

October 16, 1996

SECY 96-219

For: The Commissioners
From: James L. Blaha, Assistant for Operations, Office of the EDO
Subject: WEEKLY INFORMATION REPORT - WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 11, 1996

Contents

Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Nuclear Regulatory Research
Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
General Counsel
Administration
Information Resources Management
Controller
Personnel
Small Business & Civil Rights
Enforcement
State Programs
Public Affairs
International Programs
Office of the Secretary
Region I
Region II
Region III
Region IV
Executive Director for Operations
Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

A
B
C*
D
E*
F
G*
H*
I
J*
K*
L*
M
N
O*
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*No input this week.

Original signed by
James L. Blaha

James L. Blaha
Assistant for Operations, OEDO

Contact:
E. Hackett, OEDO
415-1733

Document Name: C:\WEEK011.

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Regulatory Rept. of
Weekly Events

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

INFORMATION REPORT

October 16, 1996

SECY 96-219

For: The Commissioners
From: James L. Blaha, Assistant for Operations, Office of the EDO
Subject: WEEKLY INFORMATION REPORT - WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 11, 1996


Contents

Enclosure

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Office of the Secretary
Region I
Region II
Region III
Region IV
Executive Director for Operations
Congressional Affairs

A
B
C*
D
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Assistant for Operations, OEDO

Contact:
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Users Council Meeting

The "AT&T Round Cell Nuclear Utility Users Council" held a meeting on September 23, 1996, just prior to the Sub-Committee (SC) 29 meeting to discuss the status of their ongoing work. The main focus of the meeting was to finalize a proposal to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) SC 29 to slightly modify IEEE 450 and IEEE 485 and to get SC 29's agreement that these Standards are applicable to the round cells. Updating the continuing activities on the AT&T round cell batteries, Lucent Technologies restated its decision to discontinue the manufacture of the High Specific Gravity Round Cell Batteries and the marketing of all power products to nuclear utilities. They are continuing to provide support to the plants that have round cells and in that regard are exploring the possibility of converting the high specific gravity cells to low specific gravity by changing the electrolyte.

Kewaunee Nuclear Power Station - Steam Generator Tube Inspection Results

Kewaunee has a high percentage of tubes with Westinghouse hybrid expansion joint sleeves. These sleeves were installed to bridge degradation in the tube sheet crevice and top of the tube sheet region. In recent outages indications have been observed in the parent tube at the upper sleeve joint. This was confirmed by tube pulls to be stress corrosion cracking in the parent tube. Wisconsin Public Service Corporation recently was granted an amendment to allow sleeved tubes with cracks to remain in service provided that the cracks could be demonstrated by a specific eddy current inspection technique to be outside the pressure boundary. The licensee was anticipating being able to recover a large percentage of sleeved tubes that were previously plugged.

During the current refueling outage inspection, the licensee has identified indications in an unexpectedly high number of sleeved tubes that did not have indications in the previous outage inspection. In addition, the licensee has found that only about 20-percent of these sleeved tubes can be left in service based upon demonstrating that the indications are outside the pressure boundary.

Currently, Kewaunee has approximately 20-percent of the tubes in the steam generators plugged. Based on the results of ongoing inspections, the licensee has projected that an additional 20 to 30-percent of the tubes would need to be plugged. The licensee has proposed to repair defective sleeved tubes by installing a laser weld in the center of the sleeve upper hardroll joint. A TS amendment for this type of repair was sent to the NRC in early September as a backup repair technique. The staff is beginning its review of this amendment and a meeting with the licensee was held on Thursday, October 10.

A related concern of the licensee is the present unavailability of the Westinghouse laser weld equipment. Assuming the staff approves the proposed

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE A

laser weld repair, the licensee projects a minimum one month delay in its startup because the equipment to perform these repairs is committed to other plants for installation of Westinghouse laser welded sleeves.

Braidwood Unit 1 Proposed Deletion of the Braidwood 1 SG Mid-Cycle Inspection

The staff concluded on September 30, 1996, after an initial review of the ComEd's September 24, 1996, response to the RAI issued on September 9, 1996, that it would not be able to reach a decision on ComEd's August 2, 1996, proposal to delete the Braidwood 1 mid-cycle steam generator tube inspection prior to the presently scheduled date of October 11, 1996. A letter stating this was issued on October 3, 1996, that included a list of five items identified to date requiring further clarification and/or justification. The staff then met with ComEd on October 4, 1996, to discuss these five items as well as other changes in the licensee's Braidwood 1 cycle length assessment. At this meeting, the staff reiterated its position that it would need several weeks to complete its review of the extensive ComEd responses to the September 9, 1996, RAI and recent changes in the analysis methodology. The staff anticipates sending another RAI to the licensee. The staff stated in the meeting that this RAI would be issued in several weeks. ComEd is planning to request NRC to continue reviewing their submittal because of its applicability to Byron Unit 1's mid-cycle inspection.

Accordingly, ComEd will conduct the pending Braidwood 1 mid-cycle SG inspection as scheduled.

Byron Unit 1 Proposed Deletion of the Byron 1 SG Mid-Cycle Inspection

At the October 4, 1996, meeting on Braidwood 1 discussed above, ComEd informed the staff that it would be submitting a proposal, by October 18, 1996, to delete the Byron 1 SG mid-cycle inspection. By current commitments, the inspection must be conducted after 448 days of operation at T_{hot} over 500°F. Assuming no extensive unplanned outages, the inspection outage would begin in September 1997. The Byron 1 SGs are scheduled to be replaced in February 1998. As in the case for Braidwood 1, the Byron 1 SG inspection is to determine whether there are circumferential indications at the top of the tubesheet in the roll transition zone.

ComEd stated that the proposal will be based on the same methodology which is presently under review for Braidwood 1. If this proposal is approved by the staff, it would permit operation for about 600 days at a T_{hot} over 500°F, until February 1998.

ComEd stated that it would request a decision by the staff by November 15, 1996, but no later than November 30, 1996. Unit 2 is presently scheduled for a refueling outage in the fall of 1997, so conducting the mid-cycle inspection in September 1997 would result in a dual unit outage. If the staff denies the licensee's request for an extension to the operating period, ComEd indicated that it intends to conduct a spring 1997 Byron 1 mid-cycle SG inspection. In such a case, ComEd needs to plan by December 1996, its mobilization of the work force to conduct the spring 1997 Byron 1 SG inspection as well as conduct

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE A

preliminary work in advance of the Byron 1 SG replacement schedule for February 1993.

Oconee Nuclear Station - Steam Leak with Injuries - Update

On September 24, 1996, Unit 2 was being restarted at approximately 60 percent power when a rupture occurred in the No. 2 Moisture Separator Reheater drain line to the feedheaters. As part of the startup evolution, the drain system was being manually shifted from discharge to the main condenser to discharge to the feedwater system when a large water hammer was generated. The reactor was immediately tripped by the control room operators. The main turbine subsequently tripped automatically. Seven personnel in the area were injured by the steam, four were taken to the Columbia-Augusta Regional Medical Center (Burn Center) in Augusta, Georgia. They remain in critical but stable condition. Three others were admitted to local hospitals and have been released. An NRC Augmented Inspection Team investigation of the event found that the pipe rupture was caused by a large water hammer that was generated as manual gate valves in the drain path were being opened. The root cause was found to be a lack of sensitivity to previous water hammer events in the same piping and failure to correct the cause of these problems. Units 1 and 3 are now shut down to allow evaluation of similar piping. Region II and NRR continue to closely monitor activities related to the problems. Units 1 and 2 are expected to be shut down for approximately five weeks and Unit 3 will enter its previously-scheduled refueling outage.

Braidwood Units 1 and 2 - Braidwood Spent Fuel Pool Boraflex Degradation

On October 3, 1996, the NRC held a conference call with ComEd regarding LER (96-01) on the status of Boraflex degradation in the Braidwood spent fuel pool (SFP). In the LER, the licensee reported that based on recent blackness tests, the data shows gaps greater than four inches in the Boraflex panels. A gap of greater than four inches in any Boraflex panel exceeds that assumed in the current criticality analysis. As a result, the licensee is not in compliance with its design basis. In addition, Braidwood can not be certain that the requirements of Technical Specification 5.6.1.1 can be met. This TS requires that K_{eff} be less than or equal to 0.95 with unborated water. ComEd had also declared the racks inoperable because the racks were in an "indeterminate" state of operability according to GL 91-18. Section 5.0 of the Braidwood TS is the Design Features section and does not have any action statements associated with the TS.

The NRR and R-III staffs discussed the operability of the fuel racks with the licensee and requested that the licensee provide their plan for restoring compliance with their TS and their long-term corrective actions. In the interim, the licensee has taken compensatory actions to administratively maintain the fuel pool soluble boron concentration above 1000 ppm which they have evaluated to be adequate to maintain K_{eff} below 0.95 with no credit being taken for any Boraflex. The safety impact of this condition appears to be minimal; however, because of the generic nature of this issue (GL 96-04) and the licensee's noncompliance with its TS, the licensee was asked to expand their compensatory measures, develop a short-term plan to comply with their

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE A

TSs and to prepare long-term corrective actions similar to those suggested in GL 96-04 in a timely fashion.

After the call, the licensee informed the NRC that they will be requesting a temporary TS change to allow credit for soluble boron to allow adequate time for the licensee to establish a permanent solution. The staff will be holding additional discussions with the licensee to review the adequacy of licensee's compensatory actions and long-term corrective actions.

This event also affects Byron Station and any solution developed by Braidwood will be also adopted at Byron.

Dresden Units 2 and 3 - Reactor Water Cleanup Systems Isolation

On October 8, 1996, while researching Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system design basis documentation, the licensee identified a potential discrepancy between the actual pressure drop value for pressure control valve (PCV) PCV2 1217 and the value listed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Valve PCV2 1217 is the Unit 2 pressure regulating valve between the high pressure and low pressure piping sections of the RWCU system. The UFSAR states that the pressure drop value for valve PCV2 1217 is 950 psid. The licensee has determined that the value is less than the 950 psid described in the UFSAR. The concern with the pressure drop value being less than 950 psid is that if the valve fails in the full open position concurrent with the failure of the single high pressure RWCU isolation switch, the low pressure piping has the potential to be over pressurized. The licensee is still investigating to determine the actual pressure drop value of the valve in its current configuration.

As a result of identifying the UFSAR design basis discrepancy on October 8, 1996, the licensee isolated the RWCU systems for both units. The Dresden site engineering staff is working to resolve the RWCU design deficiency. The licensee has performed a temporary alternation of the RWCU systems. PCV2 and PCV3 valves have been isolated and the RWCU systems are operating on the bypass valves. The bypass valves have been throttled such that the pressure drop across the valve prevents over pressurization of the low pressure piping in the RWCU system. The licensee has restarted the RWCU systems in both units. Unit 2 remains at 98% power and Unit 3 is currently at 81% power in coast down for a refueling outage in March 1997. Region III and NRR Projects are following the licensee's handling of this event.

LaSalle Units 1 and 2 - Part 21 on Anchor Darling AOVs

On September 28, 1996, the licensee reported that 38 primary containment isolation valves at LaSalle were potentially inoperable because incorrect effective diaphragm area values were used to calculate the bench set and supply air set points. The valves affected are air operated valves manufactured by the Anchor Darling Valve Company. On October 7, 1996, Commonwealth Edison submitted a Part 21 report of this deficiency. The report stated that the affected valve assemblies may not provide adequate system isolation under designed accident conditions. The licensee is awaiting the vendor's final testing report to determine if the valves would have performed

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE A

under accident conditions. Both units at LaSalle are currently shutdown. All affected valves will be evaluated and necessary design changes will be made prior to restarting either unit. The Part 21 report listed 32 other plants that use AOVs with similar actuators in various systems. The NRC is evaluating the generic implications of this report.

Zion Units 1 and 2

A management meeting was held in Region III on October 7, 1996, to discuss the personnel errors that have occurred since the start of the Unit 2 refueling outage in mid-September. They included Technical Specifications (TS) issues, such as a control rod withdrawal while rod position deviation was greater than allowed by Technical Specifications, an inadvertent LCO entry when a manual isolation valve was opened to return an atmospheric relief valve to service, and the failure to perform, on 6 different occasions, the TS required verification of the availability of offsite power sources every 8 hours, when an EDG is inoperable. In addition, improper configuration control resulted in the second occurrence of an isolated residual heat removal flow transmitter, spraying of 3,000 gallons of demineralized water inside the containment, inadvertent transfer of 500 gallons from the refueling water storage tank to the fuel transfer canal, cross connecting the demineralized water system to the service air system, exceeding the administrative limit for hydrogen concentration in the volume control tank, and isolating instrument air to the unit 2 containment. There were also incidents of workers unknowingly working in an energized cabinet, damage to the polar crane control box and improper component manipulation and disassembly by an equipment attendant.

In addition, in the last couple of days, there was an isolation of the penetration pressurization compressor on the wrong unit due to an incorrect drawing and a failure to isolate the proper air supply to two residual heat removal valves.

On October 8, 1996, the Zion Site Vice President, John Mueller, notified the resident staff that he would be announcing a site work stoppage, including both the operating unit and the unit in a refueling outage. The reasons for this action included: recent wrong unit errors and lack of focus of site supervisors on ongoing work. The duration of the work stoppage is not known at this time.

Proposed actions to be taken during the work stoppage include: determining current work status; reviewing and resetting work schedules for both units; determining what will be required to have active supervision in the control room, i.e., free supervisors from paperwork and computer terminals; reviewing all work packages for the next 5 days with the work force until they clearly understand the work involved; moving the work analysts to the maintenance department under the shop masters; re-verifying all engineering special tests, such as leak rates; and ensuring that all foremen clearly understand Zion's work rules.

The residents will closely monitor the stop work actions.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE A

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

On Wednesday October 2, 1996, the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board (EQB) met and unanimously adopted 2 resolutions regarding Prairie Island dry cask storage. The EQB was tasked with reviewing and certifying Northern State Power's (NSP's) application for an offsite ISFSI to store Prairie Island's spent fuel in dry casks. NSP was required by the state of Minnesota to proceed with building a specified number of alternative energy sources facilities and making a good faith effort of designing and submitting a license application for an alternate ISFSI site in Goodhue County, but off of the Prairie Island site. Application for a license for the offsite ISFSI was tied with state approval for loading of future casks onsite at Prairie Island.

The first resolution passed by the EQB denied NSP's application for state certification of the alternate ISFSI site in Florence Township. The EQB determined that there were no other "comparable" sites in Goodhue County to the present site at Prairie Island because all other sites involve transportation of casks, making any other site inferior to the Prairie Island site. Also, the resolution formally requests NSP to withdraw it's NRC license application for the alternate site. It also authorizes the EQB to intervene in NRC licensing proceedings and will request that the NRC suspend or terminate it's review of the NSP license application.

The second resolution passed by the EQB certified compliance with the state law. This resolution confirmed that NSP has followed the state mandates regarding alternative sources of energy production and that NSP has made a good faith effort in developing the alternate ISFSI. This resolution allows NSP to load casks 6 through 9; they were formerly limited to loading only 5 casks by the state law.

At this time, NSP does not plan to withdraw their application for a license for the offsite ISFSI from the NRC because of potential legal challenges to the EQB decision by the local Dakota Tribe.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE A

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Radioactive Material Found at Herman Strauss Industries Scrap Yard

On October 4, 1996, Herman Strauss Industries, a scrap yard located in Wheeling, West Virginia, informed Region II that a load of scrap had set off a radiation alarm. The material was separated and two pieces were identified as radioactive. Initial measurements made by Herman Strauss were on the order of 200 mR/hr at 2-3 feet. The sources were then wrapped in an eighth inch sheet of lead and covered in a metal bucket. The sources were later placed in a locked room and the door was posted with radioactive material caution signs. These sources were originally thought to be medical brachytherapy sources, but upon further investigation it appears they may be part of industrial sources. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a representative onsite and is the on-scene coordinator. A Region II inspector also responded to the scene. The Herman Strauss representatives believe that the sources came in through a walk-in disposal area of the yard. The EPA has determined that the facility should pay the cost for disposal of the sources and is negotiating with Herman Strauss, who does not agree, and has indicated that they intend to contact Senator Byrd regarding the issue. If no agreement is reached, EPA will hire a contractor to take possession of the sources and dispose of them properly. Prior to shipment of the sources, photographs will be taken, the sources will be checked for markings, and more accurate dose rates will be measured to accurately estimate doses for the individuals involved.

Participation in Nuclear Cardiology Symposium

On October 8, 1996, staff from the Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety presented a lecture on the current Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for licensure of cardiologists during a symposium entitled, Contemporary Nuclear Cardiology: Practical Considerations, Interpretation and Case Studies. The symposium was held at the headquarters of the American College of Cardiology located in Bethesda, Maryland.

Meeting with Plateau Resources Limited

On October 10, 1996, staff from the Uranium Recovery Branch met with representatives of Plateau Resources Limited (PRL) to discuss the status of the staff's review of PRL's license renewal application for the resumption of operations at the Shootaring Canyon uranium mill site. The mill, which is located in Garfield County, Utah, has been on standby status since 1982. During the meeting, the staff provided comments on PRL's proposed detailed site reclamation plan and discussed the current schedule for completion of the staff's review of the operational aspects of PRL's application. The current date for the completion of that review is March 1997.

The staff is in the process of documenting its acceptance review comments on the reclamation plan in a letter to PRL, and agreed to provide PRL with a copy of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved mill tailings reclamation plan for PRL's information.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE B

Implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards

On October 3, 1996, a meeting of the Subgroup on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards in the U.S. was held at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Topics of discussion included the status of safeguards on the downblending of the high-enriched uranium from Kazakhstan (Project Sapphire) by Babcock and Wilcox, trilateral discussions with IAEA and Russia on the application of safeguards to excess weapons materials, and IAEA safeguards at DOE facilities.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE B

Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Maine Yankee Independent Safety Assessment

The Maine Yankee Independent Safety Assessment team's final report was issued by the Chairman on October 7, 1996. On October 10, the Team Manager and the Team Leader met publicly with the licensee near the site to discuss the team's findings. The Team Manager and the Team Leader also responded to questions from the public and the media during a meeting held immediately after the meeting with the licensee. A final meeting to brief the Commission is scheduled for October 18, 1996.

Independent Spent Fuel Pool Study

On October 3, 1996, the EDO transmitted to the Commission the AEOD independent spent fuel pool (SFP) study on extended loss of cooling. Overall, the study conclusions are that there are large variations in designs and capabilities of SFP configurations and equipment at individual nuclear plants and loss of inventory or loss of cooling events have been infrequent and of low consequence. The risk assessment indicates that no immediate NRC actions are warranted since SFP events are not a dominant contributor to overall plant risk. However, because human error initiators and operator action required to detect and correct an error are subject to large uncertainties and because of the large variation in design vulnerabilities, further plant-specific actions may be warranted.

Diablo Canyon Exercise

IRD staff members observed the Region IV Site Team respond to a simulated emergency at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant on October 9, 1996. This response is the basis of the annual assessment of the Region's capabilities for incident response required by the AEOD Management Directive on the Incident Response Program.

IAEA Advisory Group Meeting

During the period from October 7-11, 1996, Stuart Rubin, Incident response Division, participated as the Chairman of an Advisory Group Meeting at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The purpose of the meeting was to compile a report of examples of good and ineffective practices in the field of nuclear safety culture. Representatives from France, Hungary, Israel, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, together with technical representatives from IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety participated in the meeting. World-wide plant safety performance evaluation experience, including OSART mission results, were utilized to identify selected notable good practices representative of the safety culture attributes documented in the IAEA Safety Series Report, 74-INSAG-4. Mr. Rubin also presented the results developed in connection with a 1995 IAEA Consultants Meeting on the same subject. Other national presentations addressed human performance improvement

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE D

and evaluations initiatives which have been recently implemented at nuclear power reactor facilities.

Preliminary Notifications (PNs)

- a. PNO-II-96-060A, Florida Power Corp. (Crystal River 3), SHUTDOWN IN EXCESS OF 72 HOURS.
- b. PNO-II-96-065B, Duke Power Company, (OCONEE 2), STEAM LINE BREAK (UPDATE).
- c. PNO-II-96-068, Herman Strauss Industries, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN SCRAP YARD.
- d. PNO-II-96-068A, Herman Strauss Industries, UPDATE ON RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN SCRAP YARD.
- e. PNO-II-96-069, Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah 1 2), SEQUOYAH POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION IN THE SWITCHYARD.
- f. PNO-II-96-070, Florida Power Corp., (Crystal River 3), UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HURRICANE WARNING.
- g. PNO-II-96-070A, Florida Power Corp., TROPICAL STORM JOSEPHINE UPDATE.
- h. PNO-III-96-058B, Illinois Power Co., (Clinton 1), SHUTDOWN TO REPAIR RECIRCULATION PUMP SEAL (SECOND UPDATE).
- i. PNO-IV-96-053, Barnett Industrial X-Ray, Inc., INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY INCIDENT.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE D

Office of Administration
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

NRC-DOE Agreement

NRC has signed an agreement with DOE to provide mutual security services for the protection of classified information that is released to federal contractors, licensees, certificate holders and grant recipients. The agreement is an important step in ensuring that classified information is protected in an effective and efficient manner at facilities where both NRC and DOE have responsibilities, such as the United States Enrichment Corporation's gaseous diffusion plants. The agreement was signed under the National Industrial Security Program, established by a January 1993 Executive Order, to serve as a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security approach for protecting classified information and preserving the country's economic and technological interests. Raymond Brady, Director of Security, and Edward McCallum, Director, Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE, signed the agreement for their respective agencies.

Deliberate Misconduct by Unlicensed Persons (Parts 30, 32, 40, 50, 52, 60, 61, 70, 71, 72, 110, and 150)

A proposed rule that would extend NRC's deliberate misconduct rule to six categories of persons was published in the Federal Register on October 4, 1996 (61 FR 51835). The deliberate misconduct rule placed licensed and unlicensed persons on notice that they may be subject to enforcement action for actions that cause a licensee to be in violation of the Commission's requirements or for deliberately providing incomplete or inaccurate information to the NRC. The certificates of compliance; applicants for, or holders of, early site permits, standard design certifications, or combined licensees for nuclear power plants; applicants for, or holders of, certificates of registration; applicants for, or holders of, quality assurance program approvals; and employees, contractors, subcontractors, and consultants of these categories of persons. The comment period for this action expires December 18, 1996.

Minor Corrections, Clarifying Changes, and a Minor Policy Change (Parts 20, 32, 35, 36, and 39)

A proposed rule that would make a number of minor and clarifying changes to the Commission's standards for protection against radiation was published in the Federal Register on October 7, 1996 (61 FR 52388). The proposed rule would also revise the monitoring criterion for minors and pregnant women to make this provision technically correct and in conformance with other regulatory provisions. The comment period for this action expires December 23, 1996.

Significant FOIA Requests Received during the 5-Day Period of October 04 - October 10, 1996:

Records authored by named individual regarding an inspection of Five Star Products in Fairfield, CT, on August 18-19, 1992. (H. Pickerstein of Trager & Trager; FOIA-96-392)

Records related to the radiation operations under license no. 05-00046-13 for the U.S. Army Garrison, Fitzsimons in Aurora, CO. (M.Glade; Parsons Engineering Science, Inc.; FOIA-96-395)

Eight radiological information reports initiated between 01/03/96 and 04/16/96 re Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (H.G. Brack; Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.; FOIA-96-396)

Records pertaining to determinations made by the Secretary of Energy, pursuant to DOE regulation 10 CFR, Part 810, for United States companies to engage in nuclear activities in the People's Republic of China covering the time frame of 1/1/82 through 7/21/87. (H.Strobel; Research Information Services, Inc.; FOIA-96-398)

Copy of OI report related to investigation at New Britain General Hospital in New Britain, CT. (Individual; FOIA-96-401)

Transcripts of a 3/27/96 pre-decisional enforcement conference between NRC and Florida Power Corporation concerning the Crystal River plant. (Individual; FOIA-96-402)

Records, on behalf of his client, related to work performed at the Bear Creek facility in Oak Ridge, TN by any of seven named companies. (G.Waites of O'Donoghue & O'Donoghue; FOIA-96-403)

Copy of releasable documents regarding Neutron Products, Inc., located in Dickerson, MD. (K.Cutlip; WJLA-TV; FOIA-96-404)

Travel records for the Commission from May 1995 until October 1, 1996. (K.Hart; McGraw-Hill; FOIA-96-406)

Copy of SECY Paper, SECY-95-154, which concerns recommendations of the NRC National Performance Review Steering Committee. (T.Ortciger; IL Dept. of Nuclear Safety; FOIA-96-407)

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE F

Office of Personnel
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

NRC Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) Kickoff Held

On October 10, 1996, NRC held its 1996 CFC Kickoff in the OWFN Commissioners' Conference Room. The kickoff featured opening remarks by Chairman Jackson, presentation of awards for last year's CFC campaign, remarks by Charleen Raddatz representing the Mid-Atlantic Burn Camp Fund, and performance of the macarena dance by the White Flint Country Day Children's Dance Troupe.

Executive Forum for Senior Executives Held

On October 9, 1996, the Organizational Development and Training Staff sponsored the Third Executive Forum for members of the Senior Executive Service. The two half-day presentations featured Dr. Robert Gurland, Professor of Philosophy at New York University and visiting faculty member to the OPM Management Development Centers. Dr. Gurland focused on ethical decision-making, and concepts of "professional responsibility" and accountability.

Leadership Seminar Held for Executives, Managers, Supervisors, and Technical Professionals

On October 10, 1996, the Organizational Development and Training Staff sponsored its fourth Leadership Seminar for executives, managers, supervisors, and technical professionals. The three-and-a-half-hour session was broadcast via interactive satellite to NRC and featured Dr. Joseph M. Juran, a world-leading expert on the history and practice of quality. Dr. Juran drew from a lifetime of experience to explore the origins of quality, current activities in the American "quality movement," and how organizations and government agencies are implementing quality programs.

Arrivals

BEARDSLEE, Cheryl	MATERIALS ENGINEER (PFT)	NRR
BILLINGS, Danny	RESIDENT INSPECTOR (PFT)	RII
DICKSON, Billy	REACTOR ENGINEER (PFT)	RIII
ELLIS, James	REACTOR ENGINEER (PFT)	RIII
KROHN, Paul	REACTOR ENGINEER (PFT)	RIII
SHEEHAN, Neil	PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER (PFT)	RI
TAYLOR, Donald	OPERATIONS ENGINEER (PFT)	NRR

Departures

FRYE, Edward	SUMMER HIRE (OPFT)	RII
OWENS, Loralee	CLERK (OPFT)	SECY

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE I

Office of Public Affairs
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Media Interest

OPA received a large number of calls from the media regarding NRC's reaction to the Public Citizen report, "Nuclear Lemons," which alleges that NRC allows unsafe reactors to operate.

School Program

Phil Justus, NMSS, was a technical chaperone on a Robert Frost M.S. field trip aboard a sailboat on the Severn River. He also helped to curate rock and mineral collections and sorted earth science lab materials.

Press Releases

Headquarters:

- 96-133 Independent Safety Assessment of Maine Yankee Rates Operations Adequate with Significant Weaknesses and Deficiencies
- 96-134 NRC and DOE Sign Agreement on Services for Protection of Classified Information
- 96-135 Note to Editors - ACRS Meeting
- 96-136 NRC Names Dr. George M. Hornberger to Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste
- 96-137 NRC Requests Information From all Licensees on Maintaining Plant Design
- 96-138 NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste to Meet October 22-23 in Rockville, MD
- 96-139 Note To Editors: Letters to NU regarding Haddam Neck and Millstone
- 96-140 NRC to Hold Workshop in Rockville, MD, on License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants

Regions:

- I-96-67 NRC to Discuss Apparent Violations at Haddam Neck Nuclear Plant
- II-96-83 NRC Staff to Hold Public Meeting October 8 at Oconee to Discuss Inspection Findings on September 24 Event

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE M

II-96-84

NRC Postpones Two Meetings Scheduled for Wednesday,
October 9, at Florida Power Corporation's Crystal River Plant

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE M

Office of International Programs
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

IAEA Vacancy Notices

The following notice from the International Atomic Energy Agency has been posted on NRC bulletin boards:

P-3	Safeguards Data Evaluator Safeguards	96/072
P-5	Section Head Research and Isotopes	96/073
P-4	Documentation Specialist Safeguards	96/074
D-1	Director Nuclear Energy	96/075

Foreign Visitors

Canada:

On October 8, 1996, Canadian officials from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS) of the Atomic Energy Control Board met with staff and senior management in IP, NRR and RES to obtain information related to a study of the lifetime management of nuclear power plants (aging, backfitting, including the related matters of in-service inspection and testing). They also met on October 9 and 10 for discussions with the ACRS.

United Kingdom:

On October 7, 1996, Deputy Director-General David Eves and Head of the Chemicals and Hazardous Installation Division Dr. Paul Davies, of the British Health and Safety Executive met with Chairman Jackson. The main focus of their visit was to discuss new initiatives here in the U.S. nuclear energy sector and the changing situation in Europe as a result of European Union directives for high hazard industries.

On October 8, 1996, Chairman Sir Kenneth Eaton and Chief Executive Dr. Derek Pooley of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority met with Commissioners. The purpose of their visit was to discuss decommissioning and radioactive waste, in preparation for their visit to Yucca Mountain and the Hanford facility.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE N

Region I
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Differing Professional View

Region I issued a recommendation to NRR to issue guidance for licensees on the reporting requirements for violations of the administrative section of Technical Specifications. This recommendation resulted from the Region's review of a Differing Professional View.

First Annual Radiation Safety Officer Counterpart Meeting

On October 8-9, 1996, the First Annual Radiation Safety Officer Counterpart Meeting was held at RI. Radiation Safety Officers from Regions I, II, III, IV, TTC, NMSS, and NRR met to exchange information and ideas about the radiation safety of NRC employees. Topics discussed included review of Management Directive 10.131, the various radiation safety programs at each Region and Headquarters' office, recent radiation safety events, radiation safety training, the NRC dosimetry program, and the Employee Exposure Database System. RI's Deputy Regional Administrator provided management's perspective and expectations of the Region I Radiation Safety Program. A RI Radiation Safety Committee representative discussed the role and benefits of the RI Radiation Safety Committee. A meeting summary report is being prepared and will be distributed to all participants and management.

Flood at INS Corporation's Springfield, MA Facility (Update)

On September 30, 1996, INS reported to RI that a valve to a commercial washer failed in the open position some time during the evening of September 28-29, resulting in up to 180,000 gallons of water flooding the nuclear laundry facility, a majority of the water entered a storm drain outside the loading dock that empties into an adjacent local pond (Dimmock Pond) owned by the City of Springfield. RI immediately dispatched an inspector to the facility on September 30 to take independent samples and monitor licensee activities. The inspector's independent measurements and Region I laboratory analysis of samples of water and/or sediment from Dimmock Pond and from the storm drain did not identify radioactivity levels above NRC free release limits. Results of samples and measurements in the facility did not reveal contamination above NRC allowable limits.

From October 7 through 9, 1996, the licensee performed additional water and sediment sampling at Dimmock Pond. The sample locations were based on a sampling plan approved by the NRC and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Both RI and the Commonwealth had inspectors present during the sampling. The NRC, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the licensee received split samples and each will perform analyses. The sampling of the pond was also observed by a representative from the City of Springfield.

Region II
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Florida Power Corporation - Crystal River Extended Shutdown

On October 4, 1996, the licensee notified the NRC that an extended shutdown (initially thought to be two to three months) was being initiated in order to accomplish modifications necessary to increase design safety margins. These modifications (not yet defined) could affect several safety systems. The plant had originally shutdown on September 2, 1996 due to a problem with the turbine lube oil system. The outage was extended to resolve potential unreviewed safety questions concerning emergency diesel generator loading and emergency feedwater starting logic. On October 1, 1996, the licensee identified a single failure vulnerability that could render the emergency feedwater system inoperable. A meeting with the licensee is being scheduled for the licensee to present further details of their outage modification plans.

Florida Power and Light Company - Turkey Point

On October 10, the Regional Administrator and other members of the Region II staff were at the Florida Power and Light Company's Turkey Point facility to present the results of the latest SALP. Following the SALP presentation, a public meeting with local officials was conducted.

Radioactive Sources at Herman Strauss Industries Scrap Yard

On October 4, 1996, Herman Strauss Industries, Wheeling, West Virginia, informed Region II that a radiation monitor had alarmed at the scrap yard and their staff had identified two sources reading greater than 2 rads per hour. The sources had been placed in lead in locked storage. Initially the sources were thought to be medical brachytherapy sources, and a radiologist and physicist from a local hospital (who had inventoried their sources and knew the sources were not theirs), responded to the scrap yard and did confirmatory surveys and verified the sources were in shielded secure storage. An EPA representative, accompanied by a Region II radiation specialist, visited the scrap yard on October 7 and 8 to perform confirmatory surveys, verify safe storage, and evaluate potential exposures. Based on worker descriptions, the sources appeared to be from a gauge. On October 10, EPA contractors identified the sources to be radium. The EPA contractors plan to ship the sources for disposal.

Enforcement Discretion

On October 7, 1996, enforcement discretion letters were sent to four State of Florida licensees (Okaloosa Asphalt, Inc.; Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.; Bailly Engineering and Testing, Inc.; and Larry M. Jacobs, Inc.) who had used moisture/density gauges in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction in Florida without first obtaining an NRC license (for example by obtaining a general license by filing for reciprocity). These licensees had been unaware of the need to file for reciprocity. The State of Florida has recently sent letters

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE P

to their licensees informing them of the need to obtain an NRC license prior to work in Federal jurisdiction.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE P

Region III
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Commonwealth Edison Meeting -- Zion Nuclear Power Station

A management meeting was held in the Region III Office, Lisle, Illinois, on October 7, 1996, between NRC Region III senior managers and Commonwealth Edison Company senior managers. The meeting discussion focused on recent operational performance errors at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. Since the previous management meeting on September 6, 1996, numerous operational performance errors occurred at the Zion station. The operational errors were in the areas of: Unit 1 start-up; conduct of operations; and configuration control. NRC Region III meeting participants included Regional Administrator A. Bill Beach, Director of the Division of Reactor Safety Geoffrey Grant and Acting Director of the Division of Reactor Projects James Caldwell.

During the meeting, ComEd Site Vice President John H. Mueller and Zion Station Manager G.K. Schwartz, presented several initiatives to improve operations performance. The ComEd initiatives discussed included: changes in the management organization of operations; reviewing procedures; and increasing senior management presence in the field.

Management Changes Announced for LaSalle Nuclear Power Station

On October 11, 1996, Commonwealth Edison Company announced management changes for the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. The changes include: training and regulatory assurance functions will report directly to the Site Vice President William T. Subalusky, Jr.; Phil Hildebrandt will become Site Engineering Manager; and Tom Wise from the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, will become Site Quality Consultant and report directly to the Site Vice President.

Byron Nuclear Power Station

A public meeting between the NRC staff and Commonwealth Edison managers was held onsite on October 8, 1996, to discuss the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report. The NRC was represented by the Region III Regional Administrator A. Bill Beach, Region III Acting Director of the Division of Reactor Projects James Caldwell, Region III Director of the Division of Reactor Safety Geoffrey Grant, Headquarters Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project Director Robert Capra and Project Manager George Dick. Representatives from the utility include: ComEd's Chief Executive Officer James J. O'Connor; Chief Nuclear Operating Officer Harold Keiser; and Senior Vice President Thomas Maiman.

Prairie Island Nuclear Power Station

During the week of October 7, 1996, a fifth spent fuel dry cask was loaded at the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Station. The cask will be moved to an onsite concrete pad on October 16, 1996.

Predecisional Enforcement Conference with Centerior Service Company

On October 11, 1996, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region III Office between management representatives from Centerior Service Company and members of the NRC Region III staff. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the findings of an inspection conducted at the Perry Nuclear Power Station. Four apparent violations were discussed at the conference. Two of the apparent violations involve technical specification limiting condition for operation action requirements which were exceeded. The remaining two apparent violations involve corrective action issues.

Predecisional Enforcement Conference with Cleveland Clinic Foundation

On October 8, 1996, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region III Office between management representatives from Cleveland Clinic Foundation and members of the NRC Region III staff. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the findings of an inspection at the facility and an investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations. Three apparent violations were discussed at the conference. Two apparent violations pertain to the failure to implement annual refresher training for radiation workers from 1993 to 1996, and to perform an annual senior management audit in 1995. The third apparent violation pertains to failure to secure from unauthorized removal or limit access to licensed materials that were stored in unrestricted areas.

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE P

Region IV
Items of Interest
Week Ending October 11, 1996

Diablo Canyon Exercise and SALP Meeting

On October 9, 1996, a full scale emergency preparedness exercise involving Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), the NRC, other federal officials, and the state of California was conducted at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. On October 10, the Regional Administrator and other NRC staff met with PG&E officials at a public meeting in San Luis Obispo, California, to discuss the results of the recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP).

OCTOBER 11, 1996

ENCLOSURE P