviewed by the appropriate supervisor.

The licensee had attempted to standardize the way issues were included in the "Operations Concerns List" and the "Operator Workaround List" by issuing an internal memorandum on August 28, 1995. Criteria 3, of this memorandum, states that an operator workaround was "a plant condition which results in

operator action during a transient or normal operations compensatory for a degraded condition that is not part of plant design." In discussions with various members of the operations and engineering departments, the inspector determined that the difference between an operator workaround and an operations concern were neither clearly understood nor agreed on throughout the organization.

The inspector also identified several other existing plant conditions as operator workarounds. For example, operation of two portable fans (installed permanently to cool the squib firing valves for the liquid poison tank) had been included as part of normal operator rounds. The inspector considered this requirement to represent a workaround as the criteria above seemed to apply; however, the licensee did not. Senior plant management informed the inspector that this specific issue was scheduled for review. Whether the use of portable fans constitutes a temporary modification, a design change, or an operator workaround is an inspection followup item (50-155/96005-01).

c. Conclusion

The inspectors considered the licensee's identification, tracking, and resolution of operator workarounds and concerns appropriate. However, the inspectors considered the licensee's view of what may or may not be a workaround to be narrowly focused. Additionally, agreement on and understanding of the rules for operator workarounds and operations concerns appeared to be issues requiring further attention.

II. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a. Inspection Scope (62703) (61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

Maintenance Activities

- WO FPS-12611140 Trouble alarm comes in momentarily on some diesel fire pump starts, troubleshooting
- WO FPS-12511004 Repair lube-oil sprinkler check valve
- WO RDS-12611266 Replace Battery

Surveillance Activities

- T7-28 Emergency diesel generator (EDG) test start, loaded
- T7-33 Alternate shutdown equipment check

- T30-01 Reactor protection system test at power
- T30-59 (RDS-L2) Reactor depressurization system (RDS) test at power

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough. All work observed was properly authorized and tagged for maintenance. The procedures and work orders (WOs) were on the job site and required sign-offs were up-to-date. Post maintenance testing (if required) was promptly performed with good support from maintenance personnel.

M1.2 Planning and Scheduling of Work Activities

a. Inspection Scope (62703)

The inspectors reviewed the way the licensee planned and scheduled maintenance activities.

b. Observations and Findings

During the inspection period, the licensee initiated steps to improve the planning and scheduling of work activities. These steps included:

- planning a 13 week rolling schedule
- walking down work activities 3-weeks in advance of the planned work
- defining (freezing) the work scope for the 1997-refueling outage.

Before developing the rolling schedule process, the licensee only had activities planned for a week at a time and the effects of regularly scheduled maintenance and surveillance activities were not factored into planning other activities. The licensee started implementing changes to total-activity control after the 1994 refueling outage (completed in late 1994) and this was an additional step towards actually controlling the sequence of the combined departmental activities vice simply putting a time frame on a schedule. The process of planning and controlling the sequence of all activities was being extended to the 1997 refueling outage schedule as well.

M1.3 Diesel Fire Pump (DFP) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the maintenance work performed on the diesel fire pump (DFP). This included observation of the work activities, review of the completed DFP troubleshooting work order, and monitoring the duration of the LCO governed work activities.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee had first noted a momentary low lube oil pressure alarm ("locked in" on control room annunciators and momentarily on the local panel) when starting the DFP on March 4, 1996. After several failed attempts to fix the momentary alarm, this problem was added to the "OPERATIONS CONCERN LIST" on May 6, 1996. Based on discussions with the vender, on July 25, 1996, DFP maintenance work order FPS-12611140, "The trouble alarm comes in on some pump starts," was performed to check that the wiring connections for tightness and continuity. In order to spend less time working in an LCO clock, a pre-job briefing was held the day before the work was planned to be accomplished. The majority of personnel who were involved in the work participated in the briefing.

The inspector noted that this was the first time that the licensee had published a detailed schedule to make the most effective use of activities while working in a LCO clock. This schedule organized and planned work activities for an 8-hour period (time-line) of the 24-hour LCO clock. The elements in the time-line were tagging the DFP, system engineers final briefing of the repair workers, physical troubleshooting, contingency plan, paper closeout, untagging, and testing the DFP. The DFP was declared operable after 7 hours of work activities.

Some loose screws were found on the wiring-terminal strip for the oil-pressure switch and speed-sensor assembly. These screws were tightened; however, when the DFP was tested, the trouble alarm still momentarily annunciated. Tightening the screws had no effect on the momentary alarm. Further trouble-shooting will be performed at a later date. While, the DFP trouble alarm still momentarily annunciated when starting the DFP and will require more troubleshooting to resolve, the licensee determined that this did not affect the operability of the system.

M1.4 Reactor Depressurization System LCO Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed the maintenance activities associated with troubleshooting and replacing a degraded battery cell in the reactor depressurization system (RDS).

b. Observations and Findings

While taking weekly pilot-cell readings on July 1, 1996, a plant mechanic identified a low voltage condition on the RDS "D" pilot cell. Further investigation revealed that cell no. 41 was reading 14.27 Vdc versus a normal reading of 6.39 Vdc. The mechanic immediately reported the discrepancy and initiated condition report (CR) C-BRP-96-628 to document this anomaly. The RDS "D" battery was declared inoperable and a 7-day LCO was entered per TS 11.4.5.3(b) at 9:10 a.m. The licensee prepared and replaced the battery, containing cell no. 41, without incident under WO 12611266, "Replace Battery." The work was accomplished expeditiously per procedure MEPS-11, "Single Cell Replacement of Station Batteries." The total battery is composed of a bank of

individual batteries (each consisting of three cells) connected in series to attain 125 Vdc.

The inspector observed that the mechanic had difficulty removing the degraded battery containing the faulty cell. There were no projections on the battery case to provide a secure grip and the mechanic had to assume a very awkward position in order to lift the battery. Even with another mechanic attempting to help, by pushing up on the bottom of the case, the mechanic was at risk of dropping the battery onto other cells and/or personal injury.

Post-installation testing was delayed because the self-contained batteries in the only approved test gear on site were not charged enough to perform the cell-to-connector resistance readings, even though the test gear was placed on charge when the degraded RDS battery was discovered. The licensee declared the RDS "D" battery operational and exited the LCO at 2:15, July 2, 1996, after a successful post-maintenance test was completed.

This was the second RDS battery cell to be replaced in a short period of time. RDS "C," cell 43, had to be replaced on April 9, 1996. The RDS batteries were installed in the late 1980s and have an expected 20-year life. The inspectors evaluation of the battery failures is an inspection followup item (50-155/96005-02).

M1.5 Radiation Monitor Power Supply LCO Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors held discussion with licensee management and reviewed the TS requirements related to five radiation area monitors being out-of-service with no on-going maintenance activities being performed to return them to service.

b. Observations and Findings

At 2:20 p.m., on July 24, 1996, due to a broken wire in the power supply, high voltage was lost to five radiation monitors (new fuel storage area, control rod drive room, condensate demineralizer entrance, access to turbine deck, and control room). The monitors were logged out of service and instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians repaired the broken wire. The licensee instituted compensatory measures and did not hold the mechanics over to complete calibrating the instruments. The repair procedure required the monitors to be calibrated before being returned to service. The following morning, the inspectors found that all I&C personnel were in training and that the monitors had not yet been returned to service.

Management was informed at the morning meeting that "the LCO clock was running" on these monitors and that repair personnel were in training until noon. After management had accepted these conditions, the inspector questioned why the work wasn't being progressed under the licensee's LCO work policy. Additionally, the maintenance department was not aware that this was considered LCO work. The inspector reviewed the TS and ascertained (concurrently with the licensee) that this equipment is TS related with required compensatory measures but did not have an LCO time.

TS 6.4.2a states in part that, "The area monitors described above shall normally be in operation; however, individual monitors may be taken out of service for maintenance and repairs. Adequate spare parts shall be on hand to allow necessary repairs to be made promptly. During monitor outages temporary monitoring shall be provided." The licensee provided extra monitoring for the new fuel storage area and the control room. On two of the monitors, operators were required to perform hourly readings with an equivalent radiation meter and to record the readings in the station log.

On July 25, 1996, after their training was over, I&C personnel calibrated the five monitors and returned them to service at 4:05 p.m. Even though the broken wire was quickly replaced, calibration was delayed, resulting in an unnecessary increase in the out-of-service and compensatory-measures time.

M1.6 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance

The inspectors observed good procedure adherence practices. The inspectors concluded that walking down work activities and implementing a 13-week rolling schedule was a positive initiative to improve the planning and scheduling process.

During this inspection period, licensee performance in LCO maintenance varied. In the DFP planned-LCO maintenance, the work was planned in detail, communicated to the participants, coordinated fully, and worked to completion within the scheduled time line.

However, performance during emergent-LCO maintenance was mixed. During the RDS emergent work, the licensee recognized the discrepant condition quickly, communicated the requirements to the workers, coordinated actions to replace the bad battery, and worked continuously to completion as much as possible. However, in the radiation monitors emergent-declared-LCO maintenance, the LCO status was not understood well by management, the requirements were not communicated to the workers, the work was not coordinated between operations and maintenance, and it was not worked continuously to completion. After the inspector questioned the status of this work as LCO maintenance, a review of TS revealed that there was no LCO time line for the radiation monitors. However, the TS did require that the any repairs be completed promptly. The inspectors concluded that planned or emergent-planned LCO activities met management's expectation of working continuously to completion; however, a declared-emergent LCO was not communicated well nor worked in accordance with the licensee's LCO policy.

M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Assessment of Plant Material Condition

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted extensive tours of the plant, both independently and with plant personnel, to assess the plants material condition. In addition to the observations made during these tours, the inspector reviewed the licensee's backlog of non-outage and outage work requests, and reviewed the "System Engineering Quarterly Report," issued on May 15, 1996. The inspectors assessment of the "System Engineering Quarterly Report" will be discussed later in this report (see section E1.2).

b. Observations and Findings

During tours of the plant, the inspector noted the following observations:

- Both reactor feedwater pumps had a heavy accumulation of dirt and grime on the motor cooling-air intakes. Additionally, oil leaks were present on both pumps and the pumps were covered with a light to medium film of oil and grime.

- The cable penetration area inside the sphere contained a jumbled mass of wiring. In a follow-on discussion, the safety and licensing director informed the inspector that, although the functionality of the cabling was not a concern, age-related degradation of the cable sheathing had been a problem in the past.

- Both fuel-pool-cooling pumps were in need of preservation; both pump's casings showed signs of moderate to heavy corrosion and had oil and water accumulated on the bedplates.

- Two portable fans were providing auxiliary cooling to the squib firing valves for the poison tank. The operators were required to verify that these two fans were running as part of their shift rounds. These fans have been in place for several years and represent a operator workaround; however, the licensee does not have this condition identified as a workaround. Operator workarounds were discussed in section O2.1 of this report.

- One station air compressor, HSAC No. 3, has a portable fan providing additional cooling to the motor. This was a repeat finding of a previously identified operator workaround (IR 50-155/95011, Section 3.2).

- Valve VPI-19, "core spray system tie valve," had a leak-off line which was open-ended and had water dripping onto the floor.

- Both heating/cooling pumps located within the sphere had oil leaks.

- Valve VC-10 had heavy stem corrosion in the area of the packing retainer.

- The emergency diesel generator had several oil leaks which were dripping onto the floor.

- The H_2 seal oil skid had oil pooled behind the oil filter assembly.

The inspector noted that in the containment sphere, major pieces of equipment that were either contaminated or located within high radiation areas, were adequately being controlled.

c. Conclusion

The inspector observed numerous material condition and/or housekeeping issues that were discussed with licensee management. While none of the issues identified affected operability of equipment, the licensee concurred with the inspector's observations and plans to initiate the appropriate corrective actions.

M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance

M4.1 Daily use of PRA Information

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's use of available probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information in daily plant activities.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector met with a senior technical analyst to discuss the licensee's use of PRA information in the planning and scheduling of daily plant activities. The licensee had developed an on-line PRA assessment program; the "At Power Risk Profile." This program allows the licensee to determine changes in core damage frequency (CDF) based on proposed maintenance and surveillance activities for those components identified as risk significant in the licensee's individual plant examination (IPE). The program also included several enhancements. For example:

- The program was written at the component level and not the system level.

- The program included surveillance activities thereby automatically accounting for system unavailability during surveillance periods.

- The program automatically provides a prompt that identifies the technical specification (TS) requirements associated with the component being removed from service. Additionally, the program will automatically flag any proposed plant configuration which would cause the licensee to violate TS requirements for system availability.

- The program automatically provides a prompt that identifies the level of management review required for the proposed maintenance and/or surveillance activities.

- Component unavailability could be defined in minutes, hours, days or months.

In addition, the "At Power Risk Profile" program was capable of calculating new CDFs for the proposed plant configuration and new initiating event contributions to CDF based on the proposed plant configuration.

Through discussion with various operators, the inspector learned that the operators were not familiar with the programs capabilities. The inspector discussed this with the licensee and learned that the "At Power Risk Profile" was relatively new and that the operators would be receiving training on the capabilities of the program in the future.

c. Conclusions

The inspector considered the licensee's "At Power Risk Profile" program to be a good tool for planning and scheduling plant activities. The inspector also considered that training operators on this program would add value for the real-time-safe operation of the plant.

M4.2 Review of the Licensee's Policy Regarding On-line Maintenance

a. Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's policy governing on-line maintenance activities.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee's policy used to control the conduct of on-line maintenance appeared to address important regulatory concerns. For example:

- Maintenance Rule requirements were addressed and incorporated into the planning process.

- Entry into a limiting condition for operation (LCO) action statement solely for the purpose of performing preventative maintenance activities was minimized. If no corrective maintenance was needed but system engineering analysis supported the need for preventive maintenance, then the work may be done.

Additionally, the inspector noted that the licensee placed limits on the duration of the planned maintenance activities to no more than 50 percent of the allowed outage time. This could be increased to 75 percent of the allowed outage time in special cases where demonstrated need was shown, but only in those instances where the existing or potential plant configuration would not pose a greater risk.

c. Conclusions

The inspector considered the licensee's approach to on-line maintenance to be appropriately analyzed and controlled.

III. Engineering

E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) for Use of a Low Temperature Reading for Heat Balance Calculations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors attended a CARB meeting and evaluated the licensee's determination of the condition report (CR) for safety consequences, resources assigned, and the length of time assigned for completion of evaluations. The inspectors also evaluated the immediate corrective actions and compensatory measures assigned for performing heat balance calculations (C-BRP-96-690) with a clean-up system inlet temperature that read low.

b. Observations and Findings

On July 24, 1996, the inspectors monitored a discussion as to why a low temperature value used for heat balance calculations resulted in a non-conservative error of 0.15 Megawatt thermal (MWt). A Mwt allowance was already incorporated in the power release rate; therefore, the 0.15 MWt error did not exceed any licensing limits.

The licensee's investigation had revealed that the clean-up system inlet temperature element was faulty and was reading 10°F low. The licensee's discussion at the CARB meeting revealed that this temperature element -- located in the reactor recirculation pump room, a very high-radiation area with the reactor critical -- could not be worked on for ALARA reasons. The I&C technicians had previously verified that all other components in the temperature loop were operational. The temperature element was within allowable calibration but was reading 10°F low. Further work would be delayed until a forced outage or the 1997-refueling outage. The CARB concluded that continued use of the low temperature value for heat balance calculations was acceptable. The inspectors then questioned the continued use of the low reading since a non-conservative heat balance calculation resulted -- a poor practice for the operators. The licensee then decided to use steam pressure converted to temperature for the data point for the heat balance, a conservative practice. At the report exit on August 1, 1996, the operations manager (who was not at the CARB meeting) concurred with this conclusion.

c. Conclusions

The inspector concluded that the first decision reached by the CARB to continue to use a low temperature value for heat balance calculations did not demonstrate a conservative operating philosophy to the plant operators.

E1.2 System Engineering Quarterly Reports

a. Scope

The inspector reviewed the "System Engineering Quarterly Reports" to determine engineering's assessment of plant material condition and system availability.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector reviewed the first issue of the "System Engineering Quarterly Reports," issued May 15, 1996. The inspector concluded that, in general, the write-up for each system was reasonably comprehensive and provided some assessment of the material and operational condition of the system discussed. However, the quality of the assessment varied between the system engineers and there appeared to be a need for management to establish clearer expectations as to what goes into the report; particularly in the area of system assessment. For example, in this particular report, system performance was assessed only against past performance. If the number of condition reports written on the system had not changed or the number of work requests had not increased, the system's performance and condition were assessed as acceptable. The benchmarks used to assess system performance were not clear to the inspector. The inspector discussed this issue with the system and project engineering manager.

Even though, the system engineering concept had only been recently introduced at Big Rock Point, significant work has occurred to identify and to clearly establish management's expectation for the responsibilities of the individual system engineers.

c. Conclusion

The inspector concluded that the introduction of the system engineering quarterly reports was a positive initiative; however, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these reports.

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment

E2.1 Trending of Plant Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope (40500)

The inspectors attended a meeting in which plant performance indicator trends (generated by the engineering staff) were discussed. The inspector observed adjustments to scales, criteria, and goals for some of the plant performance indicators.

b. Observations and Findings

In the past, plant performance indicators were obtained from department reports, reports to the NRC, and reports to industry. The licensee had combined all of the indicators into one book and this book provided management with a convenient forum in which to review and hold group discussions on all

of the plant performance indicators. Each of the indicators was presented in a similar format, using similar graphs. Since the information was now in one book, management stated that it was easier to get the total "big picture" of the plant's overall performance.

The inspector observed that the review of each performance indicator generated changes in the criteria and graphs, such that the information could be better understood and the criteria for the graph was clear. This was the management team's first group review of these indicators.

c. Conclusions

All of the plant performance indicators are presented in one book which is reviewed monthly by management. This review should be useful in allowing management to direct plant resources where needed.

IV. Plant Support

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R1.1 General Comments

Using Inspection Procedure 71750, the inspectors made frequent tours of the radiologically protected area (RPA) and discussed specific radiological controls with the ALARA coordinator and various radiological protection (RP) technicians. The inspectors observed plant conditions and licensee performance including radiation protection practices including the compensatory measures for the loss of radiation monitors discussed in Section M1.5.

Within the containment sphere, most major pieces of equipment were either contaminated or located within high radiation areas. However, during tours with the operators, the inspector noted that this did not impact the operator's ability to conduct rounds. The only area which required the operators to don any type of protective clothing was the control-rod-drive pump-room. The room was contaminated during the plant hydrostatic-pressure test following the last refueling outage. The licensee had made several unsuccessful efforts to decontaminate the room. The licensee plans to take appropriate corrective actions to eliminate the contamination in the room. The licensee agreed with the inspector's observations and plans to review this matter further.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee was following good ALARA and radiation protection practices.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

After the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on August 1, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The licensee did not identify any of the documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors as proprietary.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

P. Donnelly, Plant Manager
R. Addy, Assistant Plant Manager
S. Beachum, Systems and Project Engineering Manager
E. Bogue, Plant Training Manager
G. Boss, Operations Manager
D. Hice, Maintenance Manager
K. Pallagi, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager
G. Withrow, Plant Safety and Licensing Director

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551:	Engineering
IP 40500:	Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems
IP 61726:	Surveillance Observations
IP 62703:	Maintenance Observation
IP 71707:	Plant Operations
IP 71750:	Plant Support Activities
IP 83750:	Occupational Exposure
IP 92902:	Followup - Engineering
IP 92903:	Followup - Maintenance

ITEMS OPENED and CLOSED

Opened

155/96005-01	IFI	Installed Portable Fans
155/96005-02	IFI	Degraded RDS Battery

Closed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
CARB	Corrective Action Review Board
CDF	Core Damage Frequency
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DFP	Diesel Fire Pump
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
FPS	Fire Protection System
I&C	Instrumentation and Control
IFI	Inspection Followup Item
IP	Inspection Procedure
IPE	Individual Plant Evaluation
IPTE	Infrequently Performed Test and Evolution
IR	Inspection Report
LCO	Limiting Condition for Operation
MWt	Mega-Watt Thermal
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RDS	Reactor Depressurization System
RP	Radiation Protection
RPA	Radiologically Protected Area
TS	Technical Specification
Vdc	Volts Direct Current
VIO	Violation
VC	Valve Condensate
VPI	Valve Post Incident
WO	Work Order
WRM	Wide Range Monitor