U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-373/85013(DRS); 50-374/85013(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL

Inspection Conducted: April 23-25, 1985

Inspectors: K. Tani for Z. Falevits — Date: 05/21/85

K. Tani — Date: 05/21/85

Approved By: C. C. Williams, Chief, Plant Systems Section — Date: 5/21/85

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 23-25, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-373/85013(DRS); 50-374/85013(DRS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings, 50.55(e) and IE Bulletins, review of motor rewinding modification and independent inspection. The inspection involved a total of 40 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 4 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected 4 violations were identified (Failure to assure that HVAC safety-related Temperature Indicator Controllers are set to specified and calibrated values, paragraph 3.a); (Inadequate implementation of procedures, paragraphs 3c and 3d); (Records not available to indicate the replacement of safety-related relays, paragraph 2.g.(a)-(d)); and (Safety-related work was performed and QC inspected by same individual paragraph 2.g.(e)).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*G. J. Diederich, Station Manager
*R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent
*W. R. Huntington, Technical Staff Supervisor
*D. A. Spencer, Technical Staff Engineer
*M. A. Cray, Instrument Maintenance
*R. M. Jeisy, Station QA Supervisor
*G. L. Cooper, Instrument Maintenance SOS
*R. L. Bare, QA Inspector
*D. S. Berkman, Operating Engineer
*R. M. Clark, QA Supervisor

In addition to the above, other licensee and contractor personnel were contacted during this inspection.

*Denotes the persons who attended the exit meeting on April 25, 1985.

2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (374/84004-01): This item addressed logic diagrams not reflecting design shown on schematic diagrams due to the fact that the logic diagrams had not been updated to reflect the latest design modifications made to the electrical schematic diagrams.

The licensee informed the inspector that rather than updating the logic diagrams, they would be removed from the FSAR, and that all logic diagrams will be reissued to include the following note: "for information only, not to be used for construction and/or operation." This action was scheduled to be accomplished by May 1, 1984. The inspector selected a random sample of logic diagrams to review the licensee's commitment. Of five drawings reviewed four contained the required note. One drawing did not contain the note drawing M5444 Sheet 2 Revision A. The licensee indicated that in this occurrence appears to be an isolated case, and that it will be investigated to preclude recurrence. Also see Section 3.d. of this report pertaining to this issue. This item is considered closed.

b. (Closed) Noncompliance (374/84004-02B): This item addressed nonconforming workmanship identified on safety-related HVAC panels and drawings.

The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the licensee to resolve the deficiencies previously identified by the inspector as follows:

(1) The jumper between terminal block (TB) Point (pt.) 29 and pt. 31 on panel 2PL33J was added to drawing 1E-2-4505AB Revision D.

(2) Interna' Jumper TB pt. 37 to pt. 38 is size No. 14 while incoming cable conductors are size No. 16 contrary to procedure-LEP GM, Revision 1. The use of a No. 14 conductor was analyzed by the licensee and was found to be acceptable.

(3) Indicating control light arrangements on drawings 1E-2-4497AA-AD and 1E-2-4498AA-AD do not conform to the installed arrangement of light color codes on panels. The licensee indicated that the light colors installed reflect the "Green Board" concept, showing the normal operating status of the equipment involved. It is LaSalle's station policy not to change either the wiring diagrams or schematics indicating light color to reflect the Green Board concept.

The licensee had committed to:

(a) Incorporate cautions into administrative procedures stating that the colors of installed indicating lights have been changed to indicate the Green Board concept and may not match the colors shown on drawings.

(b) Revise administrative procedures governing modifications, work requests, and post maintenance testing to include the cautions as necessary.

(c) The annual operator training module and station retraining programs will include the Green Board concept and the resulting deviation from control light arrangements shown on the drawings.

(d) The above commitments are applicable to any CECo Nuclear Generating Station which elects to implement the Green Board concept.

(4) Contacts on relay 27/2PL25J were found by the licensee to be dusty not rusted. This relay has been cleaned and also correctly labeled.

The NRC inspector reviewed selected corrective actions, including a visual inspection, in the plant to verify those actions taken by the licensee to resolve the deficiencies identified by the NRC in the HVAC panels. These actions were found to be adequate.

This item is considered closed.

c. (Closed) Open Item (374/84004-04): This item addressed deficiencies identified by the NRC on installed components in HVAC safety related panels.

The inspector conducted an inspection to visually observe the corrective action taken by the licensee to resolve the identified deficiencies. The following were inspected:

(1) Sensing lines to device 2PDI-VY026 in panel 2PL32J were reconnected.

(2) Segregation codes for cables 2VY035 and 2VY036 were changed on drawing 1E-2-4505AF from 2YC (DIV I) to 2BC (DIV II).

(3) Cable 2VY035 in panel 2PL74J was redesignated as 2VY083.

(4) Bottom of panel 2PL73J was cleaned (Rust removed) and repainted.

(5) Alarm horns were reconnected in panels 2PL24J and 2PL25J.

Corrective action was complete and adequate. This item is considered closed.

d. (Closed) Noncompliance (373/84007-01A; 374/84008-01A): This item concerned butt splices used to extend safety related control and instrumentation conductors. The inspector identified several butt splices which were made using the wrong crimping tools and did not appear to be acceptable. Furthermore, the inspector identified nicks/cuts on individual conductor insulation of multiconductor cables. The NRC required that the licensee perform an initial sample inspection to assess the scope of the problem pertaining to Unit 1 safety-related switchgear and Motor Control Center panels. This inspection previously identified 110 butt splices which were not documented or QC inspected. Of the 110 identified butt splices, sixteen were found unacceptable. Based on these results, the NRC required an expanded inspection to include the remaining safety-related Panels, Penetrations, Switchgears and Motor Control Centers in Units 1 and 2. The results were as follows:

Unit	Number of Safety Related Splices Inspected	Failed Visual Inspection	Failed Pull Test	Splices Replaced
0 & 1	762	190	33	190
2	526	140	25	140
TOTAL	1288	330	58	330

During the 1984 (373/84007) inspection effort, the NRC inspection team reviewed and observed the licensee activities pertaining to this issue, including procedural development, inspections, training, pull test, and rework. During this inspection the inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis and evaluation for safety significance (CECo - DVR 1-1-84-108 dated March 29, 1984). This report concluded "that the health and safety of the public was not affected due to the remote possibility of failure occurring and the availability of other ECCS systems." Additionally, the inspector reviewed the related Work Request WRL 34818 and LER 84-018 and applicable procedures LEP-GW-113, Revision 2 and WI500, Revision 10. These reviews and inspections revealed that the corrective actions were complete and acceptable. This item is considered closed.

e. (Closed) Noncompliance (373/84007-01B; 374/84008-01B): This item concerned the lack of documentation to identify the location of safety-related splices of individual conductors and the lack of the serial number of the crimping tools utilized.

The licensee performed a comprehensive reinspection program subsequent to the NRC findings for all safety-related splices. The licensee's program included appropriate acceptance criteria the requirements to perform pull test for each safety-related splice, including documenting the location of all butt splices. These activities were closely monitored by the NRC inspection team and were found to be acceptable. This item is considered closed.

f. (Closed) Open Item (373;374/81006-EE): It was previously identified by General Electric, that during an accident the temperature of the dry-well increases to 340°F. At this temperature there is inadequate voltage to actuate Crosby SRV solenoids.

During this inspection period, the NRC inspector reviewed the Licensee's corrective actions for addressing this deficiency. The NRC inspector reviewed LaSalle Unit No. 1 modification sheet No. M-1-1-82-059 dated May 11, 1982, and Work Request No. L15646 dated May 14, 1982. Both documents required that all 18 solenoids on the 18 SRV for Unit No. 1 be replaced with redesigned and environmentally qualified Crosby IMF-2 solenoids per GE Field Deviation Instruction (FDI) No. 138-57434. The modification sheet and work request indicated further that the replacement of the solenoids was completed on May 19, 1982.

The NRC inspector also reviewed work records for LaSalle Unit No. 2 SRV solenoid replacement. Action Item Record No. 1-82-243 dated April 29, 1982, indicated that replacement of the 18 solenoids with the redesigned and environmentally qualified Crosby IMF-2 Solenoids per GE FDI No. 138-57434 was completed on February 29, 1984.

Based on the satisfactory review of the above records that was presented to the NRC inspector this item is considered closed.

g. (Open) Open Item (373;374/84002-BB): It was previously identified in an IE bulletin No. 84-02 that GE type HFA relays in use in class IE safety systems were subject to failures.

The NRC inspector reviewed the following records and associated documentation:

(1) IE Bulletin No. 84-02 dated March 12, 1984 (Failures of GE Type HFA Relays in use in class IE safety systems).

(2) Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 44 and succeeding supplements from GE to all end users of type HFA relays, instructing end users to replace coils that are manufactured of Nylon or Lexan materials with Century series environmentally and seismically qualified coils.

(3) Procedure No. LSCS-1, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1981 (HFA Relay Magnetic Assembly Replacement).

(4) A letter from Mr. William Wright of GE installation and service engineering division to Mr. Walt Groszko of CECo Project Construction-LaSalle dated October 15, 1981 (Subject: Cracked relay coil of relay No. 1427-AP040X1).

(5) Traveller No. A-LS-1, Revision 1, dated October 14, 1981.

The results of the review by the NRC inspector are outlined below:

(a) The reviewed documents and records indicated that the licensee received notifications and procedures for the replacement of the type HFA relay coils manufactured with Nylon and Lexan materials in 1980 and 1982 in service information letter No. 44, SAL 152.2, and SAL 152.2A that GE sent to all end users of type HFA relays. The licensee was also informed by the NRC of the potential deficiencies related to the GE type HFA relay in NRC Information Notices 81-01 and 82-13 and in IE Bulletin 76-02.

(b) The licensee started their review and replacement of GE type HFA relay coil in October of 1981. The licensee's records and documents indicated that 80 GE type HFA relays were identified by the Licensee as having Nylon/Lexan coil materials used in safety systems of LaSalle's Unit Nos. 1 and 2.

(c) The licensee's records and documents indicated that 76 of the 80 identified relay coils were replaced with the recommended Century Series that were environmentally and seismically qualified. These coils were Calibrated and tested per Procedure No. LSCS-1, Revision 1, dated October 14, 1981.

(d) The licensee decided not to replace four (4) 48VDC relays (Relay Nos. 1427-AP037X1, 1427-AP040X1, 2427-AP037X1 and 2427-AP040X1) used for undervoltage detection and load shedding in the ESS 4160V switchgear No. 141Y, 142Y, 241Y and 242Y. There was no indication that the licensee's disposition of "use-as-is" for the four relays was documented.

Further, the verbal reason given by the licensee for the "use-as-is" disposition was that the four relays were not normally energized. This is an inadequate basis since IE Bulletin No. 84-02, on page 2 of 6, paragraph 3, under the subheading "Background" states the following with regards to normally de-energized type HFA relay coils with Nylon/Lexan materials. "....At that time, the relay

coil of the HFA relay was wound on Nylon spools. Winding failures occurred because of a moisture/halogens problem and affected mostly dc-excited normally de-energized relays. GE recommended replacing the Nylon coil spool with one made of Lexan material. Subsequently, the Lexan coils exhibited extensive cracking which is considered a major precursor to the current HFA relay failures."

Page 5 of 6, paragraph 2(b)(4) also states the following with regard to licensees who decided to use type HFA relays with Nylon/Lexan materials in other systems; note--not class IE Safety Systems: "If your plant uses or plans to continue to use the Nylon or Lexan-type HFA relay in the systems other than those safety-related applications defined in this bulletin, then the appropriate administrative controls dealing with maintenance, storage, and handling of spare parts at your facility must be revised to ensure that the older and problematic HFA relay coils are not inadvertently used as a replacement part in safety-related applications in future maintenance efforts at your facility(ies)."

There were no records to indicate, during this inspection period, that the licensee had such controls to prevent inadvertent use of older HFA relays in Safety Systems. Since the licensee decided not to replace the four subject relay coils with Century Series coils, the IE Bulletin No. 84-02, requires the following: "However, the licensee is responsible for determining that all safety grade equipment in the plant, including relays, is qualified for its intended service. That is, the licensee must establish and document that the service life and reliability of the relay is acceptable, and that the relays have been qualified for the environmental and seismic conditions that this equipment may encounter at its installed location in the plant."

During this inspection period, there were no records to indicate that the four subject relays that the licensee dispositioned as "use-as-is" were qualified environmentally and seismically for their application. Further, there were no records to indicate that the licensee has established and documented that the service life and reliability of the four relays were acceptable.

The observations made and discussed in d. above are considered Open Item (373/85013-01; 374/85013-01 (DRS)) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

(e) During the implementation of traveller No. A-LS-1, Revision 1, dated October 14, 1981, it was observed by the individual who was performing the HFA relay coil replacement, that one of the four relays that the licensee decided not to replace had a cracked coil (the licensee

indicated that the 4-48VDC relay coils are made of Lexan material and are normally de-energized). The relay with the cracked coil was identified as relay No. 1427-AP040X1. This deficiency was documented in a letter dated October 15, 1981, from Mr. William Wright (GE Installation and Service Engineering Division) to Mr. Walt Groszko (CECo-Project Construction-LaSalle). Mr. William Wright recommended that the cracked relay coil be replaced.

There are no records to indicate that the subject cracked relay coil was replaced by the licensee.

The observations made and discussed in e. above are contrary and are in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 17, which states in part "....sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality....Inspection and test records shall, as a minimum:

1. Identify the inspector or data recorder,

2. The type of observation,

3. The results,

4. The acceptability, and

5. The action taken in connection with any deficiencies noted. Records shall be identifiable and retrievable."

This is considered an item of noncompliance (373/85013-02; 374/85013-02(DRS)).

(f) A review of Procedure No. LSCS-1, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1981, (HFA Relay Magnetic Assembly Replacement) indicated that one of the acceptance criteria for the HFA relay replacement was that the QC organization shall perform 100% inspection of the coil replacement, calibration and testing. Contrary to the above the NRC inspector observed during a review of traveller No. A-LS-1, Revision 1, dated October 14, 1981, that the same individual (William Wright - GE Installation and Service Engineering Division) who performed the HFA relay coil replacement, calibration and testing also performed the required QC inspection.

The observations made and discussed in f. above are contrary to and in violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 10, which states in part "....such inspection shall be performed by individuals other than those who performed the activity being inspected."

This is considered an item of noncompliance (373/85013-03; 374/85013-03(DRS)).

(g) The licensee concurred with the NRC inspector with regards to the findings discussed in paragraph 2.g of this report. Based on these findings Item 373/84002-BB; 374/84002-BB remains open.

3. Independent Inspection

Review and Observation of Installed Component

a. During the inspector's review of licensee corrective action on previously identified deficiencies in the HVAC panels the inspector observed that safety-related Temperature Indicator Controllers (TIC) were not set to the specified setting as required on the engineering data sheets. Further investigation and review of latest applicable calibration sheets indicated that the TIC's were calibrated as per the requirements of the engineering data sheets. However, subsequently plant personnel had changed the set points on the TIC's without documenting the changes. These TIC's are used to control safety-related dampers, fans, or provide temperature indications and alarms for safety-related equipment located in the Auxiliary and Turbine buildings.

The following specific observations were made by the inspector:

Instrument Number	Separation Division	Service	Temp. Set Point as Specified By Eng. Data Sheets, and Calibration/ Test Reports	TIC's Set Point As Found in Field At Time of Inspection	Room Temp At Time of Inspection
2TIC-VD003	ESS 3	Diesel Generator (D.G.) room 2E22S001 dampers 2VD01YA, B & 2VD0ZYA, B (Panel 2PL24J)	70°F	89°F	90°F
2TIC-VD005	ESS 3	D.G. room 2E22S001 temp. ind. & alarm (Panel 2PL24J)	130°F	110°F	89°F
2TCU-VD008	ESS 2	D.G. room 2DG01K dampers 2VD09YA,B & 2VD010YA, B (Panel 2PL25J)	70°F ± 5°F	78°F	86°F

Instrument Number	Separation Division	Service	Temp. Set Point as Specified By Eng. Data Sheets, and Calibration/ Test Reports	TIC's Set Point As Found in Field At Time of Inspection	Room Temp At Time of Inspection
2TIC-VD010	ESS 2	D.G. room 2DG01K temp. ind. & alarm (Panel 2PL25J)	130°F	116°F	92°F
2TCU-VD013	ESS 3	D.G. room 2DG01P dampers 2VD17Y & 2V0184 (Panel 2PL24J)	70°F ± 5°F	78°F	82°F
2TIC-VD01S	ESS 3	D.G. room 2DG01P temp. ind. & alarm (Panel 2PL24J)	130°F	78°F	82°F
2TCU-VY023	ESS 1	RHR Service Water Pumps A & B Temp. Cont. Dampers (Panel 2PL73J)	104°F	78°F	83°F

The inspector also identified the following deficiencies:

(1) Alarm window on panel 2PL24J indicating "D.G. Room Vent Return Air to Fan 2VD07C Temp Hi" was observed to be lit. No work request tag or other deficiency tag could be found.

(2) Press Differential Indicator 2PDI-VD014 on panel 2PL24J was observed to be indicating outside of its upper limit (Range was 0-1" H_2O) indicator indicated above the 1" mark all the way to the extreme right.

(3) Damper 2TZ-VY024B electric position motor was removed, dampers were wired open. No work request or other deficiency tag could be found.

The inspector was accompanied by a licensee's representative who observed the inspector's findings noted above on April 24, 1985. Subsequently, on April 25, 1985, the same findings were again noted by the inspector and licensee's engineer. None of these conditions were corrected or identified by the licensee's plant operators.

b. The inspector reviewed Auxiliary and Turbine Building Round sheets, document ID 0028d, used by the operator during his rounds to inspect plant equipment. These rounds are required to be performed three times a day.

(1) Page 1, paragraph 5.a. states: "Check alarms and lights." Paragraph 5.b. states: "Check controls are in proper position and systems are within operating parameters."

(2) Page 2, paragraph C.1 states: "If abnormal conditions exist:

(a) Inform Foreman and Unit NSO.
(b) Note in comments abnormal events for elevations, time, date and initial."

(3) Page 4 states: "Check HPCS D/G room SWGR room and pump room vent system control panel 2PL25J that all points are within normal limits."

Also, "check CSCS equipment cooling system control panel 2PL73J that all points are within normal limits."

It appears that none of the above requirements were implemented by the operator performing the inspection rounds. Furthermore, it could not be established who changed the settings on the TICs.

Technical Specifications 6.2.A require in part, that detailed written procedures shall be adhered to for applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Included in Appendix A, Section 3.0 of this Regulatory Guide are typical safety-related activities that should be covered by written procedures including Auxiliary or Reactor Building HVAC systems.

The inspector informed the licensee that the items identified in a. and b. above are considered to be an item of noncompliance contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.2.A. (374/85013-04(DRS)).

c. The inspector reviewed CECo lifted lead procedure LAP-240-6, Revision 6, and selected four lifted leads, located in local HVAC panels, which were lifted and tagged to ascertain licensee adherence to the procedure. Three of the four lifted leads were observed to be properly controlled. The fourth lead No. LL130, located in cabinet 2PL74J, associated with Work Request WRL46560, relating to RHR Service Water Pumps Room Dampers, was observed to be lifted from the termination point while Temporary System Change Log, Attachment A of LAP-240-6, Revision 6, indicated by the shift engineer's date entry, that the lead had been restored on April 4, 1985. Procedure LAP-240-6, Revision 6, Page 5 indicates that when a temporary change is no longer required the initiator:

(1) Obtains authorization to restore the system to normal configuration from the shift engineer.

(2) Restores the system to normal.

(3) Obtains independent verification of restoration.

(4) Documents the system restoration and verification by obtaining the "Restored by" and "Verified by" signatures and initials.
(5) Notifies Shift Engineer when completed.

It appears that none of the above was accomplished for lifted lead No. LL130 even though it was designated as "restored to normal" by the Shift Engineer.

d. The inspector reviewed licensee corrective action pertaining to inconsistencies previously identified between logic block diagrams and schematic diagrams. It appears that the logic diagrams had not been updated to reflect the latest design. Subsequently, the licensee had committed to remove all logic diagrams from the FSAR and stamp all logic diagrams as follows "For Information Only Not To Be Used For Construction and/or Operation."

A review of the five randomly selected logic diagrams from CECo central files indicated that four drawings were properly stamped. One drawing, M-5444, Sheet 2 of 2 dated June 15, 1977, did not contain the caution stamp as required (Note: the same drawing M-5444, Sheet 2 of 2 had been the subject of a previously identified item of noncompliance 374/84004-02A; also see Section 2.a. of this report).

The inspector informed the licensee that items 3.c and 3.d are considered to be an examples of an item of noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (374/85013-05(DRS)).

4. Review of Diesel Generator "1A" Cooling Water Pump Motor Rewinding Modification

The inspector reviewed Diesel Generator 1A Cooling Water motor repair which was performed by McGraw-Edison Service Facility on March 31, 1985. The safety-related motor was determined to have had a turn to turn short which caused the motor failure. It was determined by CECo that the McGraw-Edison Service Facility did not have an approved QA program. The licensee conducted a source inspection of the repair and initiated QCS Report No. 850015 dated April 1, 1985, documenting the process. Originally the motor insulation was classified as "RH", the licensee elected to reduce it to "H" to expedite the repair process. The licensee indicated that "H" insulation is sufficient.

The following concerns were raised by the inspector:

a. The cause of the motor failure was not determined. (There are 15 similar type safety-related motors currently in use at LaSalle Units 1 and 2.)

b. Attachment 3 to QCS Report No. 850015 utilized during vendor testing of the motor did not contain acceptance criteria.

c. Paragraph 1 of QCS Report No. 850015 states "The material used was suitable for Class "H" insulation level." No specific material type is given.

d. Paragraph 2 of QCS Report No. 850015 states "The stator was dipped in epoxy, and baked in the oven overnight. The dipping and baking process was not observed." Due to the lack of the approved QA program of McGraw-Edison, the inspector believes that this activity should have been witnessed by CECo QA.

e. CECo document EM-20031, repair Of 460V Induction Motors, Section 3.5 requires that the temperature rise of any rewound stator winding shall not exceed the limits for Class B per NEMA MG1-12.42. No evidence could be located that this requirement was accomplished. Section 6.2 states "no load measurements of current, power and nominal speed at rated voltage and frequency shall be conducted on all repaired motors following re-assembly." Additionally, Work Request L47854 instructions require "Obtain no load and full load current readings." Motor test data sheet, Attachment A LEP-GM-102 dated April 2, 1985, did not contain any current readings for testing the motor unloaded.

f. Motor test data sheet LEP-GM-102, dated April 2, 1985, did not contain megger volt setting and M(OHM) scale used during the test.

g. Temperature readings were not taken on motor windings during the tests.

h. A similar motor, on DG "0" had its insulation fail in the past. Since there are 15 additional such motors currently in use at LaSalle Units 1 and 2 plants, the inspector is concerned as to what preventative maintenance steps will be taken by CECo to prevent recurrence.

This item is considered unresolved pending further review (373/85013-04(DRS)).

5. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 2.g.(5)(f).

6. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 4.

7. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 25, 1985. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the information. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.