

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 1 6					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment Due To Failed Doorlock																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
									Browns Ferry - Unit 1				0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9			
0 4 2 5 8 5 8 5				0 1 2		0 0 0 5 2 4 8 5							0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
N		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0 10 10		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
R. C. Steele										AREA CODE						
										2 0 5		7 1 2 9 1 - 1 3 1 5 1 8 1 3				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD						
BC	J M	A L	X 9 9 9	N												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space type-written lines) (16)																
<p>Secondary containment was lost momentarily in three separate events due to personnel airlock door problems.</p> <p>a. The electric strike on unit 3 airlock door had a broken lever spring. The electric strike was replaced and the door returned to service.</p> <p>b. The electric strike was broken and the door closure needed adjustment on unit 1 personnel airlock door. The electric strike was replaced, and the door closure adjusted before returning the door to service.</p> <p>c. The permissive limit switch on unit 1 personnel airlock door, same as b above, needed adjustment. The limit switch was adjusted before returning the door to service.</p> <p>The above listed problems are not related and are considered random failures with no recurrence control required.</p>																

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 8 5	-	0 1 2	-	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Unit 1 was in cold shutdown, unit 2 was in a refueling outage, and unit 3 was in cold shutdown.

On April 25, 1985, a momentary loss of secondary containment (JM) occurred on unit 3. The assistant unit operator noticed that door (DR) 249 (personnel airlock door in unit 3 reactor building) did not interlock with door (DR) 248 (personnel airlock door in unit 3 turbine building). The assistant unit operator closed the door and notified the unit operator who immediately posted a doorwatch. Investigation revealed that door 248 and 249 failed to interlock due to a broken lever spring in the electric strike of door 249. The function of the lever spring is to apply pressure on the electric strike lever to allow the lever and solenoid to engage, locking the door. The failed strike was replaced, and the interlocks between door (DR) 249 and 248 were functionally checked satisfactory the same day.

On May 7, 1985, a second momentary loss of secondary containment occurred on unit 1 when door (DR) 221 (personnel airlock in unit 1 reactor building) was observed not to lock properly. The shift engineer immediately posted a doorwatch upon notification. The investigation revealed that a broken strike, and a misadjusted door closure were the cause of the malfunction. The electric strike holds the door latch in place to keep the door locked. The door closure automatically closes the door after it has been opened. The broken strike was replaced, and the door closure adjusted on door 221. The door was functionally checked satisfactory before being placed back in service in less than five hours from the start of the event.

On May 9, 1985, a third momentary loss of secondary containment occurred on unit 1 when assistant unit operator observed door (DR) 221 (personnel airlock door in unit 1 reactor building) and door (DR) 235 (personnel airlock door in unit 1 and 2 turbine building) could be simultaneously opened. The assistant unit operator notified the shift engineer who immediately posted a doorwatch. The inspection revealed that the permissive limit switch needed adjusting. The limit switch was being activated before the door latch was completely inside the strike. The limit switch was adjusted and the locking of the door functionally checked satisfactory during the same shift. The misadjusted permissive limit switch was replaced with an internal limit switch in the electric strike on May 18, 1985, as a temporary measure. The internal limit switch will ensure the proper alignment of the door latch and the electric strike before releasing the interlock between the inboard and outboard airlock doors. The permanent measures will be completed as outlined in LER 50-260/82028 R4 dated December 5, 1984.

The momentary loss of secondary containment due to the opening of the personnel airlock doors is not considered to have significant safety implications on the availability of the containment isolation system.

All three of these events are different in nature, occurred at different times, and are considered to be random in nature, and no further action is required.

Responsible Plant Section - N/A

Previous Events - BPRO-50-259/82088; 50-260/82028; 50-260/81024; 50-260/81025

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

P. O. Box 2000

Decatur, Alabama 35602

May 24, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 3 -
DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/85012

The enclosed report provides details concerning the momentary loss of
secondary containment due to failed doorlock. This report is submitted
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



G. T. Jones
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Resident Inspector, BFN