

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)  
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANTDOCKET NUMBER (2)  
0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 OF 0 3TITLE (4)  
Reactor Scram from False High Steam Flow IsolationEVENT DATE (5)  
MONTH DAY YEAR  
0 6 1 0 8 5 8 5  
LER NUMBER (6)  
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER  
0 1 7 0 0  
REPORT DATE (7)  
MONTH DAY YEAR  
0 6 2 8 8 5  
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)  
FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)  
0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0OPERATING MODE (9) N  
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 2 9  
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)  
20.402(h) 20.405(e) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)  
20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(e)  
20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)  
20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)  
20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)  
20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)  
NAME Roger A. Locy  
Waste Management General Supervisor  
TELEPHONE NUMBER  
AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 2 - 3 8 4 0COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)  
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE  
TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDSSUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)  
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO  
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)  
MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A reactor scram occurred from 29 percent power at 1600 June 10, 1985 due to Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure while in the Run Mode. The MSIV closure was caused by an improper valve line-up on steam flow instrumentation, which had been turned over to contract maintenance personnel to correct an improper installation of a modification required to correct an as-built drawing error. The piping error placed the plant on a 12 hour LCO. In the rush to complete the piping correction within the 12 hour time frame, the steam flow instrument was isolated by Operations personnel, but the piping was not equalized and drained. Contract maintenance personnel opened the piping drain valve, causing a false high steam flow signal, which initiated a MSIV closure and subsequently the scram.

Scram procedures were carried out and the plant was placed in a stable condition. Operations personnel have been re-instructed to give every item the attention and time required to perform the evolution correctly.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 8 5 — 0 1 7 — 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A reactor scram occurred from approximately 29 percent of rated power at 1600 June 10, 1985 due to Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) closure while in the Run Mode. The MSIV closure was caused by an incomplete valve line-up on Primary Containment Isolation System steam flow instruments, which were being worked by contract maintenance.

During the 1985 refueling outage, an Analog Transmitter Trip System modification was installed. Investigation revealed that the modification was installed correctly per engineering drawings; however, a piping verification performed during a maintenance outage June 4, confirmed that the modification was engineered using as-built drawings that did not reflect a change believed to have been made during initial construction, i.e.: the main steam flow instrumentation piping for A and B steam lines were reversed inside the drywell. After the outage, during operation, it was noted while cycling MSIV's, that shutting the A MSIV caused a decrease in B steam line flow indication and vice versa. A safety analysis was performed which verified all required trips were available and that proper PCIS and Reactor Protection System divisional separation existed during the time the plant operated with this condition. During the June 4th outage the instrument piping was swapped outside the drywell, however, after starting up again, the B steam flow indication was driving downscale. Investigation revealed that the piping was swapped incorrectly. The B instrument high and low pressure sensing lines had been reversed, resulting in a loss of B steam line high flow isolation in the A1 and B1 logic channels. The loss of these channels placed the plant in a 12 hour LCO to either restore the channels or close the MSIV. The decision was made to isolate the instruments and correct the problem within the 12 hour limit. During the rush to support contract maintenance, Operations personnel failed to properly equalize and drain the instrument lines prior to turning the equipment over for modification. Contract maintenance personnel opened the low pressure sensing line drain in preparation for cutting the tubing to be swapped. This caused a false high steam flow signal, which initiated a MSIV closure and subsequent scram.

All systems required to automatically operate during the scram operated normally. Scram recovery procedures were implemented and the plant was placed in a stable condition. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System was manually initiated, but the turbine tripped on overspeed. Investigation by Instrument & Control personnel revealed a loose wire on the ramp generator section of the speed control circuit. The circuit was repaired and RCIC was tested to verify system operability.

A critique was held on June 11th which identified the contributing factors, which led to the scram to be as follows:

1. The job was assembled so fast that the people involved missed the point of draining the instruments and the possible trip from improper draining.
2. Because of the number of critical evolutions taking place at the time, insufficient time was given to the isolation of the instruments and review of the protective tagging request.

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3. I&C personnel are usually used to isolate instruments. In this case, due to speed or oversight, Operations personnel valved out the instruments. Operations failed to equalize the instrument when performing the isolation.
4. The instruments were requested to be isolated. But, clearly knowing the scope of the work, Operations would normally isolate and drain a system to be re-piped or cut into. Additionally, Operations personnel mistakenly understood that I&C had jumpered the steam flow instrument to prevent inadvertant trips.
5. Contract maintenance personnel operated instrument valves, realizing cutting this line without draining would have caused the same result. Possibly requesting it drained may have made someone realize that proper valving had not been performed.

## Corrective Actions include the following:

1. Until Operations personnel receive thorough training in the proper sequence of valve operations for the valving out (or in) of the various types of plant instruments, I&C personnel will perform instrument valving evolutions.
2. Operations Department Supervisors were reminded that every item must be given the attention it requires. If too many evolutions are occurring at the same time, some items must be held off until adequate attention can be given to that evolution.
3. Contract maintenance personnel have been reminded they are not to operate valves unless given permission from the Shift Supervisor.

James A. FitzPatrick  
Nuclear Power Plant  
P.O. Box 41  
Lycoming, New York 13093  
315 342.3840



Harold A. Glovier  
Resident Manager

June 28, 1985  
JAFF-85-0560

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

REFERENCE: DOCKET NO. 50-333 Licensee Event Report: 85-017-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find the referenced Licensee Event Report in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Roger A. Locy at (315) 342-3840, Extension 303.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "HAG", written over the printed name "HAROLD A. GLOVIER".

HAROLD A. GLOVIER

HAG:DJE:all

Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I (1)  
INPO Records Center, Atlanta, Georgia (1)  
Internal Power Authority Distribution  
American Nuclear Insurers (1)  
NRC Resident Inspector  
Document Control Center  
LER/OR File

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