

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2			
TITLE (4) Reactor Scram																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
									N/A				0 5 0 0 0				
0 6	0 9	8 5	8 5	0 2 7	0 0	0 7	0 3	8 5	N/A				0 5 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
N		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
NAME Mark Leahy (X-422)										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 2 9 2 0							
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC							
X	JIE	IHS	GLO	80	N												
A																	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO							
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																	
<p>During a normal unit shutdown, with the mode switch in startup/hot standby, a half Group 1 isolation alarm annunciated at the same time as the reactor pressure dropped below 850 psi. The cause of the <math>\frac{1}{2}</math> isolation was attributed to the failure of the reactor mode switch to make-up all contacts in the startup/hot standby mode. The isolation alarm signal was believed to be caused by steam line pressure less than 850 psi and some mode switch contacts still in the "run" position. The unit NSO attempted to clear the isolation signal by "jiggling" the mode switch to move these contacts from the "run" to "hot standby" position. This attempt resulted in additional contacts of the mode switch returning to the "run" position. With reactor pressure less than 850 psi, and at least two mode switch scram contacts in their "run" position, the MSIV's closed, leading to a reactor scram from 10 percent MSIV closure.</p> <p>The mode switch was checked for electrical and mechanical defects, and none were found. In order to prevent future occurrences of this type, an operating order will be written which will instruct the Operators on the proper actions to be taken if it is believed that not all of the mode switch contacts are in the correct position. The safety significance of this event is considered minimal, as the unit was shutting down, all safety systems operated as designed, and the event would not occur if the unit was at power operation. This was the first reportable occurrence of this type at Dresden Station.</p>																	
8507160286 850703 PDR ADOCK 05000237 S PDR I 222 1/1																	

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 5	— 0 2 7	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During a normal unit shutdown, with the mode switch in startup/hot standby, a half Group 1 isolation alarm annunciated at the same time as the reactor pressure dropped below 850 psi. The cause of the half isolation was attributed to the failure of the reactor mode switch to make-up all contacts in the startup/hot standby mode. The isolation alarm signal was believed to be caused by steam line pressure less than 850 psi and some mode switch contacts still in the "run" position. The unit NSO attempted to clear the isolation signal by "jiggling" the mode switch to move these contacts from the "run" to "hot standby" position. This attempt resulted in additional contacts of the mode switch returning to the "run" position. With reactor pressure less than 850 psi, and at least two mode switch scram contacts in their "run" position, the MSIV's closed, leading to a reactor scram from 10 percent MSIV closure.

The mode switch was checked for electrical and mechanical defects, and none were found. In order to prevent future occurrences of this type, an operating order will be written which will instruct the Operators on the proper actions to be taken if it is believed that not all of the mode switch contacts are in the correct position. The safety significance of this event is considered minimal, as the unit was shutting down, all safety systems operated as designed, and the event would not occur if the unit was at power operation. This was the first reportable occurrence of this type at Dresden Station.



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July 3, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-711

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #85-027-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).

D.J. Scott  
Station Manager  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III  
File/NRC  
File/Numerical

1522  
1/1