NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
STANDBY GAS TREATMENT AUTO INITIATION DUE TO INCORRECT RESTART OF BATTERY CHARGER

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	2 4	8 5	8 5	0 1 1		0 5	2 1	8 5	E. I. Hatch, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	9 1 2 3 6 7 - 7 8 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 04/24/85 at approximately 0500 CST, Unit 1 was in steady-state operation at 2423 MWt (approximately 100% power) and Unit 2 was in refuel with no fuel in the vessel when the "A" train of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Systems for each unit started. This ESF actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence, thus, this event is reportable per the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Each "A" train of SBGT was returned to normal status immediately. The battery charger was correctly placed in service later the same day.

This actuation was due to inadequate special instructions which failed to give detailed instructions for returning a battery charger to service.

These special instructions were for one time use; hence, corrective action to prevent recurrence is not required.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1	8 5	0 1 1	0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 04/24/85 at approximately 0500 CST, with Unit 1 in steady-state operation at 2423 MWt (approximately 100% power) and with Unit 2 in refuel with no fuel in the vessel, and following replacement of some cells of the "2A" station service battery (2R42-S001A), non-licensed operations personnel were placing the "2A" station service battery charger (2R42-S026) into service. During this operation, the charger's AC supply breaker tripped when the charger was turned on and immediately connected to its output load.

This attempt to place the charger in service resulted in a low voltage dip on the charger's AC power supply due to the high current drawn when the "2A" battery charger tried to start and assume its output load at the same time. This low voltage dip in the supply power momentarily de-energized the "A" train SBGT relay for each unit (this AC supply power is common to the normally energized relay which de-energizes to start the "A" train of SBGT for each unit, and activates the High Radiation Refueling Floor alarm in the control room). Thus, on 04/24/85 at approximately 0500 CST, the "A" train of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Systems for each unit started.

There was no effect on plant safety since the trains only initiated, and they were returned to normal status immediately. The battery charger was correctly started later the same day.

This ESF actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence, thus, this event is reportable per the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Plant personnel initially thought that the refueling floor Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) (either 2D11-K609A & B or 2D11-K611A & B) had spiked up-scale and actuated the "A" train of SBGT for each unit by de-energizing the respective normally energized relays. However, investigation showed that the refueling floor ARMs had not actuated.

The root cause of this event was inadequate special instructions. Special instructions were written for "2A" station service battery cell replacement and "2B" station service battery replacement to ensure the Division 1 and Division 2 busses remained energized during battery and cell replacement. However, the instructions did not give specific enough instructions for returning the "2A" charger and batteries to service; the instructions should have referenced the "125/250 VDC STATION SERVICE CHARGER ROTATION AND BREAKER RACKING" procedure (HNP-2-1660).

These special instructions were for one time use; hence, corrective action to prevent recurrence is not required.

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Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

May 21, 1985
GM-84-492

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1985-11. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

for H. C. Nix
General Manager

HCN/TLE/vlt

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